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Vietnam War: Special Operation Forces and Warfare Training on U.S. Military Installations Vietnam Historic Context Subtheme

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Buildings, structures, and sites related to the buildup for and sustained fighting in the Vietnam War are turning 50 years old. Recently, an overarching historic context was developed that provides a broad historic overview from 1962 through 1975, highlighting the Vietnam War-influenced construction that created facilities on many installations (Hartman et al. 2014).

The historic context provides common ground for understanding the need for construction on military installations in support of the conflict in Vietnam. It also identifies several thematic areas related to stateside construction in support of the war effort under which significance can be defined. This report is tiered from the historic context, addresses the role of special operation forces in the Vietnam War, identifies specific installations and resource types associated with special operation forces and warfare during the Vietnam War, and provides a context to evaluate the historical significance of these resources.

Although the military had used special operation forces and warfare and units prior to 1962, the war in Vietnam proved to be a turning point for the establishment and evolution of Special Operations in the U.S. military. All military branches incorporated aspects of unconventional warfare into their operations to fit mission needs. Special Operations advisors and support units began working in Vietnam before the war escalated in 1965. The use of Special Operations units became a backbone of the American war effort in Southeast Asia as the war escalated between 1965 and 1969.

The National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended, requires federal agencies to inventory and evaluate their cultural resources, usually as they near 50 years of age. These special operation forces and warfare-related structures are about to turn 50.

This report provides context and typology for Vietnam War (1962–1975) special operation forces and warfare-related resources on Department of Defense (DoD) installations in the United States. This report can be used for the identification and evaluation of Vietnam War special operation forces and warfare-related facilities at DoD installations. This report's historic context provides military cultural resources professionals with a common understanding for determining the historical significance of Vietnam War special operation forces and warfare-related facilities, greatly increasing efficiency and cost-savings for this necessary effort.

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

The Department of Defense Legacy Resource Management Program (DoD Legacy Program) was created in 1990 to assist the military branches in their cultural and natural resource protection and enhancement efforts with as little impact as possible to the agency's mission of military preparedness. The DoD Legacy Program is guided by the principles of stewardship or protection of irreplaceable resources, leadership of the Department of Defense (DoD) as the leader in resource protection, and partnership with outside DoD entities to access the knowledge and skill sets of others. The DoD Legacy Program's general areas of emphasis can be found on the "About legacy" tab on the Legacy website. These areas are:

- Implementing an interdisciplinary approach to resource stewardship that takes advantage of the similarities among DoD's natural and cultural resource plans. Often, the same person is responsible for managing both natural and cultural resource plans on an installation. The DoD Legacy program strives to take advantage of this by sharing management methodologies and techniques across natural and cultural resource initiatives.
- Promoting understanding and appreciation for natural and cultural resources by encouraging greater awareness and involvement by both the U.S. military agencies and the public.
- Incorporating an ecosystem approach that assists the DoD in maintaining biological diversity and the sustainable use of land and water resources for missions and other uses.
- Working to achieve common goals and objectives by applying resource management initiatives in broad regional areas.
- Pursuing the identification of innovative new technologies that enable more efficient and effective management (https://www.dodlegacy.org/Legacy/intro/about.aspx).

Each year, the DoD Legacy Program develops a more specific list of areas of interest, which is usually derived from ongoing or anticipated natural and cultural resource management challenges within the DoD. These specific areas of emphasis; however, reflect the DoD Legacy Program's broad areas of interest. To be funded, a project must produce a product that can be useful across DoD branches and/or in a large geographic region. This particular project spans all the DoD branches and can be used across the nation.

1.1 OVERARCHING VIETNAM WAR CONTEXT

The DoD and its individual services must comply with the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended (NHPA), by identifying and managing historic properties that are part of their assets. In an effort to help with this requirement, the U.S. Army Construction Engineering Research Laboratories (USACERL) directed a study of DoD Vietnam War resources, many of which are about to turn 50 years old. The resulting report, which was approved in December 2014, is an overview study of construction on DoD military installations in the United States (US) from 1962 through 1975 resulting from the U.S. involvement in the conflict in Vietnam.

The report was developed as an overview document from which more detailed historic contexts and other documents can be developed. This programmatic approach will ultimately lead to the efficient and cost-effective identification and evaluation of Vietnam War facilities at DoD military installations in the United States.

The report identifies several significant thematic areas (subthemes) related to construction in support of the war. These include ground training, air training, special operation forces and warfare, schools, housing, medical facilities, and logistics facilities.

This project contributes to the broad Vietnam War context by addressing Special Operations forces and warfare training. More specifically, this study addresses the formation and training of Special Operations forces during the Vietnam War and provides a framework for identifying and evaluating associated historic properties at DoD installations.

This historic context focuses on the history of Special Operations forces in the military during the Vietnam War, but is intended to be a companion to other contexts that address Vietnam and/or the history of Special Operations forces in the military in a considerably more holistic sense. Specific Vietnam War subcontexts will include ground training, air training, housing, helicopter use, medical facilities, and logistical facilities. Currently, the subcontext for ground combat training and helicopter training and use have been developed; other subcontext have yet to be written. Vietnam War subcontexts will be posted to http://www.denix.osd.mil/references /DoD.cfm as they become final.

This report is intended to provide a basis from which to evaluate DoD special operation forces and warfare training resources related to the Vietnam War. When evaluating special operation forces and warfare training resources, the information contained in this document should be augmented with installation-specific historic contexts to make an accurate and justified argument regarding historic significance. Specific branch Special Forces histories can provide the context within which individual and interrelated resources may be evaluated.

Appendix C includes a list of the primary special operation forces and warfare units and their training installation; however, it should not be considered exhaustive. Some units were active during the period of the Vietnam War, but did not serve in the Vietnam War, while other units may have served in supporting roles or trained and did not deploy.

1.2 PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this effort was to research and develop a historic context of Special Operations forces and training during the Vietnam War. The report also provides context and typology of Vietnam War (1962–1975) and DoD installations and resource types associated with Special Operations forces in the United States. This is an analysis of the development and training of Special Operations forces during the war. This report is not a detailed history of military engagements and important battles. Military action is summarized briefly to strengthen the overall context describing the training of Special Operations forces in the war and how this affected the built environment on DoD installations in the United States.

Research and site visits were pivotal to the development of the historic context. Researchers accessed primary and secondary sources and visited Special Operations training installations. They conducted research at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) Archives I (Military Reference Branch); NARA, Archives II (Cartography and Architectural Records Branch); USACERL Technical Library; University of Colorado libraries; Fort Bragg environmental office and museum; Hurlburt Field environmental and history offices; Eglin Air Force Base (AFB) environmental and history offices and library; and Air Force Armament Museum. Online sources of information were also consulted.

The development of the Vietnam War historic context was supported and facilitated through the assistance of several individuals. A number of individuals provided additional support to the project by assisting with data requests, site visits, and providing reports and resources related to Vietnam War special operation forces and warfare training in the DoD. They also provided general guidance and installation-specific information.

- Ellen R. Hartman, Engineer Research and Development Center (ERDC) / Construction Engineering Research Laboratories (CERL)
- Susan I. Enscore, ERDC/CERL
- Adam D. Smith, ERDC/CERL
- Ilaria Harrach Basnett, Air Force Civil Engineer Center Environmental Operations Division (AFCEC/CZO), Cultural Resources Manager, Eglin AFB
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- Steve Gregory, Museum Technician, Fort Huachuca Museum
- Lori S. Tagg, Command Historian, U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, Fort Huachuca, Arizona
- William Manley, Naval Facilities Engineering Command Headquarters Cultural Resources, Program Lead, Navy Department Federal Preservation Officer

1.3 HOW THIS REPORT IS ORGANIZED

This report is presented in five chapters. Chapter 1 provides the introduction and methodology used to prepare this report. Chapter 2 provides a summary of the Vietnam War, and a summary of Special Operations by each of the military service installations during the beginning, middle, and end of the Vietnam War. Chapter 3 provides a context for special operation forces and warfare training during the Vietnam War at U.S. installations. Chapter 4 provides a description of the types of resources that would be associated with special operation forces and warfare training during the war on U.S. installations and an overview of evaluating resources under the NHPA with descriptions of evaluation criteria and integrity. Chapter 5 contains selected references. The appendixes include installation-specific histories for Fort Bragg, and Eglin AFB, Hurlburt Field; a list of Special Forces units that deployed to Vietnam, and the report contributors.

2.0 SHORT HISTORY OF THE VIETNAM WAR

[Portions of this summary are adapted from Ellen R. Hartman, Susan I. Enscore, and Adam D. Smith, "Vietnam on the Homefront*:* How DoD Installations Adapted, 1962–1975," Department of Defense Legacy Resource Management Program, Report ERDC/CERL TR-14-7, December 2014.]

The Vietnam War was a conflict that played a significant role in American foreign policy during much of the Cold War. However, the foundations of unrest in Vietnam (a French possession since the 1800s) were laid during World War II and were driven by a legacy of European colonialism and the exigencies of Cold War politics.

Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia) was not a major stage during World War II, but the region fell to the German-sympathizing Vichy French government during the war. A local resistance movement known as the Viet Minh quickly rose in defiance of the Vichy. The group, led by a Vietnamese nationalist named Ho Chi Minh, gained the support of China, the Soviet Union, and the United States. The Viet Minh defied the French in Indochina until the Vichy government in France fell to the Allies in 1944. Japan filled the void left by the French and briefly occupied Vietnam between 1944 and August 1945.

The defeat of Japan and the end of World War II resulted in a power vacuum in Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh subsequently declared Vietnamese independence and established the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. He asked the United States to recognize the newly independent country. American leaders, however, were uncomfortable with Ho Chi Minh's nationalism and his political ideology, which was largely influenced by communism. Even though the Soviet Union was an American ally during the war, the specter of communism, real or imagined, came to dominate Cold War foreign policy in the late 1940s.

Meanwhile, leaders from the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union met in Potsdam, Germany to shape the post-war world. The Potsdam Conference did not serve Ho Chi Minh's interests. Instead of acknowledging a Vietnam free of colonial control, the world leaders decided that Indochina still belonged to France, a country that was not strong enough to regain control of the region on its own. Instead, China and Britain removed the Japanese from southern and northern Vietnam, respectively.

A French colonial government took control of Vietnam by 1946, but prior to their arrival, the Viet Minh held elections in which they won several seats in northern and central Vietnam. In an effort to consolidate their rule, the French drove the Viet Minh out of the urbanized areas of Vietnam. This action triggered the First Indochina War, a guerilla campaign against French occupation. The war pivoted on a north/south axis, with the Viet Minh, who had a solid foothold in the north, maintaining control of the central and northern portions of the country and the French holding on to power in the southern part of the country.

The Cold War stakes of the First Indochina War became considerably more significant when the newly established Communist government in China recognized the Viet Minh as the legitimate government of Vietnam. American policymakers looked gravely upon these developments. They

believed that U.S. foreign policy and aid should strive to prevent and contain the spread of Communism, a policy termed "containment." As a result, the United States began assisting the French in their fight against the Viet Minh. Pragmatically, President Eisenhower chose to send military supplies but not combat troops. The First Indochina War continued for another four years until the French suffered a final defeat at the battle of Dien Bien Phu, which ended colonial rule in Vietnam.

The 1954 Geneva Accords codified France's withdrawal from Indochina, but did not mark the end of Western influence in Vietnam's governance. The treaty was negotiated among the United States, the Soviet Union, China, France, and Britain. There were no Vietnamese representatives. The accords created three countries in Indochina: Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Vietnam was temporarily divided along the 17th parallel. The Viet Minh were placed in control of the north while an Anti-Communist government under Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem was installed in the south until nationwide elections could be held, as stipulated.[1]

Subsequently, the Viet Minh held elections in the north and won by significant margins. The situation in the south was markedly different; Prime Minister Diem cancelled elections in 1955 because he was afraid the Viet Minh would win convincingly. The United States agreed.[2] To make matters worse, Diem became increasingly authoritarian. He proclaimed himself president of the Republic of Vietnam in October 1955. While he had little influence in the north, Diem's regime was oppressive and anti-democratic in the south.

Nonetheless, the United States Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) began training South Vietnamese soldiers in 1955. The USAF advisory role began even earlier. Beginning in 1951, the USAF provided a small number of Air Force advisors to support the South Vietnamese Air Force. No doubt, training played a major role in the American advisory era in Vietnam. Most training occurred in Vietnam, but by 1961, 1,000 South Vietnamese soldiers received training in the United States each year.[3]

By 1956, a Communist-influenced insurgency escalated in the countryside and these rebels, known as the Viet Cong, complicated U.S. policy in the region. In addition to containment, U.S. policymakers also espoused the Domino Theory which argued that if the West did not take a stand, Communism would spread from country to country like toppling dominoes. South Vietnam was ground zero in this scenario. If South Vietnam fell to Communism then Laos would be next, then Cambodia, followed by Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Burma, and so forth. The United States, while not comfortable with Diem's anti-democratic rule, considered him an ally in their fight against Communism.

By 1958, a full-scale civil war was raging in South Vietnam. The opposition to Diem received encouragement and support from North Vietnam, which, by 1959, was providing supplies and troop support to the Viet Cong. Meanwhile, the U.S. support of South Vietnam continued. There

[1] "Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference on Restoring Peace in Indochina, July 12, 1954," in *The Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. XXXI, No. 788 (August 2, 1954): 164.
[2] Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–2002* (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 2002): 170.
[3] Ronald H. Spector. *Advice and Support: The Early Years of the United States Army in Vietnam 1941–1960* (Washington, DC: United States Army Center for Military History, 1983): 239.

were 900 advisors in Indochina at the end of the 1950s and the U.S. financial and material commitments to Vietnam at this time ran into the billions of dollars.

John Fitzgerald Kennedy became President of the United States in 1961. While he did not want to commit the United States to a full-scale war in Vietnam, President Kennedy was steadfast in his opposition to Communism. As a result, the American advisory and support role grew dramatically under his administration. The President initially increased support for Diem's regime and sent additional troops to Vietnam, including U.S. Army and Marine Corps units. The USAF role also increased, with the first permanent units arriving in the fall of 1961. The U.S. Navy provided critical troop transport and increased their presence in the Gulf of Tonkin.

There were over 11,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam by the end of 1962.[4] While ostensibly there to train troops and protect villages, the soldiers found themselves involved in border surveillance, control measures, and guerilla incursions. They also supported Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations in the region.

The U.S. involvement in Vietnam increased perceptibly in the first two years of President Kennedy's administration, but did not ameliorate the crisis as events grew increasingly out of control in South Vietnam. The intractability and oppression of Diem's administration had become untenable by 1963. He rebuffed U.S. demands that he hold elections. Worse, he lost any support he previously had in South Vietnam. This was graphically displayed to the world on 11 June 1963, when Thich Quang Duc, a Buddhist monk, set himself on fire at a busy Saigon intersection. The self-immolation, which attracted the attention of the world, was a direct protest to Diem's anti-democratic policies and the war that was raging in the countryside.

By the fall of 1963, President Kennedy realized that as long as Diem was in power, South Vietnam could not put down the insurgency. Kennedy and other top U.S. officials discussed ousting Diem through diplomatic approaches or if resorting to a coup was necessary. Plans were discussed to have the CIA overthrow the South Vietnamese government. An actual coup occurred on 1 November 1963, when the ARVN launched a siege on the palace in Saigon. Diem and his brother were later arrested and assassinated by the ARVN.[5]

The fall of Diem resulted in considerable instability. From November 1963 to June 1965, the South Vietnamese government was a revolving door. Five administrations came and went until Lt. Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu and Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky came to power. Thieu remained president until the fall of Saigon in 1975. The years of instability; however, undermined South Vietnam's ability to counteract the Communist insurgency. The Viet Cong attracted substantial support and assistance from the Viet Minh in South Vietnam who saw the instability as an opportunity to overthrow the South Vietnamese government.

Upon President Kennedy's assassination on 22 November 1963, Lyndon Baines Johnson was immediately sworn in as president of the United States. Initially, President Johnson was not

[4] Joel D. Meyerson, *Images of a Lengthy War: The United States Army in Vietnam,* (Washington, DC: United States Army Center for Military History, 1986): 69.

[5] Prados, John, editor. The Diem Coup After 50 Years, John F. Kennedy And South Vietnam, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 444, Posted – November 1, 2013, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/search/node/president%20John%20F%20Kennedy

interested in expanding U.S. involvement in Vietnam. In fact, the crisis in Southeast Asia took a backseat to his domestic agenda, which included civil rights legislation and an ambitious package of domestic policies and laws known as the "Great Society."

At the same time, President Johnson did not want U.S. policy and actions in Vietnam to fail. After all, the United States had spent nearly a decade supporting the South Vietnamese government in the fight against the Viet Cong and, by proxy, the Viet Minh. More importantly, he did not want the 14,000 Americans who were in the region to lose their stand against the spread of Communism.

President Johnson increased the number of advisors and other military personnel in Vietnam to 16,000 by early summer 1964, but domestic matters occupied most of his energy until August when the war in Southeast Asia forcefully became the priority.

On 2 August 1964, three North Vietnamese patrol boats fired on the U.S. destroyer *Maddox* in the Gulf of Tonkin. The U.S. Navy retaliated and fended off the attack. The details of the confrontation are debated; at the time, the United States claimed the U.S. Navy vessel was on routine patrols in international waters, but other sources have since suggested that the USS *Maddox* was supporting South Vietnamese troops who were raiding North Vietnamese ports.[6] Regardless of the details, the event, which came to be known as the "Gulf of Tonkin Incident," marked a significant shift in the Vietnam War.

President Johnson ordered air strikes on North Vietnamese bases and critical infrastructure. The retaliation strikes ordered by President Johnson destroyed or damaged 25 patrol boats and 90% of the oil storage facilities. This strategy eventually became a cornerstone of the air war in Vietnam.

The most important outcome of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, however, was the 7 August passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution by the U.S. Congress. The resolution gave the President broad authority to prosecute the war in Vietnam by allowing him to take "all necessary measures" to defend U.S. and allied forces and to "prevent further aggression."[7]

President Johnson did not immediately use his new war-making powers in any comprehensive or aggressive way. He was, after all, running for reelection as the peace candidate in opposition to Barry Goldwater. President Johnson was re-elected in November 1964, and the war in Vietnam took precedence. The President and his advisors began to initiate a forceful military response. President Johnson removed all restrictions on U.S. military involvement, allowing U.S. personnel to directly engage in combat without the guise of training or advising the South Vietnamese.

In February 1965, President Johnson approved a sustained aerial bombing of North Vietnam. The campaign was known as OPERATION ROLLING THUNDER. U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps aircraft dropped hundreds of tons of bombs on North Vietnam nearly every day

[6] LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War 1945–2002, 252–253.
[7] "Gulf of Tonkin Resolution," Public Law 88-408, 88th Congress, August 7, 1964.

from early March 1965 to early November 1968. President Johnson hoped the bombings would bring North Vietnam to the negotiating table.

