


DoD Safety Evaluation

IG Project D2005-DIPOE2-0051



Department of Defense
Office of Inspector General
Inspections & Evaluations

DoD's Opportunity to Get It



Wm Brem Morrison
Assistant Inspector General
for Inspections and Evaluations

DoD Safety & Health Forum
October 16, 2007

Evaluation of DoD Safety *Overview*

Why the Inspector General?

Why evaluate the safety program?

Process

Current condition

- Culture
- Resourcing
- Organization
- Policy

Essential Questions



Why the Inspector General?

**Title 5 - Appendix, U.S. Code
“The IG Act of 1978” as amended**

Statutory Inspector General


- Transparent, objective and independent
- Promotes economy, efficiency, effectiveness

Dual Reporting Channels

- Secretary of Defense
- Congress

**OIG recommends to management/
decision makers**





Evaluation of DoD Safety *Purpose*

The purpose of our project was to:

- Evaluate the DOD safety program and suggest changes to help achieve a reduction in mishaps, as directed by the former Secretary of Defense
- Identify safety issues within DoD and provide a roadmap for change to improve the Department's safety program

Evaluation of DoD Safety *SecDef Concern*


42,100 Deaths since 1980
68% were preventable

May 2003: SecDef challenged DoD to reduce mishaps by 50% by 2005


August 2004: DUSD(R) requested comprehensive safety evaluation

March 2005: SecDef challenged to reduce accidents and mishaps by 75% by 2008

May 2007: SecDef reiterated the 75% reduction and established “Zero Preventable Accidents” as the goal



FY 2002 Active Duty Deaths (999 total)



FY 2005 Active Duty Deaths (1942 total)

Data collected by DMDC – Feb 2007

Evaluation of DoD Safety Process



Project Elements:

Climate and Culture


- Senior Leader Survey
- Safety Perception Survey
- Interviews

Resourcing

Organization

Policy

Communicating the Results



Evaluation of DoD Safety *Process – Constructive Engagement*

Interviewed over 100 Senior Leaders

- **Military**
- **Civilian**

Participation with:

- **Services' Safety Knowledge Centers**
- **Defense Safety Oversight Council (DSOC)**
- **National Safety Council (NSC)**
- **Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC)**

Provided briefings and interim progress reviews to:

- **COCOM IG Conference**
- **National Safety Congress**
- **Joint Service Safety Council**
- **Tri-Service Safety Conference Europe**
- **Joint Program Development Office – NGATS**

<http://www.nsc.org/issues/dod-matrix.htm>

Current Condition *Climate Surveys*

“We the senior leaders believe...”

▲ *our support of safety is exceptional*

▼ mishaps are inherent to our profession

▼ *safety is inadequately represented in the budget process*

Leaders know the importance of safety, but believe they are constrained from making systemic change (IG)

“Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Civilians believe...”

▲ we have a strong sense of teamwork


▼ *senior leaders are not sincere in their safety efforts*

Personnel perceive that leaders “say more than they do” (IG)

Current Condition *Culture*

DoD safety culture is evolving

- Gap between senior leader beliefs and personnel perceptions
- Resource allocation?
- Accountability standards?
- Top-down leadership?
- Prevention focus?




Current Condition *Resourcing*

Total direct and indirect costs of safety failures are not quantified or visible to senior management

- **Consequence cost of safety failures not quantified**
- **Prevention cost of safety not visible to senior management**

Resources given to safety do not foster accountability



Source: SecDef Memo of 30 May 2007


Current Condition Organization

Incomplete involvement of all OSD Under Secretaries

Priority for Safety in OSD?

Representation in all parts of the organization?

OSD safety program oversight?



 active involvement in the safety program.


Strategic policy balance – process dominated by:

- **Consequence management**
- **Lagging indicators**

Uneven implementation

- **Environment, Safety & Health program fragmented**
- **Inconsistent vision for accountability**

Evaluation of DoD Safety *Comprehensive Prevention Model*



Essential Questions

The Way Forward

Continuous improvement requires DoD to move beyond compliance by transforming the culture and accentuating prevention

How does Leadership describe the desired end-state?


Which leading indicators will impact mishap prevention?

How does Leadership align policy and program resources?

How does Leadership describe accountability?

DoD Safety Evaluation

IG Project D2005-DIPOE2-0051



“We can no longer tolerate the injuries, costs, and capability losses from preventable accidents.”

Honorable Robert M. Gates