The President began committing combat troops to Vietnam in the spring of 1965 when he deployed U.S. Marine Corps and Army combat troops to Da Nang and Saigon, respectively. Helicopter units accompanied both the U.S. Army and Marine Corps deployments. U.S. Navy vessels transported the troops, who were tasked with the defense of airbases. The deployments brought the U.S. presence in Vietnam to over 50,000. The United States' first major ground offensive occurred in August 1965 when the U.S. Marine Corps, in cooperation with the South Vietnamese Army, launched an airmobile and amphibious assault on Viet Cong forces near Chu Lai.

President Johnson continued increasing troop strength in Vietnam throughout the summer and fall of 1965. U.S. military presence had increased to 175,000 by the end of 1965. This included major Army divisions and units such as the 1st Cavalry Division, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, and 1st Infantry Division. The U.S. Marine Corps Expeditionary Force accounted for nearly 20,000 troops in Vietnam by the end of 1965. Large deployments continued through the peak years of the war (1965–1968).

It became clear to military leadership that the Vietnam War required more aggressive enlistment than the existing annual average of just over 55,000. The war necessitated an annual enlistment of nearly one million. Initially, military planners attempted to meet the shortfall through recruitment. Recruitment was successful for all branches except the U.S. Army, which was not able to fill the personnel gap and resorted to the draft in 1966. Draft calls continued until 1973.

The U.S. military was now committed to defeating the enemy in direct action. There were no longer any illusions about the United States merely providing training and logistical and material support to the South Vietnamese. U.S. ground forces participated in more than 550 battalion-size or larger operations during 1966. U.S. military aircraft flew almost 300,000 sorties in 1966. Ground forces also participated in more than 160 joint operations with allies. As the war in Vietnam intensified in 1966, U.S. Marine units were conducting several hundred small unit actions during each 24-hour period. These operations, which were designed to find and isolate the Viet Cong, were successful. Within a year, the U.S. Marine Corps was able to gain control of almost 1,200 square miles of Vietnamese territory. Active campaigns continued through 1967. There were nearly 490,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam at the end of the year over 260,000 of whom were Marines and 28,000 of whom were Navy seamen.

Early 1968 brought two major battles. First, the Khe Sanh Combat Base, a garrison of 6,000 U.S. Marines and South Vietnamese Rangers, which came under attack from North Vietnamese forces in late 1967, was completely isolated by the beginning of 1968. President Johnson and General William Westmoreland were determined to hold the base at all costs. This precipitated one of the longest and bloodiest battles of the war. The base remained under siege for 77 days until mid-April 1968. Khe Sanh eventually fell to the North Vietnamese in July 1968.

The other major engagement, known as the Tet Offensive, was a surprise attack on South Vietnamese targets by North Vietnamese troops. The operation, which occurred on 30 January

1968, was a simultaneous assault on more than 100 South Vietnamese cities and military installations. The U.S., South Vietnamese, and other allied troops eventually repelled the attacks, but the offensive was a public relations disaster. President Johnson and other leaders had been telling the American public that the end of the war was in sight and that the North Vietnamese were on the defensive. The Tet Offensive appeared to belie this contention. Support for the war, which was already unpopular, eroded further.

The military reaction to the Tet Offensive was to deploy more soldiers to Vietnam. General Earle Wheeler traveled to Vietnam after the Offensive to assess conditions in the country. He was convinced that there were not enough troops in Vietnam to effectively fight the war. Therefore, the general requested deployment of 206,000 additional U.S. troops. There were already nearly 500,000 soldiers in Vietnam and the American public was not supportive of increasing that number by nearly 50%. President Johnson denied General Wheeler's request. Instead, he authorized a comparatively small increase of about 13,000 troops. The president also began scaling back OPERATION ROLLING THUNDER.

Khe Sanh and the Tet Offensive captured the public's attention and convinced many that Vietnam was a never-ending quagmire. Military leaders, however, were planning for the U.S. exit from Vietnam. Their most pressing concern was still preservation of an independent South Vietnam and they knew that the only way this could occur was if they provided modern equipment and professional training to the South Vietnamese military. A defined withdrawal plan, however, was elusive.

Meanwhile, President Johnson decided not to run for reelection in 1968. His successor, President Richard Milhous Nixon, announced a new plan called "Vietnamization" in the spring of 1969. Essentially, the plan consisted of a concomitant rapid withdrawal from Vietnam and strengthening of South Vietnamese defense capabilities. The latter would be achieved through training and the provision of military equipment. Some U.S. units literally left Vietnam without their vehicles and aircraft that were donated to the South Vietnamese military.

The military was at peak troop strength of 543,482 when President Nixon implemented Vietnamization. Drawdowns were rapid and troop levels were down to 250,000 by 1970. Stand-downs continued over the next couple of years, reducing U.S. forces to only 24,000 U.S. soldiers in Vietnam at the end of 1972.

Vietnamization coincided with increased hostilities in Vietnam and a widening of the war. Citing their support for North Vietnamese troops, President Nixon approved secret bombings of Cambodia and Laos in 1970. The United States also took part in a ground incursion in Cambodia in the summer of 1970 and supported a South Vietnamese incursion in Laos in February 1971. President Nixon ordered the mining of North Vietnam's Haiphong Harbor in 1972 to prevent the arrival of supplies from the Soviets and Chinese.

The United States and North Vietnam agreed to a ceasefire in January 1973. U.S. minesweepers cleared Haiphong Harbor of mines in February 1973 and the last U.S. combat troops left Vietnamese soil in March. The U.S. military remained in the region but reverted to its training

and advisory role.[8] The U.S. exit from Vietnam resulted in greater instability. The President warned the North Vietnamese that the U.S. military would return if the Viet Minh broke the ceasefire. However, in June 1973, the Senate passed the Case-Church amendment prohibiting further intervention in Vietnam.

President Nixon was soon consumed by his own downfall as the Watergate scandal broke. President Nixon resigned in August 1974. His replacement, Gerald Ford, was greeted with continued crisis in Cambodia and Vietnam.

Cambodia's long-running civil war was at a critical point in early 1975. The U.S.-supported Khmer Republic was on the verge of collapse as the Communist Khmer Rouge solidified control over most of the country. The Khmer Republic only held Phnom Penh and its fall was imminent. The U.S. military, therefore, conducted a helicopter-based evacuation of U.S. citizens and refugees from Phnom Penh on 12 April 1975.

Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong had launched an offensive in early 1975. Just as they had done in Cambodia, the United States implemented an existing evacuation plan on 29 and 30 April 1975. Much larger than the Cambodian evacuation, the Vietnamese operation provided transport for over 1,300 Americans and nearly 6,000 Vietnamese (and other foreign) evacuees from the country. The evacuation provided a graphic end to the Vietnam War as U.S. helicopters lifted civilians off the roof of the U.S. embassy in Vietnam. Saigon fell to North Vietnamese forces on 30 April 1975, effectively marking the end of the Vietnam War.

One final clash occurred in May 1975 when the Khmer Rouge Navy seized a U.S. container ship (the SS *Mayaguez*). U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force units launched a rescue operation. They met heavy resistance from the Khmer Rouge. The U.S. Marine Corps suffered significant casualties during the operation, which ultimately resulted in the release of the SS *Mayaguez* and crew.

The Vietnam War and related military actions finally ended in the summer of 1975—over two decades since the United States began providing support to the French colonial government in their fight against a nationalist indigenous uprising. The war was a turning point for Americans and the U.S. military. It was a conflict that occurred on a complicated stage that pushed technological change and forced the military Special Operations forces to continually innovate. It was also an increasingly unpopular war that reshaped the manner in which U.S. civilians viewed warfare. Many became increasingly distrustful of their government and military leadership.

The war was also a quintessential Cold War conflict in which U.S. policymakers viewed anything branded as Communist, whether real or imagined, as a fundamental threat. Some threats were grave; others were illusory. There is no doubt that Communism shaped the war in Vietnam. It is also true that Vietnam was finally unified as a single country in the spring of 1975 under a generally popular Communist regime. The country was also finally free of the divisions established by foreign governments. Vietnam, which had been colonized by Europeans since the 19th century, was finally independent, albeit not on the terms the United States would have liked.

[8] Meyerson, Images of a Lengthy War, 183.

Source: usnews.com

Figure 2-1: The Fall of Saigon.

2.1 SUMMARY OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS TO 1960

2.1.1 ARMY

Army Special Operations trace their roots to World War II and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the precursor to the CIA. The OSS formed during the war with two duties, the acquisition of intelligence and the conduct of unconventional warfare behind enemy lines in support of resistance groups.

The OSS established operational sites in England, North Africa, India, Burma and China by 1942. Typical OSS combat missions consisted of parachuting small teams across enemy lines where they trained resistance movements and conducted guerrilla operations against the Germans and Japanese. They also performed sabotage missions and raids behind enemy lines. Army Special Operations groups were established to support the OSS in these operations. The forces included the Army Rangers, the First Special Service Force, and several other units.

The Army established the first Ranger forces in Ireland when the 1st Ranger Battalion was formed in June 1942. Five additional battalions were formed during World War II. The 1st through 5th operated in North Africa, and Europe. The 6th Ranger Battalion, established in December 1943 under the command of General Douglas MacArthur served in the Pacific theater. McArthur envisioned the Rangers as the Army's version of the Marine Raiders (discussed

below). The Rangers were deactivated at the end of the war only to be reactivated in 1950 to serve in the Korean War. Fifteen Ranger companies operated in Korea until 1952 when they were deactivated.

World War II begat other Special Operations groups, such as the First Special Service Force, a joint Canadian-American unit that was formed on 9 July 1942. The unit, which was Airborne qualified and trained in mountaineering, skiing, and amphibious operations, saw action in the Aleutians, Italy, and France. The First Special Service Force adopted the crossed arrows of the U.S. Army's Indian Scouts, which later became the branch insignia of Special Forces.

Other unconventional warfare units included the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), a 3,000-man long-range penetration force that operated in the China-Burma-India theater. The Alamo Scouts of the Sixth Army were an elite reconnaissance unit that saw action in the Pacific theater, especially New Guinea and the Philippines.

The 5307th and other World War II Special Operations groups laid the foundation for modern Special Forces, which grew out of the Special Operations Division of the Psychological Warfare Center. Activated at Fort Bragg, North Carolina (NC), in May 1952, the Special Forces Group and Psychological Warfare School filled the void left by the deactivation of the Rangers at the end of the Korean War.

The 10th Special Forces Group, formed at Fort Bragg in June 1952, was composed of former OSS officers, airborne troops, ex-Rangers, and combat veterans of World War II and Korea. The 10th Special Forces Group trained in advanced techniques of unconventional warfare in order to meet their mission to infiltrate enemy occupied territory, organize resistance and guerilla forces, and conduct guerrilla warfare.

Less than six months after their formation, the 10th was divided into two groups, the 10th Special Forces Group and the 77th Special Forces Group. The groups encountered their first combat operations at the end of 1952 when they executed missions in North Korea in cooperation with anti-Communist Korean Guerillas.

The Army's Special Forces capabilities continued to grow after the Korean War, with units stationed at Fort Bragg (North Carolina), Fort Schaffer (Hawaii), Camp Drake (Japan), Camp Buckner (Okinawa), and West Germany. Special Forces operational and training doctrine also evolved in the late 1950s with a basic 12-man unit structure (two officers, two operations and intelligence sergeants, two weapons sergeants, two communications sergeants, two medics and two engineers) in which all members were trained in unconventional warfare and cross-trained in each other's specialties. They also spoke at least one foreign language.

2.1.2 MARINE CORPS

Marine Corps leadership began developing Special Operations forces on the eve of World War II. Two small groups of 40 soldiers reported to Lakehurst Naval Air Station, New Jersey in October 1940 to train as paratroopers, or paramarines. Their expected missions were to act as a raiding and reconnaissance force behind enemy lines and serve as a vanguard force capturing

strategic positions until larger forces could arrive. With their training complete, the 1st Parachute Battalion officially formed in August 1941.

Two more parachute battalions followed. A battalion began training at the Marine Corps Parachute School in San Diego in May 1942 and another began training at New River, North Carolina. The battalions were established as the 2nd and 3rd Parachute Battalions in September 1942. A fourth battalion was established in April 1943.

The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Parachute Battalions served in the Pacific theater of World War II. Seen as a wartime expediency, the paramarines did not receive long-term support and were disbanded in February 1944.

Other Marine Corps Special Operations capabilities were developed during World War II when President Roosevelt determined that the United States needed a force similar to the British Commandos, which were formed in 1940. Established in February 1942, the 1st and 2nd Raider Battalions deployed to American Samoa.

The composition of the Raider battalions was similar to modern Special Operations forces. Lightly armed and highly trained, the Marine Raiders were tasked with three missions. They conducted high speed raids on enemy troops, preceded large amphibious raids on beaches in difficult terrain, and conducted guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines. The Raider battalions operated in the Pacific theater of the war until they, like the paramarines, were disbanded in February 1944. The Marine Corps resurrected the "Marine Raider" moniker for the Marines Special Operations Command in 2015.

A third Special Operations group, The Marine Corps Amphibious Reconnaissance Company, was formed in January 1943. Operating in the Pacific, the company's primary mission was to search the numerous Pacific atolls for enemy units and potential landing sites for larger operations. They also played pivotal roles in amphibious landings including Okinawa, Iwo Jima, and Tintin.

The Marine Corps Amphibious Reconnaissance Company led to the establishment of the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company, or Force Recon, at Camp Pendleton, California (CA) in June 1957. Ultimately based at Camp Pendleton and Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, the company brought together the three elements of Marine Corps Special Forces developed during World War II. Force Recon was organized into three groups, an amphibious reconnaissance platoon, a pathfinder reconnaissance platoon, and a parachute reconnaissance platoon.

Source: Photo A193605 NARA RG 127: Records of the Marine Corps, Color Photographs of Marine Corps Activities in Vietnam, 1962 - 1975.

Figure 2-2: Members of Marine Corps 1st Force Recon in Extraction Operation, date unknown.

2.1.3 NAVY

Like the Army and Marine Corps, the Navy established their first dedicated Special Operations units during World War II. It became clear early in the war that the United States needed a beach reconnaissance force in both the European and Pacific theaters. To meet this need, the Navy created the Amphibious Scouts and Raiders at Amphibious Training Base, Little Creek, Virginia (VA) in August 1942. The Scouts and Raiders were envisioned as an advanced group who would identify objective beaches for assault. Their essential mission was to land on and hold the beaches while guiding in larger assault forces.

The first units of the Scouts and Raiders were commissioned in October 1942 and participated in the first allied landings in Europe (OPERATION TORCH) a month later. A second unit of the Scouts and Raiders, called Special Service Unit # 1 saw their first action in the Pacific before briefly transferring to the European theater. Renamed the 7th Amphibious Scouts in January 1943, the unit received a modified mission and returned to the Pacific for the reminder of the war. The 7th Amphibious Scouts went ashore with assault boats and buoyed channels, erected markings for aircraft, removed beach obstacles, and established communications for larger assault groups. They also provided medical evacuation services. The unit participated in more than 40 landings during the war.

A third Scout and Raider group operated in China to support Chinese and American troops in the region. Known as Amphibious Roger, the group trained at the Scout and Ranger school at Fort Pierce, Florida. They were an amphibious guerrilla force operating from coastal waters, lakes, and rivers. Based in Calcutta, the group did not see considerable action during the war.

The Navy also established a second type of Special Operations group during the war. The first Naval Combat Demolition Unit (NCDU) was established at Fort Pierce, Florida in the summer of 1943. The unit was specifically focused on developing and perfecting techniques for eliminating obstacles on enemy-held beaches. Thirty-four NCDU personnel were assigned to OPERATION OVERLORD, the Allied amphibious landing at Normandy on D-Day, in June 1944. The NCDUs landed on Omaha and Utah Beaches where they blew large holes in barriers placed by the Germans. NCDU seamen were also active in the Pacific theater with the 7th Amphibious Force.

Meanwhile, in the Pacific, it became clear that another type of demolition team was required. Not only was it necessary to remove obstacles from beaches, but the islands themselves were surrounded by reefs that impeded the movement of troops. In an effort to address this problem, the Navy established two Underwater Demolition Teams (UDT) at Waimanalo Amphibious Training Base in Hawaii in 1943. The force quickly grew to 34 teams. Trained for mobility, the UDT teams wore swimsuits, fins, and facemasks into combat operations where they cleared underwater obstacles in advance of assaulting groups. UDT teams operated in every major amphibious landing in the Pacific Theater.

Some members of the UDT teams were part of another Special Operations group, the Operational Swimmers of the OSS. Established in 1943, the Operational Swimmers, were initially trained by the British Royal Navy at Camp Pendleton before relocating to the Bahamas in 1944. The swimmers were divided into two small groups, one of which was assigned to the Navy's Pacific theater. The men became part of UDT-10 in July 1944. The Operational Swimmers and UDT teams foreshadowed the Navy SEALs.

Navy Special Operations capabilities reduced considerably after the War. The UDT teams, for example, demobilized from 34 teams to 4 (two on each coast). The other Special Operations units, such as the Raiders and Scouts, were disbanded.

UDT teams saw action during the Korean War, but unlike World War II, the Navy did not add additional Special Operations capabilities during the war. The demolition teams acted as wave guides for Marine Corps landings, supported mine clearing operations, conducted demolition

raids on railroad tunnels and bridges along the Korean coast, performed beach and river reconnaissance, assaulted North Korean guerrilla forces from the sea, and participated in operations that undermined North Korean's fishing capability.

2.1.4 AIR FORCE

Air Force Special Operations were born during World War II when the 1st Air Commando Group was formed (as part of the Army Air Corps) in August 1943. The unit was initially established to support Allied guerrilla operations in Burma, but Air Commandos also deployed to the European theater of the war. They were active in both theaters until the end of the war. The Air Commandos provided pivotal support to ground forces. They inserted troops in covert locations across enemy lines, provided cover fire, resupplied Special Operations troops on the ground, and provided reconnaissance and medical evacuation support. The Air Commandos used various aircraft, including L-1 and L-5 scout aircraft, P-51 Mustangs, B-25Hs, and C-47s. The units also utilized gliders for assault and resupply. Finally, the Air Commandos had four YR-4 helicopters at their disposal, and were, in fact, the first to use the helicopter in a combat situation in Burma. The 1st Air Commando Group, like many Special Operations units established during the war, was deactivated by 1945.

The USAF became an independent branch of the U.S. military in 1947. USAF leadership began considering the use of aircraft in covert operations, though no action was taken until the Korean War when the Air Resupply and Communications Service (ARCS) came into existence. The three squadrons of the ARCS were tasked with a variety of missions. They used B-29 Superfortress bombers to drop printed leaflets in an effort to lower enemy morale (Psychological Operations). They also used helicopters and pararescue troops to retrieve pilots downed behind enemy lines. The ARCS survived the deactivations that accompanied the end of the Korean War, but were ultimately disbanded in the later 1950s. Specific Air Force Special Operations units were not reestablished until they began operating in Vietnam in the early 1960s.

2.2 SPECIAL OPERATIONS DURING THE VIETNAM WAR

The Vietnam War proved to be a watershed for the establishment and evolution of Special Operations in the U.S. military. All military branches incorporated aspects of unconventional warfare into their operations to fit mission needs. Special Operations advisors and support units began working in Vietnam before the war escalated in 1965. The use of Special Operations units became a backbone of the American war effort in Southeast Asia as the war escalated between 1965 and 1969. Special Forces units were also some of the last to leave Vietnam in the 1970s.

The expansion of Special Operations during the war was the result of political and organizational support in the United States. Indeed, President John F. Kennedy was a strong proponent of Special Operations forces. The topography and decentralized nature of the conflict in Vietnam also lent itself to the development of Special Operations. Conventional warfare was considerably less effective in Vietnam than in previous wars. Finally, the integration of new technology, such as rotary wing aircraft, facilitated the effective use of unconventional forces. Legacy project 14-739, Vietnam War: Helicopter Training and Use on U.S. Military Installations, Vietnam Historic Context Subtheme, provides a context for helicopter use in Vietnam.

2.2.1 ARMY

2.2.1.1 Early War

The Army's Special Operations presence in Vietnam began small and early. The United States sent 30 Special Forces instructors to Vietnam in May 1960 to establish a training program for the Vietnamese Army who were in the midst of a civil war.

President Kennedy, however, was extremely concerned about the Communist-influenced Viet Cong insurgency in Vietnam. He was afraid that if Vietnam fell, the rest of the region could come under communist control. This was an unacceptable scenario to Cold War American policymakers. The President was also interested in fortifying the United States' Special Operations capabilities. To this end, he authorized the establishment of the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces at Fort Bragg on 21 September 1961. The group, which came to be known as the Green Berets, trained at the U.S. Army Special Operation Forces and Warfare School located at the installation.[9]

The Green Berets were almost immediately deployed to Vietnam where they served as advisors and supported CIA missions in Southeast Asia. The Special Forces association with the CIA lasted at least until 1970. The early Special Forces advisory program came to be known as the Civilian Irregular Defense Group Program (CIDG). It was a program in which Army advisors focused their efforts on developing counter-insurgency groups among Vietnam's rural ethic groups, who were, themselves, targets of Viet Cong recruiting.[10]

Beginning in 1961, the United States Army advisors offered weapons and training to selected ethnic groups if they professed their support for the South Vietnamese government. Known as the Buon Enao experiment, the effort required an increase in the number of Special Forces troops in Vietnam. The program grew quickly. In February 1962, a 12-man U.S. Special Forces detachment was operating in forty highland villages recruiting village defenders and training the local security forces.[11] By November 1962, there were 12 U.S. Special Forces detachments in Vietnam in November 1962.[12] These included soldiers from the 1st Special Forces Group based at Okinawa and the 5th and 7th Special Forces Groups at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. By December 1963 Special Forces detachments had trained and armed 18,000 men as strike force troops and 43,376 village defenders.[13]

Training was the primary focus of Special Operations activities until the end of 1964 when offensive operations began to play a larger role than training, in part due to the intensification of the conflict. By June 1963 the United States had trained enough South Vietnamese counterinsurgency units that emphasis began shifting from training to operations against the Viet Cong.[14] Many of the offensives were conducted as joint operations with Vietnam Army units,

[9] Francis J. Kelly, *US Army Special Forces: 1961* – 1971, (Washington D.C., Department of the Army, 1973), 5; Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine1942-1976* (Washington DC.: Center for Military History, 2006): 223, 227, 458-62. Also, it should be noted that counterinsurgency training occurred in some level at all U.S. Army schools and West Point throughout the 1960s.
[10] Horace Sutton, "The Ghostly War of the Green Berets," *Saturday Review*, October 18, 1969: 25.
[11] Kelly, US Army Special Forces: 1961 – 1971, 25-8
[12] Kelly, US Army Special Forces: 1961 – 1971, 31
[13] Kelly, US Army Special Forces: 1961 – 1971, 31
[14] Kelly, US Army Special Forces: 1961 – 1971, 41

counterinsurgency units, and U.S. Special Forces soldiers. These offensive maneuvers, which focused on the utilization strike forces and border actions, laid the groundwork for combat operations after the war intensified in the summer of 1965.[15]

Special Forces troops, to the extent they could, also undertook civic action projects. They operated medical dispensaries, assisted in the construction of schools, and initiated sanitation, agricultural, and home improvement projects in the villages in which the soldiers operated. These civic support programs were viewed as a way to win the hearts and minds of the local population. As the advisory program developed, it became common for two noncommissioned medical officers to accompany each Special Forces detachment. The medical support was extremely beneficial to the villagers. Medical officers or their associates had administered to over 1.5 million Vietnamese patients by the spring of 1964.[16]

Source: James I. Hatton; Photo CC-44758, NARA RG 111: Records of the Office of Chief Signal Officer, 1860-1985 Photographs of U.S. Army Operations in Vietnam, compiled 1963 - 1973.

Figure 2-3: Special Forces Soldier (H.R. Anderson) and a CIDG Soldier conducting Reconnaissance near My-Phuc Ty. 1967.

Finally, the Special Forces undertook psychological operations between 1961 and 1965. The program initially emphasized direct day-to-day contact informed by a thorough knowledge and understanding of the ways of the local villagers and their leaders. Again, the operations were another avenue used to win the loyalty of the villagers. As time went by, the program became more formal with mass-media programing presented to assembled audiences. The programming

[15] Kelly, US Army Special Forces: 1961 – 1971, 50
[16] Kelly, US Army Special Forces: 1961 – 1971, 60

grew to consist of lectures, films, (American westerns were very popular), loudspeaker broadcasts, and the distribution of printed material.[17]

Early Special Forces deployments were temporary six-month assignments. This changed in the summer of 1964 when the tours of duty were extended to one-year deployments. In addition, the army requested the augmentation Special Forces troop strength in Vietnam. In March 1964, the commanding officer of Special Forces requested that 18 additional detachments be deployed to Vietnam. As a result, the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces, with an authorized strength of 1,297, was assigned to Vietnam in October 1964.[18]

2.2.1.2 Middle of the War

The increased American involvement in Vietnam after 1965 diversified Army Special Forces operations in Southeast Asia. Direct combat and combat support missions and active counterinsurgency actions took on a more prominent role alongside the advisory and training role the Army filled in previous years.

The Army established 22 new Special Forces camps between 1966 and 1967. Designated as "fighting camps" in the highlands and "floating camps" in the delta region, the corresponding number of combat reconnaissance platoons was increased from 34 to 73.[19]

The fighting camps were simple, easily-defended encampments designed as a base for extended operations throughout a specific tactical area of responsibility. The camps were constructed with locally-procured materials and labor. Floating camps were designed to be functional even during the annual floods of the Mekong River as buildings were constructed with a floating floor that rose with the water. Medical and ammunition bunkers and weapons storage areas were built on reinforced platforms that also floated. Finally, the floating camps had floating helipads capable of supporting a loaded UH-1D.[20]

In the middle years of the Vietnam War, the Special Forces and their Vietnamese partners essentially became hunters of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army. No longer primarily advisors, U.S. forces were there to defeat the enemy. Indeed, the buildup of conventional U.S. forces shifted Special Operations activities from a largely defensive role to a distinctly offensive posture. By 1965, Special Forces troops and their Vietnamese (CIDG) counterparts had three clearly defined missions: destroy the Viet Cong and create a secure environment; establish governmental control over the population; and enlist the population's active support of the government.[21]

The troop buildup during this period resulted in new challenges. For example, the Special Forces troops who arrived in Vietnam in small numbers prior to 1965 were careful to develop close-knit relationships with the Vietnamese tribesmen with whom they worked. They also understood how to effectively use the Vietnamese irregulars. This changed somewhat in 1965 when new

[17] Kelly, US Army Special Forces: 1961 – 1971, 64
[18] Kelly, US Army Special Forces: 1961 – 1971, 74
[19] Kelly, US Army Special Forces: 1961 – 1971, 97
[20] Kelly, US Army Special Forces: 1961 – 1971, 108

[21] Kelly, US Army Special Forces: 1961 – 1971, 78

American commanders with no experience in the area began requesting that the Vietnamese irregulars undertake tasks they were neither trained nor prepared to execute. This remained a problem throughout the rest of the war.[22]



Source: Robert C. Lafoon. Photo CC-43909, NARA RG 111: Records of the Office of Chief Signal Officer, 1860-1985 Photographs of U.S. Army Operations in Vietnam, compiled 1963 - 1973.

Figure 2-4: A Special Forces Soldier and Villager constructing a bridge as part of the Army's Civic Action efforts. 1967.

Nonetheless, the CIDG units remained indispensable for their ability to gather intelligence. The Vietnamese irregulars and their U.S. and Vietnamese Special Forces leaders were ideally suited for the task of finding enemy forces from their dispersed camps that were often located Viet Cong territory. The intelligence gathering role expanded as American troop commitments grew. The information evolved from understanding regional dynamics in an effort to undermine Viet Cong operations to a less intensive process in which intelligence was limited to identifying in Viet Cong positions and feeding the information to conventional forces.[23]

[22] Kelly, US Army Special Forces: 1961 – 1971, 80
[23] Kelly, US Army Special Forces: 1961 – 1971, 82

Intelligence needs also resulted in the establishment of the 403rd Radio Research Special Operations Detachment and military intelligence detachments (unnumbered) in 1964 and 1965. The members of the military intelligence detachment were subdivided into five composite teams that each contained men with counterintelligence, interrogation, collection, analysis, and administrative skills. The teams were located at group headquarters and one team went to each of the four company headquarters in the four corps tactical zones where they managed intelligence operations in conjunction with other Special Forces troops. The 403rd was an airborne detachment attached to the 5th Special Forces battalion. The detachment was tasked with three interrelated communications tasks. Trained in signal intelligence and Special Forces capabilities, they provided communications intelligence, security, and countermeasures in support of 5th Special Forces operations and missions.[24] The 403rd and the military intelligence detachments were based at Fort Bragg, North Carolina when they were in the United States.

The increased demand for intelligence resulted in the development of unconventional operations carried out by the Special Forces. These operations included Projects Delta, Omega, and Sigma.

Project Delta operations consisted of a team infiltrating a Viet Cong controlled area by helicopter at dusk or after dark. The teams were initially only used for reconnaissance and were withdrawn if discovered, but eventually they continued operations with attacks on small targets that they could handle without help. When first established in December 1964, Project Delta consisted of six reconnaissance teams of eight Vietnamese and two U.S. Special Forces men each, and a reaction force. The reaction force was composed of three companies form the Vietnam Army's 91st Ranger Battalion (Airborne). Two years later, the force had expanded to 16 reconnaissance teams composed of 4 Vietnamese and 2 U.S. Special Forces members, 8 roadrunner teams, and a reaction force of 6 companies.[25]

Projects Omega and Sigma were each composed of 600 men organized into a reconnaissance element, a strike element, and an advisory command element. A typical operation might consist of long range reconnaissance over Viet Cong trail networks and saturation patrols in a designated reconnaissance zone. The reconnaissance elements would relay information to the strike elements who would engage small units of Viet Cong and aid in the extraction of reconnaissance units.[26]

Special Forces also formed the Apache Force and the Eagle Scouts. The Apache Force was a combined force of Special Forces men and indigenous troops who oriented Conventional American forces for combat against Viet Cong or North Vietnamese Army forces. The Apache Force also accompanied the conventional forces for the first several days of combat. The Eagle scouts were similar to the Apache force but helicopter based and designed to be more mobile in reconnaissance and combat operations.[27]

In late 1965, Special Forces soldiers and their Vietnamese counterparts were also formed into Mobile Strike Forces who specialized in long-range patrolling, reinforcement, and reaction.

[24] Kelly, US Army Special Forces: 1961 – 1971, 100

[25] Kelly, US Army Special Forces: 1961 – 1971, 90
[26] Kelly, US Army Special Forces: 1961 – 1971, 138, 140
[27]Kelly, US Army Special Forces: 1961 – 1971, 90-1

Every Mobile Strike Force consisted of a headquarters and three companies with a total strength of 594. Each company was composed of three infantry platoons, a weapons platoon, and a reconnaissance platoon which together had a total strength of 198. Finally, a Special Forces detachment was assigned to every Mobile Strike Force.[28] The Mobile Strike operations included extended roving missions in which they conducted reconnaissance, raided enemy bases, disrupted enemy communications and support, destroyed small enemy units, and established contact with large Viet Cong units before major air and ground forces could be called in. The strength of the Mobile Strike Forces doubled in the period from June 1966 through June 1967.[29] The 28 Mobile Strike Force companies provided indispensable support during the Tet offensive. As a result, the United States authorized a total of 47 companies in 1968.[30]

Mobile Guerilla Forces were established in late 1966. Inspired by the Mobile Strike concept, the units were organized, trained, and equipped to operate in remote areas for 30 to 60 days at a time. These were areas where no previous reconnaissance or clearing had occurred. The soldiers infiltrated an area and undertook a wide range of actions, including the compromise of communications and supply routes, surveillance, collection of intelligence, and the location of Viet Cong forces and installations. If Viet Cong base camps were found, the Mobile Guerrilla Forces raided or harassed the enemy.[31]

The Special Forces missions could be incredibly dangerous. For example, in March 1966 there was a significant engagement at A Shau, a Special Forces encampment about 5 miles from the Laotian border. Intelligence collected in early March indicated that an attack on the camp was imminent. In response, the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) committed a Mobile Strike Force company of 143 men, 7 of them U.S. Special Forces, arrived in the camp on March 7. The camp came under attack at 2 AM on March 9. Two American and 8 South Vietnamese soldiers died in the attack and 60 more soldiers (30 American and 30 South Vietnamese) were injured. The Army called for Marine Corps and Chinese Nung reinforcements, medevac, and airstrikes, but weather conditions precluded any immediate action. Sporadic fighting with limited air support continued through the day and intensified in the early morning of March 10 when the Viet Cong attacked the encampment again. This time they breeched the walls of the fortification. U.S. Special Forces and Nung volunteers fought off the attackers but became confined to the northern portion of their compound. By mid-morning March 10, air support finally became more regular, though still undermined by weather conditions. Meanwhile, conditions became desperate on the ground. The 380-man encampment could not withstand the attacks from 3 regiments of Viet Cong and, by the evening of March 10, the soldiers evacuated A Shau.[32]

During the middle of the war, Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) continued to play an important role in Special Forces operations. The missions were designed to either gain or bolster the support of non-combatants and soldiers in Vietnam and the army used several strategies to pursue this goal. The most effective, according to Army documents, was simple face-to-face contact. Subsumed in this concept were rallies, speeches, civic action, agitation, and one-on-one

[28] Kelly, US Army Special Forces: 1961 – 1971, 92
[29] Kelly, US Army Special Forces: 1961 – 1971, 117
[30] Kelly, US Army Special Forces: 1961 – 1971, 127

[31] Kelly, US Army Special Forces: 1961 – 1971, 134-135
[32] Kenneth Sams, "The Fall of A Shau: Project CHECO Report," April 18, 1966, accessed February 12, 2015, available from the National museum of the Air Force, http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-060629-001.pdf.

contact. Army Propaganda Teams conducted rallies among the families of known Viet Cong sympathizers. Culture Drama Teams provided entertainment for the South Vietnamese Troops. Mobile Training Teams travelled the country providing indoctrination training and Medical Civic Action Teams provided medical support in Viet Cong villages.[33] PSYOPS units also attempted to win the hearts and minds of the local population through loudspeakers mounted on aircraft and trucks that transmitted news, music, and civic messages. Messages and propaganda were also disseminated through other media, including radio, newspaper, movies, and comic books. PSYOPS battalions also provided support to Special Operations troops involved in pacification efforts. The importance of PYOPS to the Special Forces mission was pointed out in a late 1965 report that described PYSOPS as "the most important aspect of our operations."[34]

Mid-War PSYOPS units started small, but grew quickly. A PSYOP unit, composed of 7 officers and 21 soldiers, was formed from Special Forces units based at Fort Bragg in July 1965. Designated the 24th PSYOP Detachment, the unit arrived in Vietnam in September 1965.[35] The 24th was almost immediately joined by another small detachment of 22 officers and enlisted men, the 25th PSYOP Detachment, also from Fort Bragg. A larger PSYOP group, the 143-member 7th PSYOP group composed of soldiers based at Okinawa and Fort Bragg, was deployed to Vietnam in October 1965. PSYOPS quickly overwhelmed the units. Therefore, the 6th PSYOP battalion was organized from regular army units in Vietnam to alleviate the challenges of the bourgeoning PSYOP operations. The 6th, based at Saigon and Bien Hoa, was established to provide personnel and logistics support as well as command and control of all Special Forces PSYOPs units in Vietnam.[36]

The activation of the 6th PSYOP battalion in February 1966 signaled a new expanded PSYOPS mission. This included an intensified *Chieu Hoi* program. *Chieu Hoi* was a broad-based operation designed to encourage and facilitate the defection of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese soldiers and supporters. Established in 1963, *Chieu Hoi* did not have the resources to be very effective until 1967. Indeed, the United States played only an ancillary role in the program until 1966.[37]

The 6th PSYOP battalion was reorganized into the 4th PSYOP Group in December 1967 and 4 subordinate companies became battalions. The 244th and 245th Companies became the 7th and 8th PSYOP battalions. The 246th Company became the 6th PSYOP battalion. Finally, the 19th Company became the 10th PSYOPs battalion.[38]

[33] General 1968 Command History Vol 2, 1968, 597-8, Folder 01, Bud Harton Collection, The Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University; SP4 Vaughn Whiting, "Madison Avenue, Vietnam," *Typhoon*, Vol. 3, No. 6 (June 1969): 4-7.
[34] Michael G. Barger, "Special Operations Supporting Counterinsurgency: 4th PSYOP Group in Vietnam, M.A. Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2007, 26; General 1968 Command History, 600-602; Whiting, "Madison Avenue, Vietnam," 4-7.
[35] Barger, "Special Operations Supporting Counterinsurgency," 26. The detachment was designated the 245th PSYOP Company in 1966.
[36] Barger, "Special Operations Supporting Counterinsurgency," 26. The Battalion was designated the 4th PSYOP Group in December 1967.
[37] J. A. Koch, "The Chieu Hoi Program in South Vietnam 1963-1971," a report prepared for the Advanced Research Projects Agency, by the RAND Corporation, 1973, 20-1; Barger, "Special Operations Supporting Counterinsurgency," 33; General 1968 Command History, 593; History and Mission, 4th Psychological Operations Group, No Date, Folder 03, Box 01, John Cheney Collection, The Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University.
[38] History and Mission, 4th Psychological Operations Group, No Date, Folder 03, Box 01, John Cheney Collection, The Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University.

Within a year, the battalions of the 4th PSYOP Group were based throughout Vietnam. The 6th PSYOP Battalion was located a Bien Hoa and was responsible for the PSYOP support in all of the Corps III tactical zones, which included the populated urban areas of Saigon and Bien Hoa. The 7th PSYOP Battalion, based at Da Nanag, supported Marine Corps operations in the northern Corps I area. The battalion provided active support during the Tet Offensive. The 8th PSYOP Battalion, based in Pleiku and Nha Trang, provided PSYOPs in the large, central, Corps II region of Vietnam. The battalion also operated a radio station that broadcast messages throughout Vietnam. The 10th PSYOP Battalion, based at Can Tho, oversaw PSYOPS in the southern Corps IV area.[39]

Source: Wendell D. Garrett; Photo 43940, NARA RG 111: Records of the Office of Chief Signal Officer, 1860-1985 Photographs of U.S. Army Operations in Vietnam, compiled 1963 - 1973.

Figure 2-5: Members of the 245th PSYOPS company set up a camera to broadcast a film for villagers. 1967.

Army Special Operations forces also continued to implement civic actions. The 5th Group Civic Action Program accounted for half of all the civic action projects conducted by U.S. Army units during middle years of the war. Projects ranged from dam construction, crop development,

[39] History and Mission, 4th Psychological Operations Group, No Date, Folder 03, Box 01, John Cheney Collection, The Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University.

bridge building, and road improvements to the digging of wells, planning and supervising sanitation systems, the establishment of small businesses, the construction of hospitals, and the technical training of medical orderlies, dental technicians, and automotive mechanics.[40]

2.2.1.3 End of War

The United States' role in Vietnam shifted in 1969 when President Richard Nixon began implementing a process he coined "Vietnamization" in which the responsibility for prosecuting the war would be turned over to the Vietnamese. Meanwhile, the President began a phased withdrawal of over 100,000 American troops during the summer of 1969.

While simple in concept, Vietnamization was difficult for Army Special Forces to execute. According to Colonel Francis J. Kelly, Vietnamese Special Forces were not ready to take over the execution of their war. Moreover, Army Special Forces troops were in combat until the day they left, which left little room for a measured drawdown.[41]

Source: Talmadge B. Harbison; Photo CC-49886, NARA RG 111: Records of the Office of Chief Signal Officer, 1860-1985Photographs of U.S. Army Operations in Vietnam, compiled 1963 - 1973

Figure 2-6: Spreading PSYOPS leaflets and messages via truck. 1968.

[40] Kelly, US Army Special Forces: 1961 – 1971, 82-3
[41] Kelly, US Army Special Forces: 1961 – 1971,151

Meanwhile, the United States and its allies began concerted operations in Cambodia and Laos in the summer of 1970 and winter of 1971, respectively. Cambodia and Laos were both neutral nations, but the border region between Vietnam and Cambodia and Laos harbored Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops. Until the early 2000s, the Cambodian ground operation was described as one that was officially conducted by the Army's 1st Cavalry. Similarly, the Laotian campaign, known as Lam Son 719, was officially described as an operation in which no U.S. ground troops took part. Declassified records, however, indicate that Army Special Operations Group teams who had been active in covert operations across the Cambodian and Laotian borders since 1964, provided the functional foundation for both operations.[42]

Troop drawdowns continued in the midst of the Cambodian and Laotian operations. Indeed, by 1970, with a reduction in combat and decreased American resolve to move forward with redeployments, Vietnamization began to have a palpable effect on Special Forces operations. The Army began closing CIDG camps in early 1970 and by June the number of camps was reduced to 38 from a high of 73 three years earlier. The remaining CIDG camps were converted to Vietnamese Army Ranger camps by the end of the year.[43] Army Special Forces troops were incrementally redeployed to the United States as CIDG camps were closed or converted and Special Forces Soldiers were replaced by a small cadge of U.S. Army Advisors at each camp.

The advent of Vietnamization also resulted in a shift for the Army's PSYOPS operations. First, the PSYOPS units began transferring their operations to the Vietnamese and shifted their focus to supporting U.S. Army and Marine Corps pacification missions. Second, units began redeploying to the United States. In subsequent years, many PSYOPS units transitioned from active duty elements to Reserve elements. The last PSYOP units left Vietnam on 21 December 1971 and direct American involvement in the *Chieu Hoi* ended in 1972.[44]

The total redeployment of the Army 5th Special Forces Group was scheduled for 31 March 1971, shortly after the conclusion of Lam Son 719. About 40% of the American Special Forces soldiers redeployed to Fort Bragg. The rest were integrated in to conventional U.S. Army units in Vietnam.[45]

Historian Andrew J. Birtle notes that the fall of Saigon and the end of the Vietnam war marked a turning point for U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine. He correctly argues that President Kennedy's administration began pursuing counterinsurgency in 1962 from the optimistic perspective of philanthropic nation building and that, by the mid-1970s, such an approach was untenable.[46] The original idea was that counterinsurgency would prevent the prolonged conflict that the Vietnam War became.

[42] ; Simon Dunstan, *Vietnam Choppers: Helicopters in Battle, 1950–1975* (Osceola WI: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 2003), 41.
[43] Kelly, US Army Special Forces: 1961 – 1971, 156; Darrell W. Carr, "Civil Defense Forces in Counterinsurgency: An Analysis of The Civilian Irregular Defense Group In Vietnam," M.A. Thesis, Fort Leavenworth, 2012: 94-5
[44] Michael G. Barger "Psychological Operations Supporting Counterinsurgency: 4th PSYOP Group in Vietnam," M.A. Thesis, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2007: 60; Koch, "The Chieu Hoi Program," 58.
[45]Kelly, *US Army Special Forces: 1961 – 1971,* 157; The 5th Special Forces Group transferred to Fort Campbell in 1988.
[46] Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine," 477-8.

Counterinsurgency, moreover, was intended to give the Vietnamese the ability and resources to overcome threats to their well-being and prosperity. The failures of this idea were laid bare in 1975 when civilian and military agencies and strategists turned away from counterinsurgency toward more conventional means of defense and diplomacy.

2.2.2 AIR FORCE

2.2.2.1 Early War

Direct United States Air Force participation in the Vietnam region began in 1961. Air Force leadership ordered the establishment of a new squadron, the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron (CCTS), on 14 April 1961. The new unit was trained and based at Eglin AFB before they deployed to Southeast Asia. Code-named Jungle Jim, they were not a typical training squadron. They were tasked with covertly training South Vietnamese aviators using World War II-era fixed wing aircraft (C-47, B-26, T-28). The squadron was deployed in October 1961 with aircraft that were painted to match the insignia of the South Vietnamese Air Force. The airmen, who entered South Vietnam under the pretense of providing aid to flooded villages in the Mekong Delta, wore simple uniforms and carried nothing that might identify them as Americans. Once in Vietnam, they were expressly ordered keep a low profile and avoid the press. Their operation, called OPERATION FARM GATE, lasted until 1963.[47]

Another Air Force unit, 2d Advanced Echelon deployed to Vietnam and established at Tan San Nhut Airport near Saigon in the fall of 1961. They supported OPERATION FARM GATE by providing reconnaissance and intelligence, again under the guise of humanitarian relief in the Mekong Delta.[48]

The Air Force Special Operations presence increased in January 1962 when RANCH HAND, a unit of 69 men and 6 C-123s, arrived at Tan San Nhut. The unit was tasked with the application of defoliants to open up the jungle canopy along communication routes.[49] They also flew C-47s (previously based at Pope AFB, North Carolina) equipped with loudspeakers and the ability to spread leaflets for psychological operations in support of FARM GATE.

By 1964, the RANCH HAND mission had evolved into solely a defoliation operation run by crews from the 309th Air Commando Squadron, a redesignated troop carrier unit out of Pope AFB, North Carolina. The defoliation missions also evolved from a program focusing on communication routes to one that also targeted transportation routes and enemy crops. The missions were also modified to target Viet Cong "safe havens" in the Mekong Delta. RANCH HAND crews sprayed defoliant over nearly 100 square miles of jungle and destroyed over 15,000 acres of crops in 1964. The program grew in 1965 to include operations in neighboring Laos.[50]

[47] Jacob Van Staaveren, "USAF Plans and Policies in South Vietnam, 1961-1963," (USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, 1965) 11, 14, 34. Accessed February 4, 2015, available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB248/.
[48] Russell G. Ochs, "The Evolution of USAF Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia," (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL.) 4, accessed February 5, 2015, available at http://rotorheadsrus.us/documents/Ochs-7366-4.pdf ; Van Staaveren, "USAF Plans and Policies," 18.
[49] Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report # 171 - Ranch Hand Herbicide Operations in Southeast Asia - 01 July 1961 to 31 May 1971, 13 July 1971, Folder 0169, Box 0003, Vietnam Archive Collection, The Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University, 6; Van Staaveren, "USAF Plans and Policies," 18-19
[50] James R. Clary, "Ranch Hand Operations in SEA: 1961-1971, July 13 1971, 9-10, 11, 13. See also William Buckingham, Jr. *The Air Force and Herbicides in Southeast Asia, 1961-1971* (Washington DC.: Office of Air Force History, 1982).

The expansion of USAF Operations in Vietnam is evident in the fact that the number of USAF aircraft deployed to South Vietnam increased from 35 in 1961 to 117 by the end of 1963.[51]

FARM GATE was disbanded in June 1963 and the 1st Air Commando Squadron was established in its place with detachments at Bien Hoa Airfield, Pleiku Airfield, and Soc Trang. The 1st Air Commando Squadron was officially organized at the Special Air Warfare Center (SAWC) at Eglin AFB in the United States. The unit was a component of President Kennedy's effort to expand the United States' Special Operations and counterinsurgency capabilities, an effort best known for the creation of the Army's Green Berets. The SAWC was created to train and instruct the Air Force's newly created counterinsurgency Air Commandos. The Air Force counterinsurgency mission was described in 1962 as an advisory program to "teach our distant allies how to put down Communist aggression."[52] In reality, the Air Commandos served as an adjunct to CIA operations in Southeast Asia.

Trained at Eglin AFB in Florida and Stead AFB in Nevada (NV), the air commandos initially tested and developed techniques that enabled them to serve as advisors. Specifically, they trained in and developed instructional programs in guerrilla warfare, low-level drop techniques for equipment and personnel, close air support, fast deployments, reconnaissance, and psychological operations. They also trained in hand-to-hand combat and many were qualified by the Army as paratroopers. Finally, the Air Commandos played an active role in the research, development, and testing of equipment.[53]

The 1st Air Commando Squadron operated out of Bien Hoa Airfield, Pleiku Airfield, and Soc Trang from 1963 until 1966 when they transferred to Nakhon Phanom Air Base in Thailand. The squadron's advisory mission evolved into a combat and combat support mission as the war intensified.

2.2.2.2 Middle of the War

A 1967 Air Force report reflecting on the growth of activities in Vietnam noted that air war capabilities and responsibilities had dramatically expanded. Air Force missions ranged from transport to assault, but the authors maintained that Special Operations (Special Air Warfare) remained the foundation of Air Force activities in Southeast Asia. Special Air Warfare fell into four categories: revolutionary development, counterinsurgency, psychological warfare, and civic action.[54]

Revolutionary development was a "nation-building" program intended to prepare Vietnam for "future economic growth."[55] To this end, Special Air Warfare units assisted in the construction of infrastructure, schools, and medical centers and facilitated the development of local industry, especially fishing and textiles.

[51] Van Staaveren, "USAF Plans and Policies," 104.
[52] Claude Witze, "USAF Polishes it new COIN," *Air Force Magazine*, June 1962, 46-7
[53] Witze, "USAF Polishes it new COIN," 49-50.
[54] Department of the Air Force, "Fact Sheet: The U.S. Air Force in Southeast Asia," Report 3-67 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 1967), 20.
[55] Air Force, "U.S. Air Force in Southeast Asia," 20.

Counterinsurgency (COIN) was a mainstay of Air Force operations in Southeast Asia since the early 1960s. However, in 1966, a clandestine group of USAF Commandos began operating in Laos at the behest of the CIA. The CIA had been active in Laos since the early 1960s training Hmong villagers in hopes of undermining the Pathet Lo villagers who supported the North Vietnamese. The Laos operations are best known today for the Air America fixed wing and helicopter cargo transport program. Another CIA operation in Laos was the Steve Canyon Program, which began in the mid-1960s. Steve Canyon was an operation designed to impede the North Vietnamese development of the Ho Chi Minh trail. Selected Air Force pilots, who came to be known as Ravens, flew O-1 Bird Dogs. They provided forward air control for airstrikes and inserted Special Forces units into Laos. The Ravens operated covertly with no identification linking them to the USAF.[56]

In 1967, Air Force planners described psychological warfare (PSYWAR) as a tool to "subvert the enemy through the use of propaganda" designed to "make the enemy soldier forcefully aware of the economic, social, and political disadvantages of the life he is leading compared to life in an improved society."[57]

Air Force PSYWAR operations date to at least 1962, but were not consolidated until 1965 with the formation of the 5th Air Commando Squadron. Responsible for all PSYOPS in Corps Areas III and IV, the squadron supported Army PSYOPS by distributing propaganda leaflets and broadcasting messages to enemy troops and groups deemed susceptible to enemy influence. The 5th Air Commando Squadron was designated the 5th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) and placed under the 14th Special Operations Wing (SOW) in 1968, but their missions remained unchanged.[58]

Air Force PSYOP crews were very busy. In a 12-month period spanning the latter part of 1965 into 1966, the crews logged more than 16,600 hours in the air, over 4,000 hours of which included loudspeaker broadcasts. Over an 11-day period in January 1966 they dropped 130 million leaflets and broadcast 380 hours of tape. According to reports, the Air Force dropped over one billion leaflets over Vietnam in 1966 and broadcast hundreds of hours of propaganda. Air Force sources claim that the efforts led to the defection of more than 15,000 Viet Cong.[59]

The PSYOP missions lasted up to 4 hours and were conducted in cooperation with United States Army Special Forces and Vietnamese Army Forces (ARVN). The ARVN and Army provided the propaganda leaflets and tapes which were flown over target areas by Air Force C-47 "Gooney Birds" and U-10 aircraft.[60] Air Force PSYOPs leaflet drops continued in 1967 and 1968, but at a reduced rate. During one week in 1970 (15 – 22 April), a total of 109,988,000 leaflets were dropped.[61]

[56] Ralph Wetterhahn, "Ravens of Long Tieng," *Air & Space Magazine*, November 1998, available at https://www.airspacemag.com/military-aviation/ravens-of-long-tieng-284722/?all.
[57] Air Force, "U.S. Air Force in Southeast Asia," 21
[58] Report, 14th Special Operations Wing - Psychological Operations of the 14th Special Operations Wing, No Date, Folder 01, Box 01, Vietnam Women Veterans Association, The Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University.
[59] Air Force, "U.S. Air Force in Southeast Asia," 21-2
[60] Air Force, "U.S. Air Force in Southeast Asia," 22
[61] MACJ3-11, April 1970

In 1968, aircraft flew 11,639 sorties dropping nearly two million leaflets. The reduction was partly due to the fact that leaflet drops had been significantly refined by 1968. Researchers at Johns Hopkins University determined that an average of 18-30 leaflets should be dropped per 1,000 meters over target villages. The research also determined that the ideal leaflet was 6 x 3 inches.[62]

Source: Jerome McCavitt; Photo CC-36729, NARA RG 111: Records of the Office of Chief Signal Officer, 1860-1985Photographs of U.S. Army Operations in Vietnam, compiled 1963 - 1973.

Figure 2-7: Dropping PSYOPS leaflets from an Air Force C-47.1966.

The Air Force also provided assistance through civic action programs. The Air Force defined civic action as an effort to provide direct support to the Vietnamese people. While medical support was a cornerstone of Air Force Civic Action, the program was certainly more broadly implemented. For example, in 1966, Airmen provided protective cover to rice harvesters in South Vietnam. Once harvested, the rice was transported out of the fields by the helicopters of the 20th Helicopter Squadron, one of two non-SAR Air Force helicopter units in Vietnam.[63]

The Air Force deployed the 20th Helicopter squadron from Eglin AFB to Vietnam in early 1965. The squadron, which was renamed the 20th SOS in 1968, arrived at Tan San Nhut with 14 HH-3s

[62] General 1968 Command History, 604
[63] Air Force, "U.S. Air Force in Southeast Asia," 21

in February 1965 to provide transport support for the Air Force and other military branches. Eight of the squadron's helicopters were temporarily moved to Da Nang in December 1965 to support Marine Corps operations. The entire squadron relocated to Nha Trang in March 1966 to support the Army's 101st Airborne.

The 20th Helicopter's transport missions were often not typical. For example, their role in support of the 101st Airborne consisted of ferrying howitzers to the mountaintops in the mornings and retrieving them in the evening to prevent them from falling into the hands of the Viet Cong. The helicopters, most of which were transferred to Thailand in June 1966, also flew covert missions into Laos, North Vietnam, southern China, and Cambodia. Helicopter crews supported Special Operations units working in these areas.[64]

Another USAF helicopter unit deployed to Vietnam in 1967. The 21st Helicopter Squadron (renamed the 21st SOS in 1968) arrived in Southeast Asia from Shaw AFB in September 1967. The squadron's primary mission was the disruption of the Ho Chi Minh Trail through the installation of sensors and delivery of Road Watch teams. The 21st Special Operation Squadron absorbed the 20th SOS in 1969 and adopted the 20th's missions.[65] While most missions were combat related, the USAF helicopter squadron also assisted with rescues, provided humanitarian aid, and supported construction projects.

The Air Force 14th Air Commando Wing was established with elements of the 1st Air Commando Squadron at Nha Trang Air Base in 1966. Additional Squadrons joined the Wing in 1968. These were the 3rd Air Commando Squadron (activated in Vietnam), 4th Air Commando Squadron (activated in Vietnam) 5th Air Commando Squadron (activated in Vietnam), 6th Air Commando Squadron, based out of England AFB, Louisiana (LA), and 15th Air Commando Squadron (activated in Vietnam). All the Air Commando Squadrons were subsequently redesignated Special Operations Squadrons. The 17th and 18th SOS joined the wing in 1969. The 18th SOS was based out of Lockbourne AFB in Ohio. The 17th Special Operation Squadron was established and eventually deactivated in Vietnam.

The 14th worked closely with Army PSYOP battalions and Special Forces units. Operating out of 10 different airfields in Vietnam, the airmen operated several different types of aircraft to support a broad range of operations. The 14th SOW included two PSYOP squadrons, a counterinsurgency helicopter squadron, two AC-47 Dragonship squadrons, and one AC-119G Gunship Squadron. The 14th SOW combat elements were especially active in the support of the CIDG program. The PSYOPS squadrons flew O-2s, U-10s, and C-47s in their support mission, which included the aerial distribution of propaganda leaflets and the broadcast of taped messages via loudspeaker. These activities spanned into the later years of the war.[66]

The RANCH HAND defoliation operation, which began in the early years of the war, continued into the middle of the war under the command of the 309th Air Commando Squadron. The

[64] Phillip D Chinnery, *Air Commando: Inside the Air Force Special Operations Command* (New York, NY.: St. Martins Press, 1994) 123-124, 129.
[65] Chinnery, *Air Commando*, 129.

[66] Report, U.S. Army - A Short History of the 14th Special Operations Wings, Nha Trang Air Base, Republic of Vietnam [2 Copies], No Date, Folder 01, Box 01, Vietnam Women Veterans Association, The Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University.

RANCH HAND missions consisted of at least two C-123 aircraft flying in formation applying defoliant in 600-foot wide, 10-mile long, swaths. A three-plane formation could apply the defoliant in 900-foot wide, 10-mile long, swaths. In 1966 alone, RANCH HAND aircraft dispensed nearly 200,000 gallons of defoliant over 80,000 acres of landscape and cropland in Vietnam and Laos. The year also marked another expansion of operations as RANCH HAND crews began undertaking missions over North Vietnam.[67]

Regardless of location, the missions were dangerous and vulnerable to damage from enemy ground troops. Therefore, as the war progressed, RANCH HAND missions incorporated heavy suppression techniques in which fighter aircraft preceded the C-123s over their target areas by about 20 seconds. The fighters deployed antipersonnel ordnance over the area to reduce the threat of enemy groundfire.[68]

2.2.2.3 End of the War

RANCH HAND missions continued after Vietnamization, but evolved as the United States attempted to shift more responsibility and resources to the South Vietnamese. While the general outlines of the program remained unchanged in 1968, the number of missions reduced significantly in correspondence with curtailed combat operations and the fact that the South Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) was taking a larger role in the defoliation missions. These trends continued into 1969 and 1970.[69]

In 1970, laboratory experiments determined that Agent Orange [equal parts 2,4-dichlorophenoxyacetic acid (2,4-D) and 2,4,5-tricholorophenoxyacheric acid (2,4,5-T)], the herbicide used in the RANCH HAND, missions posed a significant health risk. As a result, the military temporarily suspended the use of Agent Orange. By the spring of 1970, RANCH HAND operations transitioned away from defoliation. The crews briefly provided flare support during the Cambodian incursion, but generally focused on PSYOPS missions over Cambodia. Even the PSYOPS missions were short lived. The 12th SOS was deactivated and incorporated into the 315th Tactical Airlift Wing in early July 1970.[70]

The deactivation did not result in the end of RANCH HAND missions and the United States resumed defoliation flights in late July. Crews form the 315th Tactical Airlift Wing flew about 19 sorties a month through the summer and fall of 1970, but the program was nearing its end. Politicians, academics and activists in the United States argued against the use of chemicals that were now understood to cause considerable harm. Generally, military officials were less concerned about the health effects when compared to the fact that the program had become inefficient and uneconomical. Regardless of the motivation, military leaders decided to phase out defoliation operations in Vietnam by May 1971. The end came more quickly; the last RANCH HAND mission occurred on 7 January 1971 and the entire program was deactivated by the end of the month.[71]

[67] Clary, "Ranch Hand Operations in SEA," 3, 15; Air Force, "U.S. Air Force in Southeast Asia," 22.
[68] Clary, "Ranch Hand Operations in SEA," 4.

[69] Clary, "Ranch Hand Operations in SEA," 23, 24.
[70] Clary, "Ranch Hand Operations in SEA," 27-8
[71] Clary, "Ranch Hand Operations in SEA," 29-30, 32.

Air Force Special Operations units participated in missions in Cambodia and Laos until 1973. The 20th SOS transported and extracted Army Special Forces Special Operations Group teams operating in the region in 1970 and 1971 and the Steve Canyon Program continued until September 1973. The 20th SOS was aboard the USS Midway for OPERATION EAGLE PULL and OPERATION FREQUENT WIND while the 21st SOS airlifted evacuees from Cambodia and Vietnam.

The Air Force's helicopter SOS participated in one final mission before leaving the Vietnam region. The Khmer Rouge Navy seized an American container ship called the SS *Mayaguez* on 12 May 1975. President Gerald Ford considered the seizure an act of piracy and ordered rescue operations, which began on 15 May. CH43s from the 21st SOS (and HH-53s from the 40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron) began transporting a Marine Assault force to a location near the SS *Mayaguez*. The helicopters also provided combat search and rescue and assault support. The Khmer Rouge presented strong resistance making the rescue attempt difficult and costly. Thirteen of the 15 helicopters used in the operation were either destroyed (4) or damaged (9).[72] This was the last combat action that the Air Force SOS saw before it was deactivated in September 1975.

2.2.3 MARINE CORPS

2.2.3.1 Early War

Marine Corps involvement in Vietnam was limited during the early years of the war and activity focused on support. The first Marine squadron committed to Vietnam was a helicopter squadron. Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron-362 arrived at a World War II-era airfield called Soc Trang in the Spring of 1962. Marine Corps helicopter squadrons based their operations out of the airfield from 1962 until 1964 when they moved to Da Nang Air Base. The squadron supported American military personnel who were serving as advisors and assisted the South Vietnamese and the United States in providing logistical support. Marine aviators offered reconnaissance, assault support, medical evacuation, offensive air support, troop lift, and resupply for the combat troops. Known as OPERATION SHUFLY, the mission lasted until the deployment of ground troops in 1965. Various Marine Corps helicopter squadrons rotated in and out of Vietnam during this period.[73] Marine Corps Special Operations forces did not arrive until March 1965.

2.2.3.2 Middle of the War

The A platoon of the Marine Corps 1st Force Recon arrived in Vietnam in March 1965. Their initial mission was to provide reconnaissance support for conventional units and "conduct pre-assault and distant post assault reconnaissance" in support of landing units. Force Recon's first mission in Vietnam was beach reconnaissance for the wave of Marine Corp landings in the Da Nang and Chu Lai areas in 1965.[74] The platoon subsequently settled in at Cam Ranh Bay, their

[72] Earl H. Tilford Jr., *Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia* (Washington, DC, Office of Air Force History, US Air Force, 1980), 154.
[73] "Operation Shufly Commemoration," no date, accessed February 20, 2015, available at https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/operation-shufly-commemoration; Fails, William R. Fails, *Marines and Helicopters, 1962–1973* (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, US Marine Corps 1978), 31-2, 79. The role of Helicopters in Vietnam is not addressed in detail in this context.
[74] Jack Shulimson and Charles M. Jones, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Landing and the Buildup, 1965* (Washington D.C.: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1978): 170, 172.

base of operations. Two more platoons arrived in mid-summer and fall and based themselves at Chu Lai and Da Nang, respectively.

By May 1965, the 1st Force Recon units were assigned to United States Army Special Forces units operating out of Da Nang, Phu Bai, Gia Vuc, Phi Buc, Ba To, and Kham Duc. The Marines attached to the Army Units provided reconnaissance support for the CIDG program. In addition, they acted as quick response patrols providing security for downed Marine Corps (and presumably Army) helicopters.[75]

Marine Corps Force Recon expanded in late 1965. The 3rd Force Recon Company was formed as a satellite of the 2nd Force Recon, based at Camp Lejeune, NC in September 1965. The Company recruited volunteers from active duty elements of the Marine Corps and departed for intensive training in the Caribbean and Panama in early 1966. The first units arrived in Vietnam in July 1966. Based at Da Nang, Phu Bai, and Chu Lai the 3rd Force Recon missions initially focused on defensive operations near the installations, but eventually grew to incorporate more typical reconnaissance operations.[76]

Reconnaissance missions were usually directed at known enemy harbor sites or related communication and supply lines. The Force Recon teams operated in small groups of seven Marines from either a platoon patrol base established in the countryside or they were inserted into operational areas by helicopter. Team members included a team leader [and officer or non-commissioned officer (NCO)], a corpsman, two radiomen, and a Marine armed with an M79 "blooper." Reconnaissance patrols typically lasted three to four days. The patrols were always conducted in undeveloped hostile territory and soldiers were authorized to shoot anyone they saw without hesitation.[77] These missions and strategies remained largely unchanged for the duration of the war.[78]

Marine Corps leadership realized in 1966 that conventional Marine Corps units were "too clumsy" to locate and destroy Viet Cong troop concentrations that were constantly on the move and expert at blending into their environment. Therefore, they implemented a strategy known as "stingray." The "stingray" model provided Marine Corps Force Recon units with the training, equipment, and authority to call in fire missions on targets of opportunity when encountered.[79]

Force Recon Special Operations were supplemented by the Marine Corps Combined Action Platoons (CAP), a program similar to the Army's CIDG units. First formed in August 1965, the CAP forces were comprised of 13 Marines, a Navy Corpsman, and a contingent of 35 Vietnamese Popular Forces (PF).[80] The CAP unit members spent their entire time in the Vietnamese backcountry. They had no definable base and the program was extremely

[75] Shulimson and Jones, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*: 172
[76] Shulimson and Jones, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*: 174-5
[77] B.E. Trainor, "Recon Operations in Southeast Asia,1970-1971" *Marine Corps Gazette,* Vol. 70, No. 5 (May 1986), 54
[78] See Gary L. Telfer, Lane Rodgers , and V. Keith Fleming, Jr., *U.S. Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the north Vietnamese, 1967* (Washington D.C.: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1984); Jack Shulimson, Leonard A. Balsiol, Charles R. Smith , and David A. Dawson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Defining Year, 1968,* (Washington D.C.: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1997); Charles R. Smith, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam: High Mobility and Standdown, 1969* (Washington D.C.: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1988).
[79] Shulimson and Jones, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*: 179
[80] Curtis L. Williamson III., "The US Marine Corps Combined Action Program (CAP): Proposed Alternative Strategy for the Vietnam War,"*M.M.S. Thesis,* U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2002, 13.

decentralized. Unit members were drawn from Marine Corps infantry, but CAP association with infantry battalions was informal and largely administrative. As one author noted, the only time a Marine or Sailor left the jungle was when he was "rotating home, wounded, or dead."[81]

The CAP program was voluntary, but members had to meet several requirements to be considered for it. First, one had to have been in Vietnam for at least four months and have no disciplinary actions recorded against him. He was also expected to harbor no discriminatory or xenophobic notions about the Vietnamese people. Finally, the volunteer needed a personal recommendation from his battalion commander.[82]

Source: G.J. Vojack: Photo A372286 NARA RG 127: Records of the Marine Corps, Color Photographs of Marine Corps Activities in Vietnam, 1962 - 1975.

Figure 2-8: Lance Corporal Elam and ARVN soldier participating in the Combined Action Program. 1969.

Once selected for the CAP program, the Marines were sent to Da Nang for a two-week CAP school in which the men were taught Vietnamese customs, basic language skills, small unit operations, intelligence procedures and counter-intelligence measures.[83]

CAP missions began with an encampment near a friendly village. The soldiers slowly integrated themselves into the village. At first they just observed the village without interfering. Once they

[81] Barry L. Goodson, *CAP Môt: The Story of a Marine Special Forces Unit in Vietnam, 1968 – 1969*, volume 5 of the War and the Southwest Series (Denton, TX.: University of North Texas Press, 1997): viii; Williamson III., "The US Marine Corps Combined Action Program," 14-15.
[82] Williamson III., "The US Marine Corps Combined Action Program," 14.
[83] Williamson III., "The US Marine Corps Combined Action Program," 13.

learned the local routine, the Marines would begin to interact with the local villagers while still residing at their encampment. As time passed, they would begin spending a few nights a week in the village until, ultimately, the Marines began residing in the village full-time.[84]

Once the American CAP forces inserted themselves into a village, they undertook the training of the Vietnamese Popular Force and instructed them on tactics. The Vietnamese, for their part, taught the Marines the Vietnamese language, instructed them on local customs, and provided intelligence on Viet Cong locations. Initially, the Popular Force and Marine Corps CAP units focused only on daytime local security and defensive patrols. Missions became more complex as training proceeded. Eventually, the CAP units began undertaking daily patrols during both day and night.[85]

The CAP engagement with Viet Cong followed a typical pattern. Initially, when the CAP platoons first established themselves in a village, Viet Cong forces would retreat to more secure positions (villages). The CAP platoon would then fan out in an attempt to cut off the enemy's access to recruits and supplies. Concurrently, U.S. Army Special Forces would conduct long range patrols to further destabilize Viet Cong resources. Once supply sources were effectively undermined, the Viet Cong typically doubled back and attempted to openly attack the villages. Relying on effective intelligence from villagers, the CAP platoons would call in reaction (combat) forces and aerial assault in anticipation of village attacks. According to Major Curtis L. Williamson III, the Viet Cong were no match to American conventional forces and weapons in such situations.[86]

The initial success of the CAP operations was encouraging and the Marine Corps extended the program in subsequent years. There were 58 CAP platoons in 1966, 79 in 1967, 102 in 1968, and 114 in 1969. The CAP program also developed a defined 6-part mission. It was:

1) Destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure within the village or hamlet area of responsibility.
2) Protect public security and help maintain law and order.
3) Protect the friendly infrastructure.
4) Protect the bases and lines of communication within the villages and hamlets.
5) Organize the people's intelligence nets.
6) Participate in civic action and conduct propaganda against the Viet Cong.[87]

Most importantly, the CAP battalions provided a daily link between the remote villages and the South Vietnamese government and their allies. In many cases, the local security provided by the battalions served to undermine Viet Cong efforts to win the hearts and minds of the villagers.

In addition to security, the Marines provided civic support. For example, in one year a single CAP unit constructed or facilitated the construction of nine bridges; 9 churches, temples, or pagodas; 13 culverts; 4 dispensaries; 113 family dwellings; 8 fences; 3 market places; 3 playgrounds, 1.45 miles of roads; 6 schools with 9 classrooms; 1 public shower; 4 public

[84] Williamson III., "The US Marine Corps Combined Action Program," 16.
[85] Williamson III., "The US Marine Corps Combined Action Program," 16

[86] Williamson III., "The US Marine Corps Combined Action Program," 39-40.
[87] Williamson III., "The US Marine Corps Combined Action Program," 14.

restrooms; 95 wells; 8 dams/dikes; and 1 village office. Marine Corps civic actions continued throughout the middle years of the war and grew to include larger projects such as the construction of a 10-building, 120-bed, children's hospital in Quang Tri City.[88]

The Marine Amphibious Force (MAF), which was deactivated after World War II, was reactivated as III MAF for operations in Vietnam in May 1965. However, unlike World War II where the MAF was a small reconnaissance force, the Vietnam iteration of the Force filled a more traditional role. The III MAF consisted of the 3rd Marine Division, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and elements of the 1st Marine Division. Based at Chu Lai, Phu Bai, and Da Nang, the III MAF participated in largely conventional campaigns. As such, the III MAF grew from and initial strength of 5,000 soldiers to 70,000 men by 1966. By 1969 the MAF had grown to over 80,000 troops.[89]

2.2.3.3 End of the War

By 1970, Vietnamization and the associated troop drawdowns placed Marine Corps Reconnaissance units front and center in security and intelligence gathering operations in areas where Marine Corps troops were still deployed. They filled a void left by the decrease in traditional combat units.[90]

The reconnaissance units continued to call in fire missions, but this activity became exceedingly rare by 1970 because there were very few worthwhile targets in the areas where they operated.[91] This resulted in a dramatic drawdown of Force Recon units in Vietnam. For example, the 3rd Force Recon was at its peak strength in January 1970 with an average monthly strength of nearly 170 men. Six months later, when the 3rd Force Recon was deactivated, the unit consisted of one officer and one enlisted Marine.[92] The 1st Force Recon was also redeployed to Camp Pendleton in 1970 and deactivated in 1974.

The CAP program reached its peak in January 1970 with a strength of 44 officers and nearly 2,200 enlisted men. However, policy changes associated with Vietnamization soon diminished CAP strength. Deactivations began in February 1970 and gained considerable momentum over the summer. By the end of July, the total number of CAP troops was about half of what it was less than 7 months earlier. The CAP program continued shrinking until the end of 1970 when it consisted of one CAP group attached to the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MAB). The last CAP soldiers left Vietnam in June 1971 with the 3rd MAB.[93]

[88] Michael P Peterson, The Combined Action Platoons: The U.S. Marines' Other War in Vietnam. (New York, NY.: Praeger Publishers, 1989): 104; Marine Corps Historical Reference Pamphlet: U.S. Marine Corps Civic Action Effort in Vietnam March 1965 - March 1966, 1968, Folder 05, Box 01, James Friguglietti Collection, The Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University; Telfer, Rodgers, and Fleming, Jr., *U.S. Marines in Vietnam . . . 1967*: 189, 192-3; Shulimson, et. al., *U.S. Marines in Vietnam . . . 1968*: 604, 605, 612; 287-288; Smith, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam . . . 1969*, 287-88.
[89] Jack Shulimson, "The Marine War: III MAF in Vietnam, 1965-1971,", n.p., available at https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/events/1996_Symposium/96papers/marwar.php; Smith, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam . . . 1969*, 2.
[90] Trainor, "Recon Operations," 54.
[91] Trainor, "Recon Operations," 54.
[92] Command Chronology, 01 January 1970, Folder 025, US Marine Corps History Division Vietnam War Documents Collection, The Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University.
[93] Graham A. Cosmas and Terrence P. Murray, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam: Vietnamization and Redeployment 1970–1971* (Washington, DC: History and Museum Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1986): 139 ,150, 152.

Major Curtis L. Williamson III reviewed the successes and failures on the CAP program in 2002. He noted that the small CAP units successfully provided security "at little cost to the peasant and his way of life." He also noted that the integration of the Marines into the village resulted in an effective, two-pronged intelligence program. On one hand, villagers, who developed a relationship with the Marines regularly provided imperative information. On the other hand, the Viet Cong who relied on villagers for their own intelligence, experienced an information drought where the CAP forces were active. Similarly, the Viet Cong recruitment of villagers was effectively undermined in villages where the Marines were operating.[94]

Williamson points out three areas where the CAP program failed to meet expectations. First, many Marines were never able to fully appreciate and respect the Vietnamese villagers. Cultural ignorance and petty theft was not uncommon among the Americans. Second, he notes that the lack of a strict command structure undermined troop discipline. In addition to incidences of petty theft, there were isolated cases of extortion, rape, and murder. While these activities are not an indictment of the CAP program as a whole, Williamson points out that such behavior was less likely to occur under the direct command of a senior officer. Third, the CAP program suffered from the lack of a unified overarching strategy that could shape missions; instead the CAP units were isolated without mutual support. Finally, Williamson argues that the CAP battalions were hamstrung by Marine Corps leadership who were more interested in search and destroy missions along the DMZ than the specialized counterinsurgency operations on which the CAP program focused.[95]

The CAP continued in 1970, but like other aspects of the war, it was in transition. Civic support projects became less common through 1970 due to two factors. One was the simple reality that there were fewer and fewer Marines available to undertake such tasks. Second, in keeping with the Vietnamization policy, more civic action projects were placed in the hands of the Vietnamese military. Most official civic action undertakings were cancelled by the end of the year. Nonetheless, Marines and engineer units still in Vietnam undertook some civic action projects near their installations until the Spring of 1971.[96]

2.2.4 NAVY

2.2.4.1 Early War

The Navy's first Special Operations foray into Vietnam occurred in 1959 when members of UDT 12, based at Coronado, California, piloted boats up the Mekong River into Laos when they delivered 10 landing craft to Laotian anti-Communist forces. The team also carried out hydrographic surveys along South Vietnam's coast.[97] This, however, was an isolated mission and not reflective of a programmatic Special Operations effort in Southeast Asia.

[94] Williamson III., "The US Marine Corps Combined Action Program," 18, 21, 22.
[95] Williamson III., "The US Marine Corps Combined Action Program," 29-32.
[96] Cosmas and Murray, U.S. Marines in Vietnam . . . 1970–1971," 171-2, 227.
[97] The Underwater Demolition Team Handbook: First Edition 1965, 1965, 12, Folder 02, Box 02, Jerry J. Fletcher Collection, The Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University; Edward J. Marolda and G. Wesley Pryce III, *A Short History of the United States Navy and the Southeast Asian Conflict: 1950–1975* (Washington, DC: Navy Historical Center Department of the Navy 1984), 6.

President Kennedy's Chief of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor, visited Vietnam in October 1961 on a fact-finding mission. One of the conclusions he came away with was that the United States needed to develop increased counterinsurgency capabilities. The Navy responded by establishing two 60-man SEAL (Sea, Air and Land) teams on 1 January 1962. The SEALS were trained to carry out guerilla warfare at sea and in rivers, canals, harbors and adjacent land areas. The SEAL teams were also expected to train American and Allied forces in Special Operations. SEAL Team 1, was assigned to the Pacific Fleet and based at Coronado Island (now Naval Base Coronado). A second team, SEAL Team 2, was assigned to the Atlantic Fleet and based at Little Creek, VA (now Joint Expeditionary Base – Little Creek).

The newly established SEAL teams focused on commando-style raiding from the sea or through the air. Like other Special Operations units, they focused on unconventional warfare using small-unit tactics, paramilitary direct-action missions, and reconnaissance.

The SEAL teams were drawn from existing UDT units. The UDT teams were already trained to clear underwater obstacles in advance of assaulting groups. The SEALs added additional capabilities including airborne and land operations. Moreover, the new units began training immediately for covert direct action and reconnaissance missions on land. Prospective SEALS underwent significant training that spanned over half a year. Primary training, which lasted four months, was quite similar to UDT training, which was essentially unchanged since World War II. A centerpiece of the program was a rigorous conditioning regime, including the notorious "Hell Week" exercises. Seamen who completed the initial training program travelled to Fort Benning, Georgia (GA) where they spent three weeks undergoing Airborne training. At this point, most of the sailors were assigned to existing UDT units. A small percentage went straight to a SEAL team. At this point they embarked on another 6 weeks of training to become operationally qualified as Navy SEALs.

Detachments from SEAL Team 1 and SEAL Team 2 deployed to Vietnam in 1963 and 1964. Based at Da Nang, the detachments served as advisors to American and South Vietnamese soldiers and worked closely with the CIA. They also instructed American advisors and South Vietnamese frogmen and Coastal Force commandos in Special Operations, but did not serve in a combat role.[98]

Nonetheless, the SEAL Teams required specialized transport boats in Vietnam. To this end, the Navy developed the small Patrol Torpedo Fast (PTF) boat force, which was capable of carrying out hit and run and landing operations along the coast. The first boats were 2 Korean War-era motor torpedo boats that the Navy reactivated in 1962 and armed with 40-millimeter and 20-millimeter guns. By 1963, the Navy had acquired 2 more PTF craft for the SEAL teams. They were Norwegian-built boats called "Nastys" that were considered ideal for the Southeast Asian environment. The PTF force grew to 8 boats by the end of 1964 with the addition of 4 more "Nastys." Recommissioned transport submarines were also placed at the SEALs' disposal for landing and supply, intelligence gathering, and rescue operations.[99]

[98] Marolda and Pryce III, Short History of the United States Navy, 10
[99] Marolda and Pryce III, Short History of the United States Navy, 11

The Navy established a second counterinsurgency unit in February 1962. Known as the Naval Construction Battalion (Seabee) Technical Assistance Teams (STAT), they were 13-man units whose mission it was to build goodwill and the support of local populations by undertaking civic actions in Vietnam.[100] The Navy Seabee teams were based in the United States at the Naval Construction Battalion Centers (CBC) in Gulfport, Michigan and Port Hueneme, California.

Source: NARA, Record Group 428, General Records of the Department of the Navy, 1941 - 2004 Series, General Color Photographic File of the Department of Navy,1958 – 1981.

Figure 2-9: Members of U.S. Navy Seal Team One move down the Bassac River in a Seal Team Assault Boat during operations along the river south of Saigon.

The first Seabee STAT team deployed to Vietnam for 6 months in late January 1963. By the end of 1964, 14 Seabee STAT teams were either operating in Vietnam or had completed their 6-month tours of duty. The Seabee Teams undertook a variety of projects. One of the most novel programs, the Strategic Hamlet Program, aimed to separate civilians from the Viet Cong through the construction of villages. STAT teams grouped civilians in defended hamlets where they constructed houses, schools, hospitals, roads, and infrastructure. A separate Seabee Team deployed to Vietnam in 1964 to dig deep wells throughout the country where villagers had no access to fresh water.[101] These projects were undertaken to assist the CIA and Army CIDG program.

[100] Marolda and Pryce III, *Short History of the United States Navy,* 10; Edwin Bickford Hooper, Mobility Support Endurance: A Story of Naval Operational Logistics, 1965-1968 (Honolulu, HI, University Press of the Pacific, 2003), 15.
[101]Civil Engineers, Seabees and Bases in Vietnam, 1971. 258-9, Folder 05, Box 01, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 03 - Technology, The Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University.

2.2.4.2 Middle of the War

Vietnam is a country laced by thousands of miles of river that quickly became a strategic concern among military leadership. As the war intensified, they saw the control of the waterways as a major goal and it became clear that the United States Navy would need to take the lead on riverine operations. To this end, the River Patrol Force (Task Force 116) was established in December 1965.[102] Trained at Coronado and Mare Island, CA, Task Force 116 was organized as River Patrol Squadron 5 in Vietnam and placed under the Navy's Pacific Fleet Amphibious Force. The first unit deployed to Vietnam in March 1966. By late 1968 the squadron, informally known as the Brown Water Navy, consisted of 5 divisions that were based at Can Tho, Sa Dec, My Tho, Nha Be, and Da Nang.

The river division operated from combat bases along rivers or from ships (LSDs and LSTs) positioned in the rivers. The LSDs were used in early Navy river patrol operations in Vietnam and were essentially floating helicopter landing pads. The LSTs replaced the LSDs in 1966. They were recommissioned Tank Landing Ships that the Navy extensively modified to serve as river patrol bases. The ships had new boat handling booms, a helipad that could be used in day and night, and updated electronic gear.

The Navy understood that the river patrol missions required a unique watercraft that was fast, lightweight, maneuverable, functional in a hot humid environment, and able to propel itself in the shallow fecund waters of the Mekong Delta. This new category of boat was designated the River Patrol Boat (PBR). The first PBR model was a modified commercially available watercraft.[103] Each boat had a 4-person crew that was equipped with communications equipment (radar and radios), and armed with a twin-mount 50-caliber machine gun, a 30-caliber machine gun, and a rapid-fire 40-millimeter grenade launcher.

The initial version of this watercraft, the Mark I, was a 31-foot long fiberglass hulled boat. The boats generally performed well in river patrol operations but were susceptible to engine damage by weeds. The boats' fiberglass hulls were also easily damaged. As a result, the Mark I was replaced by the Mark II in 1967. The new PBRs had aluminum hulls and better designed engines. They became the mainstay of the river patrol force.[104]

The River Patrol Force formed the cornerstone of OPERATON GAME WARDEN, an effort to keep the Mekong Delta waterways out of Viet Cong control. American Military planners knew by 1965 that the Mekong Delta was the primary route through which the Viet Cong imported supplies from neighboring Cambodia. GAME WARDEN was authorized in December 1965 and began on 8 May 1966 when a River Patrol Force unit began patrolling a stretch of the Bassac River near Can Tho. Other units subsequently initiated surveillance activities on the upper Mekong and on the My Tho, Ham Luong, and Go Olien rivers. The sailors worked in two-boat patrols checking the cargo and identity papers of occupants on sampans (flat bottomed river boats) and other boats travelling waterways. They also set up night ambushes at suspected locations of enemy activity and assisted the SEALs with gunfire and transportation support.

[102] Marolda and Pryce III, Short History of the United States Navy, 50.
[103] Victory Daniels and Lucy C. Erdham, "Game Warden," *Center for Naval Analyses,* January 1976, 15, Folder 18, Box 03, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. Collection: General Subject Files, The Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University.
[104] Marolda and Pryce III, Short History of the United States Navy, 51.

Source: V.O. McColley; Photo K-40166, NARA RG 428: General Records of the Navy, 1941-2004, Series: Vis-Aid Index to the General Photographic Files of the Department of the Navy, 1958 – 1981

Figure 2-10: Navy PBR boats on the Long Tau River. 1967.

OPERATION GAME WARDEN units also undertook psychological and civic action operations as secondary missions. They distributed propaganda leaflets and broadcasts from PBRs, included psychological programming on goods provided to villages (cigarettes, toiletries, etc.), constructed and repaired bridges, schools, houses, and other structures, and provided medical care and refugee support.[105] OPERATION GAME WARDEN lasted until it was incorporated into a larger operation called SEA LORDS in 1968. OPERATION SEA LORDS is addressed in more detail in the section entitled "Late War" below.

OPERATION GAME WARDEN activities were initially focused on the Mekong and Bassac Rivers in the upper delta, but by mid-1967, enemy contacts in the upper delta became infrequent enough to encourage a shift in operations. GAME WARDEN units, by the second half of 1967, began focusing their efforts on the lower delta. The shift, however, was short-lived. Viet Cong,

[105] Daniels and Erdham, "Game Warden," *Center for Naval Analyses,* January 1976, 4,10,20, 24-5., The Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University.

taking advantage of the new opening began moving material across the Cambodian border with impunity. OPERATION GAME WARDEN units returned to the upper delta, but they were unable to find significant numbers of Viet Cong. It was later determined that the Vietnamese had abandoned the delta rivers for smaller canals and overland routes.[106]

The Brown Water Navy effectively disrupted Viet Cong activities in the delta. In 1967 alone, PBR crews boarded over 40,000 vessels suspected of holding combatants and equipment. They damaged or destroyed over 2,000 Viet Cong craft, and killed wounded, or captured over 1,400 enemy soldiers. This came at a cost; 39 U.S. Navy personnel died, 366 were wounded, and 9 went missing.[107] The patrols, however, forced the Viet Cong out of the major waterways and into less efficient transportation on the smaller rivers and canals.

The River Patrol Force played a prominent defensive role during the Tet Offensive. Due to the mobility of their watercraft, the crews were able to rush to riverine cities and towns under siege. The sailors provided pivotal defense for the settlements of My Tho, Ben Tre, Chau Doc, Tra Vinh, and Can Tho. The crews after some early setbacks, were also able to regain control of the major delta rivers, thereby undermining Viet Cong attacks on Saigon.[108]

While most River Patrol Force activity was centered in the Mekong Delta, the Brown Water Navy did operate in other regions of Vietnam. For example, in early 1968 the PBR crews began supporting the, III MAF, in their efforts to gain control of the Perfume and Cua Viet rivers North of Da Nanag, near the Demilitarized Zone. Known as "Task Force Clearwater" the river crews were also vital to the defense of Khe Sanh and the capture of Hue, both of which delivered significant setbacks to the Viet Cong in the I Corps.

The Commander of the River Patrol Force also commanded the relatively small contingent of SEALs who operated in the Mekong Delta. There were rarely more than 120 SEALS in Vietnam, even during the peak years of combat. This included detachments from SEAL Team 1 and SEAL Team 2.

The Navy SEAL detachments continued to operate in an advisory role with the escalation of hostilities in 1965, but also took on a direct-action combat role. SEALs, operating in 14 to 16-man units, supported OPERATION GAME WARDEN. They began COIN operations in an area called the Rung Sat Special Zone, a Viet Cong controlled mangrove swamp between Saigon and the South China Sea. SEAL operations expanded to other riverine bases in the Mekong Delta in subsequent years.

The SEALs developed an effective intelligence gathering network in the Mekong Delta. SEAL petty officers set up networks of paid informants that provided good intelligence that helped support successful combat and counterinsurgency operations. The SEALs also relied on Vietnamese scouts, who were often former Viet Cong.

[106] Daniels and Erdham, "Game Warden," *Center for Naval Analyses,* January 1976, 4, The Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University.
[107] Marolda and Pryce III, Short History of the United States Navy, 54
[108] Marolda and Pryce III, *Short History of the United States Navy,* 55; Daniels and Erdham, "Game Warden," *Center for Naval Analyses,* January 1976, 35, The Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University.

The SEALS operating in the delta were supported by Boat Support Unit One (West Coast) and Boat Support Unit Two (East Coast). The Boat Support Units were similar to the helicopter units that supported Army Special Operations. They transported the SEALs as close to their objective as possible before the soldiers continued to their target on traditional Vietnamese sampans.

Like the Army Special Forces and Marine Corps Force Recon, Navy SEALs trained and equipped rural Vietnamese tribesmen to fight the Viet Cong. The covert program, which began in 1967, was funded by the CIA. SEALs worked specifically with Nung tribesmen. In groups of two, the sailors lived in the Nung villages while they recruited and trained organic Provincial Reconnaissance (PRU) counterinsurgency units consisting of 60-120 tribesmen. The PRU forces have been described as the deadliest and most effective force fielded in Vietnam.

The Navy established another Special Operations unit, the Riverine Assault Force, in early 1967. The assault force formed a component of the joint Army-Navy, Mobile River Force (MRF), a unit designed to undertake search and destroy missions in the Mekong Delta. While the Brown Water Navy was largely a patrol force, the MRF was an assault force. The Riverine Assault Force was the Navy component of the MRF.[109] Divided into 4 squadrons, the Riverine Assault Force operated 20 Monitors (5 per squadron) which were reinforced with armor and heavily armed with 50-caliber, 40-millimeter, and 20-millimeter guns, 40-millimeter grenade launchers, and an 81-millimeter mortar. The Monitors were supplemented by other armed and armored command and control craft, and armored troop carriers equipped with helicopter landing pads. Finally, an additional troop carrier was modified to serve as a refueler for the force.[110]

The MRF was at full strength by the summer of 1967 and began concerted offensive operations in the Mekong Delta. However, the most dramatic MRF actions came during the February 1968 Tet Offensive. Like the River Patrol Force, the MRF played a pivotal role in turning back the Viet Cong attacks. The river force's mobility allowed them to quickly counter Viet Cong attempts to seize Mekong Delta cities. The MRF battled through the streets of My Tho and Vinh Long in early February to recapture the besieged cities. The joint force spent the rest of the month securing the Mekong Delta's chief city, Can Tho.[111]

Another task force, the Coastal Surveillance Force (Task Force 115), was activated in July 1965. The task force was a cornerstone of OPERATION MARKET TIME, an effort to intercept Viet Cong contraband and vessels near South Vietnam. Most Task Force 115 components were previously based at Coronado, CA. Qui Nhon operated in nine patrol sectors along the South Vietnam Coast. They operated 84 50-foot Swift boats, armed with 50-caliber machine guns and an 81-millimeter mortar. They also operated 2 hydrofoil gunboats. Navy aircraft supported the surveillance force by providing aerial observation.

The Coastal Surveillance Force was very active. They boarded and inspected thousands of boats and ships between 1965 and 1967. Indeed, seamen boarded 700,000 vessels between January 1966 and July 1967. In the process, Navy forces identified and disrupted numerous Viet Cong attempts to bring arms and ammunition into South Vietnam via fishing trawlers. It became

[109] The army component consisted of brigades from the 9th Infantry.
[110] Marolda and Pryce III, Short History of the United States Navy, 56.

[111] Marolda and Pryce III, Short History of the United States Navy, 58.

apparent in the summer of 1967 that the program was successful. No covert shipments were discovered for months after July 1967. This changed during the Tet Offensive when the Viet Cong sent five ammunition-laden steel hulled ships into South Vietnamese in an attempt to support the offensive. The Navy detected the ships and the Coastal Surveillance Force pursued them. Two ships turned back, 2 went aground at Da Nang, and 1 exploded under fire. It would be over a year before Task Force 115 operations located another Viet Cong arms shipment.[112]

The extensive water-based operations of the Coastal Surveillance Force, Riverine Assault Force, SEALs, and River Patrol Force was complemented by the Seabee STAT teams, which continued to perform civic action to garner support for the South Vietnamese government. Simply called Seabee Teams by 1965, the teams remained active throughout the middle of the war. There were 15 thirteen-man Seabee Teams stationed throughout Vietnam by 1968. They represented an important, but small, component of the Seabee forces which totaled at least 10,000 personnel. Assisted by local workers, the Seabee Teams constructed schools, stores, housing, municipal offices, bridges, dams, roads, and other infrastructure in locations where conflict between the Viet Cong and South Vietnam was greatest.[113] The hope was that local residents would ally themselves with the South Vietnamese government and not the insurgent Viet Cong. [114]

2.2.4.3 End of the War

The end of the war was marked by a shift in Riverine Assault Force operations that ultimately resulted in large-scale deactivations and redeployments. One final, major operation, known as SEALORDS, a delta-wide interdiction and pacification operation, combined the forces of Task Force 115 (MARKET TIME), 116, 117 (Riverine Assault Force), and U.S. and Vietnamese ground forces. [115]

The Allies and South Vietnamese Navy launched the SEALORDS campaign in October 1968. The campaign was a cooperative operation designed to disrupt enemy activities deep in the Mekong Delta and cut off their supply lines from Cambodia. Navy units in South Vietnam were at an all-time high when the campaign began. The Coastal Surveillance Force (Task Force 115) had 81 Swift Boats and 63 other vessels at their disposal. The River Patrol Force (Task Force 116) commanded 258 boats and the Riverine Assault Force (Task Force 117) had 184 armored craft. HAL-3 had 35 armed helicopters at their disposal.[116] The Navy established another Special Operations unit, the Light Attack Squadron (VAL)-4 in April 1969. The squadron flew the OV-10 Bronco fixed wing aircraft in support of Navy and Vietnamese missions under the SEALORDS operation. SEAL Teams and their Vietnamese counterparts, by 1969, were aggressively attacking Viet Cong encampments along the entire length of the Mekong River to the Cambodian border.[117]

Task Force 115 Swift Boats, no longer tied to their MARKET TIME mission, carried out raids into enemy-held coastal waterways and began patrolling the Mekong Delta's larger rivers. The

[112] Marolda and Pryce III, Short History of the United States Navy, 48-9.
[113] Marolda and Pryce III, Short History of the United States Navy, 65.
[114] Marolda and Pryce III, *Short History of the United States Navy,* 68; General 1968 Command History, 598.
[115] Daniels and Erdham, "Game Warden," *Center for Naval Analyses,* January 1976, 38, The Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University.
[116] Marolda and Pryce III, Short History of the United States Navy, 75.
[117] Marolda and Pryce III, Short History of the United States Navy, 79.

PBR forces, in turn, began operations along previously uncontested smaller rivers and canals long held by the Viet Cong. Both operations relied on the support of naval aircraft and the riverine assault craft.[118] The SEALORDS operations, which began in the Mekong Delta, expanded into other regions in Vietnam, including Corps Area 1 (North), in 1969.

Vietnamization eventually contributed to the drawdown of the SEALORDS operation. By late 1969, the U.S. Navy was actively transferring responsibilities and selected equipment to the Vietnamese Navy in anticipation of the deactivation and redeployment of the American forces in Vietnam. Indeed, the Riverine Assault Force was the first Navy Special Operations force to redeploy as the war wound down. All units were deactivated on 25 August 1969. A year later, with Vietnamization moving forward, Task Force 115 began turning many of their assets over to the South Vietnamese military and prepared for final redeployment, which occurred in September 1970. Task Force 116 followed a similar trajectory and was redeployed in December 1970.[119] The HAL-3 squadrons continued supporting SEAL Teams and South Vietnamese units until their deactivation in January 1972. The squadron's aircraft were turned over to the South Vietnamese as part of the United States' effort to build up the capabilities of the Vietnamese military. The VAL-4 squadron was decommissioned in April 1972. Navy SEAL Teams remained in Vietnam until 1973.

The Vietnamization process also affected Seabee units, which began redeploying to the United States in late 1968. Deactivations and redeployments became more frequent in 1969 and 1970. The Seabee Teams and other units that remained in Vietnam were transferred from civic action and counterinsurgency projects to more traditional logistics projects. They were deployed throughout South Vietnam in 1970 to construct barracks, administration buildings, repair and maintenance shops, and piers at various U.S. occupied bases with the expectation that Vietnamese would assume responsibility for the installations. To this end, the Vietnamese military took charge of facilities at Cat Lo and An Thoi, Ben Luc, Rach Soi, Dong Tam, Cat Lai, Cho Moi, Long Phu, Long Xuyen, Nam Can, Qui Nhon, Vinh Long, and Thuan An in 1971. Additional bases, including Nha Be, Binh Thuy, Gam Ranh Bay, and Da Nang were turned over to the Vietnamese in 1972.[120] The last Seabee Team redeployed to the United States in mid-April 1972.[121] Direct Navy combat and counterinsurgency activity in Vietnam ended a year later, even though Navy vessels remained in the Gulf of Tonkin.

[118] Marolda and Pryce III, Short History of the United States Navy, 76.
[119] Marolda and Pryce III, Short History of the United States Navy, 80.

[120] Marolda and Pryce III, *Short History of the United States Navy,* 85-6; Seabees in Southeast Asia/Vietnam, No Date, Folder 01, Box 01, Tony deLeon Collection, The Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University.
[121] Seabees in Southeast Asia/Vietnam, The Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University.

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3.0 ON THE HOME FRONT

During the Vietnam War, the U.S. military had to adapt to fighting against the Viet Cong who employed local political units and guerrilla warfare tactics. Front lines did not exist and fighting occurred in terrain where coastal rice paddies quickly turned into thick jungles and steep mountains. The enemy's tactics and the country's topography and environmental conditions presented unique difficulties. The U.S. military developed Special Forces teams and warfare tactics to meet these challenges. State-side schools and training facilities served to prepare highly-skilled, elite units for specialized military missions, including amphibious and riverine operations, Psyops, COIN, intelligence, and civil action programs prior to deployment.

Other Legacy Vietnam historic context subthemes address pilot and crew, logistics, air mobility, ground troops, survival, and leadership (Officer and Noncommission Officer) training on U.S. military installations.

3.1 U.S. ARMY

When regular infantry units began to arrive in Vietnam in 1965, the U.S. Army had not fought a guerrilla conflict of any significance since the Indian wars of the nineteenth century. For years, the focus of the army had been training and equipping for conventional defensive war. Offensive tactics were based on the use of nuclear weapons. The U.S. Army was neither trained nor organized to face an irregular enemy.[122] The Army began to use Special Forces and train units in Special Warfare. Army Special Warfare included COIN, PSYOPS, riverine, intelligence, civil actions programs, and long-range reconnaissance patrolling (LRRP).

3.1.1 ARMY SPECIAL FORCES

Green Berets and Rangers are part of the Special Operations Forces of the U.S. Army.

Green Berets

Special Forces grew out of the establishment of the Special Operations Division of the Psychological Warfare Center that was activated at Fort Bragg, NC in May 1952. The Army allocated 2,300 personnel slots to be used to stand up the first Special Forces unit when the Ranger companies fighting in the Korean War were disbanded. The 10th Special Forces Group was established with Colonel Aaron Bank as the first commander. Concurrent with this was the establishment of the Psychological Warfare School, which ultimately became today's John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.[123]

Bank assembled a cadre of officers and non-commissioned officers to serve as the foundation of the new unit and act as a training staff for the fledgling organization. Bank wanted the best troops in the Army, and he got them: former OSS officers, airborne troops, ex-Rangers and combat veterans of World War II and Korea. After months of preparation, the 10th Special Forces Group was activated on 11 June 1952 at Fort Bragg. Bank began training his troops in the most

[122] Lanning 2006, page 50
[123] http://www.specialforcesassociation.org/about/sf-history/

advanced techniques of unconventional warfare. As defined by the Army, the primary mission of the 10th Special Forces Group was to "infiltrate by land, sea or air, deep into enemy-occupied territory and organize the resistance/guerrilla potential to conduct Special Forces operations, with emphasis on guerrilla warfare."[124]

After less than a year-and-a-half as a full Special Forces group, Bank's men proved to the Army's satisfaction that they had mastered the skills of their new trade. On 11 November 1953, half of the 10th Special Forces Group was deployed to Bad Tolz, West Germany. The other half remained at Fort Bragg, where they were redesignated as the 77th Special Forces Group. The split of the 10th and the 77th was the first sign that Special Forces had established itself as an integral part of the Army's basic structure.[125]

By the end of 1952, the first Special Forces troops to operate behind enemy lines had been deployed to Korea on missions that remained classified for nearly thirty years. For the Army, Special Forces A-detachments were 15-man teams with 2 officers and 13 NCOs. The detachment included:

- Team leader (Capitan)
- Executive officer (First Lieutenant)
- Team sergeant (Master Sergeant)
- Four weapons specialist (Sergeant First Class)
- Four demolitions specialist (Specialists Second Class)
- Medic (Master Sergeant)
- Radio operator (Master Sergeant)
- Assistant radio operator (Specialist Third Class)
- Radio repairman (Sergeant)[126]

As discussed in Chapter 2, by 1958, the basic operational unit of Special Forces had evolved into a 12-man unit. Each team comprised two officers, two operations and intelligence sergeants, two weapons sergeants, two communications sergeants, two medics, and two engineers. They were trained in unconventional warfare, cross-trained in each other's specialties, and spoke at least one foreign language. This composition allowed each detachment to operate, if necessary, in two six-man teams, or split-A teams.[127]

Special Forces flourished under the patronage of President Kennedy. President Kennedy's interest in Special Forces resulted in the adoption of the Green Beret as the official headgear of all Special Forces troops. Until then, the beret had faced an uphill fight in its struggle to achieve official Army recognition. After his visit to Fort Bragg, the President told the Pentagon that he considered the Green Beret to be "symbolic of one of the highest levels of courage and achievement of the United States military." Soon, the Green Beret became synonymous with Special Forces.[128]

[124] http://www.specialforcesassociation.org/about/sf-history
[125] http://www.specialforcesassociation.org/about/sf-history/
[126] Thompson 1988, pg 111
[127] http://www.specialforcesassociation.org/about/sf-history/
[128] http://www.specialforcesassociation.org/about/sf-history/

Rangers

The United States Army Rangers are an elite military formation that serve in designated Ranger units or are graduates from the U.S. Army Ranger School. The U.S. Army Ranger history predates the Revolutionary War. In the mid-1700s, Capt. Benjamin Church and Maj. Robert Rogers both formed Ranger units to fight during King Phillip's War and the French and Indian War. Rogers wrote the 19 standing orders that are still in use today.[129]

The 75th Ranger Regiment is an elite airborne light infantry combat formation within the United States Army Special Operations Command. The 75th Infantry Regiment was first organized in the China-Burma-India theater as Task Force Galahad on 3 October 1943. It was during the campaigns in the China-Burma-India theater that the regiment became known as Merrill's Marauders after its commander, Maj. Gen. Frank D. Merrill. The Ranger battalions were deactivated at the end of World War II.[130]

The Ranger Training Brigade, headquartered at Fort Benning, GA is an organization under the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command and is separate from the 75th Ranger Regiment. It has been in service in various forms since World War II. The Ranger Training Brigade administrates Ranger School, the satisfactory completion of which is required to become Ranger-qualified.

The outbreak of hostilities in Korea in June 1950 again signaled the need for the Rangers. Fifteen Ranger companies were formed during the Korean War. The Rangers went to battle throughout the winter of 1950 and the spring of 1951. They were nomadic warriors, attached first to one regiment and then to another. They performed scouting, patrolling, raids, ambushes, spearheading assaults, and acted as counterattack forces to regain lost positions.[131]

Rangers were again called to serve their country during the Vietnam War. The 75th Infantry was reorganized on 1 January 1969 as a parent regiment under the Combat Arms Regimental System. Fifteen separate Ranger companies were formed from this reorganization. Thirteen served in Vietnam until inactivation on 15 August 1972.[132]

In January 1974, Gen. Creighton Abrams, Army Chief of Staff, directed the formation of a Ranger battalion. The 1st Battalion (Ranger), 75th Infantry, was activated and parachuted into Fort Stewart, GA on 1 July 1974. The 2nd Battalion (Ranger), 75th Infantry, followed with activation on 1 October 1974. The 3rd Battalion, 75th Infantry (Ranger), and Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 75th Infantry (Ranger), received their colors at Fort Benning on 3 October 1984. The 75th Ranger Regiment was designated in February 1986.[133]

[129] https://www.army.mil/ranger/heritage.html
[130] https://www.army.mil/ranger/heritage.html
[131] https://www.army.mil/ranger/heritage.html
[132] https://www.army.mil/ranger/heritage.html
[133] https://www.army.mil/ranger/heritage.html

Special Forces Training

All Special Forces team members had to participate in two mandatory training courses. The first course was Basic Airborne training conducted at Fort Benning. Basic Airborne training was a 3-week program, divided into a Ground Week Phase, Tower Week Phase, and Jump Week Phase. In addition to the actual parachute training, the troopers also received extensive physical training, including calisthenics, running, and push-ups.[134]

After becoming parachute qualified, the candidate for Special Forces then completed the 17-week Special Forces Qualification Course (Q Course) at Camp Mackall, NC. Prior to entering the Q Course, candidates were normally given an orientation/preparation period to study land navigation and work up to the physical standards they were expected to show during the Q Course. During Phase I, the candidate learned hand-to-hand combat, land navigation, rappelling, use of the STABO rig (a nylon harness) for helicopter extraction, methods for crossing rivers, various survival skills, patrolling, raiding ambushes, counter-ambushes, and establishing patrol bases. Although it was not designed as a selection course, 25 to 50% of candidates were weeded out during this phase of the training.[135]

Phase II of the Q course was an 8-week training in one of the following 5 specialties: communication, medical, demolitions and engineering, weapons, and operations and intelligence. Communication and medical had the largest failure rate (up to 40%).

Phase III, the final phase of the Q course, was designed to teach the student how to bring together the skills learned in phases I and II and apply them while operating as part of a team. Unconventional warfare and clandestine operations were practiced during this phase.[136]

Beyond the requisite courses, members of Special Forces added to their skills through additional training. This additional training could take the form of language courses, training with foreign units such as the Special Air Services, and training with other, nonspecialized U.S. units (i.e. learning to drive tanks or fly helicopters). A relatively high percentage of members of Special Forces became Ranger-qualified. Ranger training lasted 58 days and was among the toughest in the U.S. Army. Additional training for certain A-detachments included High Altitude, Low Opening (HALO) parachute insertions, as knowledge of these methods allowed clandestine insertions in certain situations. A certain percentage of Special Forces members underwent a 12-week course at Fort Lee, VA to learn to inspect and pack various types of parachutes. Although the Navy SEALs were the primary U.S. combat swimmers, there was frequently a need for scuba-qualified Special Forces personnel. The Special Forces ran its own underwater school at Trumbo Point on Key West, Florida and a 3-week combat diver course. Other specialized training included ski training, Jumpmaster training, and explosive ordnance disposal.[137]

[134] Thompson 1988, pg 117
[135] Thompson 1988, 117-118
[136] Thompson 1988, pg 118
[137] Thompson 1988, pg 136-137

3.1.2 ARMY SPECIAL WARFARE TRAINING

By the end of 1962, Continental Army Command (CONARC) mandated that all regular combat units in the United States conduct six weeks of counterguerrilla training annually. The new program consisted of three phases, each two weeks in duration. The first phase focused on individual and Ranger-type training. The second phase consisted of small-unit, counterguerrilla tactics. The third phase was devoted entirely to field training, culminating in a battalion-level exercise. The 6-week counterguerrilla training program represented the single largest block of mandatory training imposed by CONARC.[138]

Many commanders disliked this requirement, believing that it was too restrictive and that it infringed upon the latitude the Army customarily accorded commanders in managing their training time. Although the command refused to budge on this issue, it did eventually reduce the number of hours of counterinsurgency lectures. By 1963, all soldiers were expected to be familiar with the general principles of American counterinsurgency doctrine, and all underwent some form of mandatory counterguerrilla training each year, with combat units receiving the most intense training. [139]

To assist officers with their training programs, CONARC prepared COIN training materials, including field manual (FM) 30–102, *Aggressor Forces* (1963), which provided advice on integrating guerrillas into training exercises; FM 31–30, *Jungle Operations* (1960); FM 31–30, *Jungle Training and Operations* (1965); and FM 57–35, *Airmobile Operations* (1960 and 1963). Other manuals of special utility were FM 31–18, *Long Range Patrols* (1962 and 1965); FM 21–75, *Combat Training of the Individual Soldier and Patrolling* (1962); and FM 21–50, *Ranger Training and Ranger Operations* (1962).[140]

FM 21–75, *Combat Training of the Individual Soldier and Patrolling*, covered ambush, patrol, and airmobile techniques applicable to counterguerrilla warfare, as well as impressed upon each soldier the importance of proper behavior toward civilians. It noted that practicing self-discipline was an extremely important part of combating the guerrilla.[141]

The 1962 edition of FM 21–50, *Ranger Training and Ranger Operations*, further reinforced the Army's efforts to develop the type of highly skilled infantrymen necessary in counterguerrilla warfare. The Ranger movement of the 1950s continued to flourish into the 1960s with benefits for counterguerrilla proficiency. Not only did Army regulations require that all rifle companies undergo annual Ranger training, but by 1962, 80% of all regular Army second lieutenants had taken the Ranger course at Fort Benning, Georgia. In 1964, the Army directed that all regular Army officers should take either Ranger or airborne training. The following year, the Infantry School revised the Ranger curriculum to include an 18-day counterguerrilla phase. Ultimately, in 1966, the Army would make Ranger training mandatory for all newly commissioned Regular Army officers.[142]

[138] Birtle, 2006, page 273
[139] Birtle, 2006, page 273
[140] Birtle, 2006, page 273
[141] Birtle, 2006, page 273
[142] Birtle, 2006, page 275

The original concept for the U.S. Army to conduct unconventional warfare (UW) originated with the creation of the OSS during World War II. In that classic context, UW was generally defined in terms of guerrilla and covert operations in enemy-held or -influenced territory. The first official Army definition that addressed aspects of UW appeared in 1950 as "partisan warfare." In 1951, the Army's UW assets were consolidated under the Office of Psychological Warfare and the Army published the first two field manuals for the performance of PSYWAR (with an emphasis on UW). By 1955, the first historical manual that specifically linked Army Special Forces to UW (FM 31-20, Special Forces Group) declared, "UW consists of the three interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, escape and evasion, and subversion against hostile states."[143]

Counterinsurgency (COIN) and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS)

In response to President Kennedy's call to bolster Special Operations and cease the spread of Communism, the Army began specifically training for Vietnam in 1962. Selected officers and NCOs were prepared for the duties of serving as military assistant training advisors in COIN operations. These selected officers were enrolled at the Military Assistance Training Advisors (MATA) course at the Army's Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg.[144] The 4-week (later 6-week) course was oriented exclusively to preparing advisers for the conflict in Vietnam. Only a portion of all personnel going to Vietnam took the course; nevertheless, the Special Warfare School continuously adjusted and improved the class based on feedback from those serving in Vietnam. The course reviewed doctrine, related Vietnam-specific tactics, and provided an orientation to Vietnamese language and culture.[145]

Other lessons were learned from the field influenced PSYOPS training at Fort Bragg. Early on, training requirements for PSYOP and POLWAR advisory personnel in the field were conducted at Fort Bragg as two separate courses for PSYOP and POLWAR. This implied that the jobs were distinctly separate in the field, when in fact, there was a high degree of overlap. A combined PSYOP/POLWAR course was determined to be more educationally sound and cost-effective."[146]

Riverine Training

On 1 February 1966, the 9th Infantry Division was activated at Fort Riley, Kansas as part of the Mobile Afloat Force plan. The 9th Infantry Division was the one division to be organized for operations in the Mekong Delta. The idea behind the riverine force was to combine an Army brigade with a comparable Navy organization that would operate from various anchorages within the Mekong Delta. Two anchors were land-based while the third was water-based. The mobile floating base would limit the interaction of the Vietnamese population with the U.S. troops.[147]

To accomplish this plan in the necessary timeframe, the division's training program was reduced from 36 weeks to 24 weeks. At the end of Army training program, they were sent to Coronado, CA to attend a 10-day riverine course given by Marine Training Team from the Naval Amphibious School. The course provided useful information on the Vietnamese river assault

[143] FM 3-05.130, 2008
[144] ERDC Dec 2014
[145] Birtle, 2006, pg 256
[146] Memo MACJ3-112, June 1970
[147] Fulton, 1985, page 42

group, U.S. Navy SEAL team, Viet Cong intelligence operations in the delta, and on the riverine environment. This course was the first opportunity for commanders and staff to focus purely on the specifics of riverine warfare in Vietnam.[148]

Intelligence Training

Three separate intelligence schools existed in 1970. There was the Army Security Agency School at Fort Devens, Massachusetts (MA), the Intelligence School at Fort Holabird, Maryland, and the Combat Surveillance and Electronic Warfare School at Fort Huachuca, Arizona (AZ). Fort Devens was established in 1917 to mobilize and train the 76th Division. The Army Security Agency, created in September 1945 to assume the mission of the former Signal Intelligence Service, opened a training school at Vint Hill Farms, Virginia during the war. The school was moved to Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, briefly, and finally moved to Fort Devens in 1951 where it became the Army's mainstay for cryptologic training. In 1957, it was renamed the U.S. Army Security Agency Training Center and School U.S. Army.[149]

Fort Holabird started as a Quartermaster Depot on 2 January 1918. Since 1945, the Army had been using Fort Holabird to teach counterintelligence. On 1 May 1955, the Combat Intelligence School at Fort Riley merged with the Counter Intelligence School at Fort Holabird Intelligence.[150] Early in 1971, the U.S. Army Intelligence School and Center began a move from Fort Holabird to Fort Huachuca, AZ. Fort Huachuca allowed for a necessary expansion of facilities and provided an area for field training. Justifications for the move included cost savings through the consolidation of the management of activities at a single installation, the collocation of several mutually supporting activities, and the eventual closeout of Fort Holabird.[151]

Civil Action Program

The Civic Action Program was established as early as 1961 to encourage the utilization of indigenous forces to assist local populations with development projects that improved living conditions. Through such community building, the U.S. military developed support in localities that helped prevent the development of insurgency. Military personnel involved with the Civic Action Program were trained at the U.S. Army Civil Affairs School at Fort Gordon, Georgia.[152]

Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrolling (LRRP) Training

In 1960, General William Westmoreland became Superintendent of the United States Military Academy at West Point where he created a Recondo (RECONnaissance and commanDO) school for cadets. As described in FM 31–18, *Long Range Patrols*, the LRRPs were small teams of highly-trained soldiers whose primary mission was to gather intelligence and acquire targets deep in enemy territory—a concept the Army would shortly put to the test in Vietnam.[153]

[148] Fulton, 1985, page 42-43
[149] A Brief History of U.S. Army Intelligence Training. Page 19
[150] U.S. Army. A Brief History of U.S. Army Intelligence Training. Page 17
[151] U.S. Army. A Brief History of U.S. Army Intelligence Training. Page 20
[152] ERDC Dec 2014
[153] Birtle, 2006, page 272

In December 1965, the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division formed an LRRP platoon, and by April 1966, the 1st Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division and each of the four Battalions of the 173rd Airborne Brigade formed LRRP units as well. On 8 July 1966, General Westmoreland authorized the formation of an LRRP unit in each infantry brigade or division in Vietnam. LRRP training was notoriously rigorous and team leaders were often graduates of the U.S. Army's 5th Special Forces Recondo School in Nha Trang, Vietnam.[154]

The LRRPs in Vietnam did not have the luxury of intensive training or the eight months of preparatory time as outlined in the field manuals. In the early years of the war, provisional LRRP units were hastily organized and committed to battle with minimal training. Training in the safe environs of a stateside post was an opportunity lost because LRRP units were not organized before their parent unit's deployment to Southeast Asia. LRRP training in Vietnam was strictly "on the job," with a brief period of unit training in or near semi-secure fire bases. The exceptions were the LRRP officers who were almost all graduates of the Fort Benning Ranger School.[155]

The LLRP course was three weeks in length with 260 hours of classroom and field instruction that required a high level of physical fitness, knowledge of patrolling techniques, first aid, land navigation, radio procedures, and weapons familiarity. It concluded with an actual combat patrol to demonstrate the students' skills. The first week was conducted on the school compound and consisted of outdoor physical training and indoor classroom training. The second week was spent outside the compound on Hon Tre Island in the South China Sea where they practiced foreign weapons familiarity, tower and helicopter rappelling, ambush and escape-and-evasion techniques, and other field activities. The third week was spent preparing and conducting an actual instructor-led combat patrol in the mountainous jungle between the massive naval air bases at Nha Trang and Cam Ranh Bay where the enemy often took position to mortar each base. During this patrol, each team member switched positions to learn all responsibilities and were graded by the instructor.[156]

Recondo School was disbanded once General Westmoreland was replaced in 1968 by General Creighton Abrams who favored a more conventional approach to the war. In February 1969, all U.S. Army LRRP units were folded into the newly-formed 75th Infantry Regiment (Ranger), a predecessor of the 75th Ranger Regiment, bringing back operational Ranger units for the first time since the Korean War. The Army had disbanded Ranger units after Korea, but kept Ranger School, on the premise that spreading Ranger School graduates throughout the Army would improve overall performance. The initial Ranger companies formed state-side in 1969 were: "A" V Corps Rangers, Fort Hood, Texas; "B" VII Corps Rangers, Fort Lewis, Washington; "D/151" Indiana National Guard; and "F/425" Michigan National Guard.[157]

Several infantry divisions re-instituted Recondo Schools in the post-Vietnam era to better train more small-unit combat arms leaders. The post-Vietnam Recondo School was located at Fort Lewis, Washington.[158]

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[154] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recondo#Vietnam_War_.281965-1970. 29
[155] Lanning 2006, pg 99
[156] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recondo#Vietnam_War_.281965-1970.29
[157] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recondo#Vietnam_War_.281965-1970.29
[158] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recondo#Vietnam_War_.281965-1970.29

3.1.3 ARMY SPECIAL WARFARE TRAINING BASES

Fort Bragg

In April 1952, the PSYWAR training activities at Fort Riley, Kansas were transferred to Smoke Bomb Hill, Fort Bragg, NC for the provision of unit training and supervision and facilities. The Department of the Army (DA) General Orders 92 established the PSYWAR School on 22 October 1952. On 10 December 1956, DA General Orders 53 changed the title from the U.S. Army PSYWAR Center to the U.S. Army Center for Special Warfare/U.S. Army Special Warfare School. It was given additional responsibility for developing doctrine, techniques, and training, and instructing personnel in Special Forces and PSYOP. The School's mission was again expanded in 1960 to assume the additional task of preparing doctrine, techniques, and instruction for training personnel in counterinsurgency operations. This expanded mission was in direct response to the building tensions in Southeast Asia; Special Forces first fielded a team into Vietnam in 1957.

Source: Fort Bragg Museum

Figure 3-1: Demolition Training, JFK Special Warfare Center.

Effective 15 January 1962, DA General Orders 2 established the School as a Class I activity directly under the jurisdiction of the Commanding General, U.S. CONARC. The Third U.S. Army provided administrative support. The school encompassed training in PSYOPS, COIN, UW, and the MATA course. It also housed a state-of-the-art language lab. The Fort Bragg Counterinsurgency and Special Warfare Staff Officer Course lasted 4 weeks and included general orientation, Introduction to Guerilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations, Introduction

to Counterinsurgency operations, and Introduction to Psychological Operations. The course was primarily conferences and lectures with some demonstrations and practical exercise.[159]

The Special Warfare Center was expanded in 1965 to accommodate the expanded mission of the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) that was activated in 1961. The headquarters and academic buildings that comprised the complex were COIN training facilities used to prepare troops to train the government and military personnel of the Republic of South Vietnam to resist communist influences.[160]

On 16 May 1969, the school was expanded and DA changed the title to the U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance. It assumed the task of developing tactics and techniques and training selected students in the field of military assistance operations. It also provided Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) and Advanced Individual Training (AIT) for personnel from Special Forces units in infiltration and exfiltration techniques, employing HALO parachuting and underwater operations and equipment. The Advance Skills were added to the training previously taught by the Special Forces Training Group from 1963 - 1969. The Group's functions were moved from the operational side of the dual-hatted command to the school.

Source: Fort Bragg Museum

Figure 3-2: Commando Training, JFK Special Warfare Center.

[159] US Army Special Warfare School, March 1962, Program of Instruction for 33-G-F7
[160] ERDC Dec 2014

In another area of training, special warfare extension courses allowed soldiers anywhere in the Armed Forces to get instruction in Special Forces, PSYOPS, and COIN. The extension courses were organized through the Department of Nonresident Instruction that operated from a small building on Smoke Bomb Hill at Fort Bragg. The program had an enrollment of over 3,600 in February 1962.[161] Additional information about Fort Bragg is provided in Appendix A.

Fort Huachuca

Fort Huachuca was established 3 March 1877 as Camp Huachuca. It is located in Cochise County, in southeast Arizona, about 15 miles north of the border with Mexico. From 1913 to 1933 the fort was the base for the "Buffalo Soldiers" of the 10th Cavalry Regiment. The installation was founded to counter the Chiricahua Apache threat and to secure the border with Mexico. In 1882, Camp Huachuca was redesignated Fort Huachuca. During the buildup of World War II, the fort had an area of 71,253 acres, with quarters for 1,251 officers and 24,437 enlisted soldiers. In 1947 the post was closed and turned over to the Arizona Game and Fish Department. However, due to the Korean War, On 1 February 1951 the USAF took official possession of Fort Huachuca, making it one of the few Army installations to have an existence as an Air Force Base. The Army retook possession of the base a month later, and reopened the post in May 1951 to train Aviation Engineers in airfield construction.[162]

On 1 February 1954, Huachuca was reactivated after a 7-month shutdown following the Korean War. Following reactivation, Huachuca emerged as a leader in the development of Electronic Warfare. The Army's Electronic Proving Ground opened in 1954, followed by the Army Security Agency Test and Evaluation Center in 1960, the Combat Surveillance and Target Acquisition Training Command in 1964, and the Electronic Warfare School in 1966. Also in 1966, the U.S. Army established the 1st Training Brigade, whose mission was to train soldiers in specialty of Field Wire and Communication, Telegraph Communications (O5B wired and wireless), Vehicle Maintenance, Food Service, and Administration due to the expanding need for these skills in Vietnam.[163]

Starting around 1962 until about 1966, the HALO parachute school was used for training by the Army Special Forces, Navy SEALs, Air Force Pararescue, CIA, and other government agencies. The HALO school existed at Fort Huachuca for about 4 years before it was moved to Marana, AZ, where government HALO training still occurs.[164]

Fort Huachuca had AIT for 9 MOSs including pole climbers, teletype operators, drivers, cooks, radio operators, etc. under the 1st Training Brigade. Brigade personnel lived in the World War II barracks and trained in the Jeffords area or in what later became "Splinter Village," the old hospital. This took place from 1967 to 1971 but slowed down by 1970 and the exit of the 1st Brigade made way for the Intelligence School.[165] The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School was installed in existing buildings. Classrooms were located in smaller buildings within former

[161] ERDC Dec 2014
[162] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fort_Huachuca
[163] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fort_Huachuca
[164] Gregory. May 2107
[165] Gregory. May 2017

barracks complexes. As a result, the school has a variety of building types.[166] Fort Huachuca also had a Vietnam Village, "Bau Don," present in late 1967.[167]

Fort Benning

Fort Benning is a U.S. Army installation near Columbus, Georgia. Since 1918, Fort Benning has served as the Home of the Infantry. The Ranger Course was conceived during the Korean War and was known as the Ranger Training Command. The Ranger Training Command was inactivated and became the Ranger Department, a branch of the Infantry School at Fort Benning, on 10 October 1951. Its purpose was (and still is) to develop the combat skills of selected officers and enlisted men. This requires them to perform effectively as small-unit leaders in a realistic, tactical environment, and under the mental and physical stress of combat. Emphasis is placed on the development of leadership and further development of military skills in the planning and conduct of dismounted infantry, airborne, airmobile, amphibious independent squad, and platoon-size operations.[168]

From 1954 to the early 1970s, the Army's goal, though seldom achieved, was to have one Ranger-qualified non-commissioned officer per infantry platoon and one Ranger-qualified officer per company. To better achieve this goal, in 1954, the Army required all combat arms officers to become Ranger/Airborne qualified.[169]

Source: http://www.fortbenningphotos.com/
Figure 3-3: Ranger Training, Fort Benning. 2011.

The Ranger course has changed little since its inception. Until recently, it was an 8-week course divided into three phases: "crawl," "walk," and "run." The course is now 61 days in duration and

[166] ERDC Dec 2014
[167] Gregory. May 2107

[168] https://www.army.mil/ranger/
[169] https://www.army.mil/ranger/ Ranger School.

remains divided into three phases: "benning," "mountain," and "florida." The benning phase of Ranger School was designed to assess a Soldier's physical stamina, mental toughness, and establishes the tactical fundamentals required for follow-on phases of Ranger School. The mountain phase provided instruction on military mountaineering tasks, mobility training, as well as techniques for employing a platoon for continuous combat patrol operations in a mountainous environment. The florida phase focused on waterborne operations, small boat movements, and stream crossings. Practical exercises tested the students' ability to operate effectively under conditions of extreme mental and physical stress. The mountain and florida phases were conducted in Georgia and Florida, respectively. [170]

3.2 U.S. AIR FORCE

The responsibility for conducting Air Force Special Operations was the primary concern of the Tactical Air Command (TAC). The TAC was recognized as one of the most versatile and mobile Air Force commands. TAC organized, trained, and administered forces comprising assault airlift, reconnaissance, tactical fighters, and Special Operations units. The TAC Special Operations mission included counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, and psychological operations.[171]

The U.S. Air Force Special Operations Force (USASOF), a TAC organization, was headquartered at Eglin AFB, Florida. The base was responsible for training American and allied personnel for worldwide Special Operations. Formerly the SAWC, it was renamed as USASOF 8 July 1968. Because of the increasing emphasis on counterinsurgency training programs, the USASOF concept grew from a training squadron in 1961 to a numbered air force equivalent headquarters with one wing, an additional group, and a Special Operations school.[172]

The USASOF had three operational units:

1st Special Operations Wing (SOW), Hurlburt Field, Florida
4410th Special Operations Training Group, England AFB, Louisiana
USAF Special Operations School, Hurlburt Field, Florida[173]

The 1st SOW, originally designated the 1st Air Commando Wing, had the basic mission of employing Air Force resources for counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, and psychological operations. The 1st SOW has eight major operating training units at Hurlburt and nearby Holley Field, with an additional detachment at Pope AFB, NC. It also supported the 7th Special Operations Flight at Otis AFB, MA.[174]

TAC first entered the Special Operations field in April 1961 with the activation of the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron at Hulburt Field, FL. Nicknamed Jungle Jim, this nucleus trained USAF aircrews in the varied and difficult skills of Special Operations. These airmen, in turn, became advisors and instructors to airmen of friendly foreign nations that were potential

[170] https://www.army.mil/ranger/ Ranger School
[171] USAF 1971
[172] USAF 1971
[173] USAF 1971
[174] USAF 1971

targets of Communist aggressions. The underlying theme was to help emerging nations help themselves in defense against Communist insurgency.[175]

The 4410th Special Operations Training Group, formerly the 4410th Combat Crew Training Wing, was responsible for the flight training and indoctrination of personnel assigned to Special Operations units worldwide. The 4410th was also responsible for training and qualifying aircrew members of allied air forces in the equipment, tactics, and techniques used in Special Operations.[176]

The USAF Special Operations School, located at Hurlburt Field, was the academic element of the Special Operations Force. The mission of the school was to train selected U.S. and allied personnel in the geopolitical, psychological, and sociological implications of insurgency. Courses were conducted in Counterinsurgency, Area Operations, and Special Air Operations/Military Assistance Programs for Allied Officers, and the Military Assistance Advisory Course.[177]

The Air National Guard (ANG) and the U.S. Air Force Reserve had five Special Operations groups and four tactical air support groups to support the Special Operations Forces:

129th Special Operations Group, California ANG, Hayward California
130th Special Operations Group, West Virginia, ANG, Charleston, West Virginia
135th Special Operations Group, Maryland ANG, Baltimore, Maryland
143rd Special Operations Group, Rhode Island ANG, Providence Rhode Island
930th Special Operations Group, Grissom AFB, Indiana

The four ANG units were charged with a mission of unconventional warfare and psychological operations. They trained for mobilization in case of general war.[178]

A unique feature of the Special Operations Force was its own operational testing and evaluation section, known as the Deputy Chief of Staff, Requirements (DCS/R). The DCS/R conducted studies, tests, and evaluations of systems, subsystems, and equipment for Special Operations, including man-pack radios and night vision devices used in aircraft.[179]

3.2.1 USAF SPECIAL OPERATIONS BASES

Due to the lull between wars, when airmen began operating in Laos and Vietnam at the start of the 1960s, the USAF had no organized Special Operations units. In 1961, President John F. Kennedy supported the Army's Special Forces, the Green Berets. In April, eager to revive the World War II tradition, Chief of Staff Gen. Curtis E. LeMay authorized the 4400th CCTS (Jungle Jim), which eventually took T-28s and B-26s to Vietnam in the FARM GATE program. The Air Force also resurrected the term "Air Commandos." In 1967, the term "Special Operations"

[175] USAF 1971
[176] USAF 1971
[177] USAF 1971
[178] USAF 1971
[179] USAF 1971

replaced "Air Commando," and in 1970, Special Operations airmen participated in the raid on the Son Tay prisoner of war (POW) camp.[180]

The Air Commando Squadrons (and later, Special Operations Squadrons) were stationed at Bakalar AFB and Grissom AFB, Indiana, Eglin AFB and Hurlburt Field, Florida, England AFB Louisiana, Lockbourne AFB, Ohio, March AFB, California, Pope AFB, North Carolina, Shaw AFB, South Carolina (SC), and Stead AFB, Nevada. Some squadrons had short-term assignments at additional bases, and some were organized and stationed in the Pacific bases in other countries.

Bakalar Air Force Base was located 4.4 miles northeast of Columbus, Indiana. During World War II, the base was known as Atterbury Air Field and Atterbury Army Air Base, but it was renamed Bakalar Air Force Base in 1954. Established in 1942, the airfield served as a training base for medium-range C-46 Commando and C-47 Skytrain troop carrier planes and glider pilots. It also was used for training B-25 Mitchell and B-26 Marauder bomber crews. Reactivated during the Cold War, it was used as an Air Force Reserve training base for troop carrier, tactical airlift, and Special Operations flying units. In 1968, the 71st Tactical Airlift Squadron received the AC-119 G gunship. The 71st was subsequently re-designated as the 71st Air Commando Squadron on 15 June, and on 5 December it deployed to Nha Trang Air Base, South Vietnam, where it was assigned to the 14th SOW. The 71st flew combat operations in South Vietnam until 5 June 1969, when its reservists returned to the United States. Bakalar Air Force Base was selected for closure in 1969, due to funding reductions for continental United States (CONUS) bases in order to fund combat operations during the Vietnam War. The military base was closed in 1970. The present-day facility operates as the Columbus municipal airport. The 71st Air Commando Squadron was inactivated in 1973 and its AC-119s were retired.[181]

England Air Force Base is a former USAF base located 5 miles northwest of Alexandria, LA and about 170 miles northwest of New Orleans. Originally known as Alexandria Army Air Base, on 23 June 1955 the facility was renamed England Air Force Base. The 319th Air Commando/Special Operations Squadrons, 6th Special Operations Training Squadron, 427th, 4412th, 4532nd Combat Crew Training Squadrons were assigned to England AFB during the Vietnam War. The 1991 Base Realignment and Closure Commission decided that England AFB would be closed by September 1992.[182]

Grissom Air Reserve Base (formerly **Grissom Air Force Base)** is a USAF base, located about 12 miles north of Kokomo in Cass and Miami Counties, Indiana. The installation was established as Naval Air Station Bunker Hill in 1942 and an active Air Force installation from 1954 to 1994. Since then it is a joint-use civil airport/military base with the Grissom Aeroplex providing general aviation and charter service.[183]

Lockbourne Air Force Base is located 10 miles south of downtown Columbus, near Lockbourne in southern Franklin County, OH. On 1 January 1951, was reactivated and redesignated as a USAF base under the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and functioned as a

[180] Dorr 2017
[181] http://military.wikia.com/wiki/Bakalar_Air_Force_Base
[182] http://englandairforcebase.com/
[183] http://www.grissom.afrc.af.mil/

training and command center. After Lockbourne was reactivated, the USAF began implementing a large construction program that was combined with the disposal of many of the World War II structures that had been occupied beyond their designed life expectancy. On 1 July 1965, the USAF transferred Lockbourne from the SAC to the TAC as the conflict in Vietnam grew in intensity. TAC's 415th Special Operations Training Squadron was responsible for training in the AC-119G/K and AC-130 gunship programs at Lockbourne.[184] Troops from Army bases from across the country arrived at the facility to organize, load gear and equipment, and depart on C-141s and C-130s for Southeast Asia. By 1967, Lockbourne achieved its peak in size at 4,400 acres and in base population at over 18,000 personnel. The 18th SOS was activated 25 Jan 1969, and deployed to Phan Rang Air Base, South Vietnam. The 18th SOS flew the Fairchild AC-119K Stinger gunship. The squadron's primary mission was the interdiction of enemy supply lines, close air support, and air base defense. The 18th SOS was inactivated 31 Dec 1972. In May 1974, Lockbourne was renamed Rickenbacker AFB. In 1980, Rickenbacker AFB closed, administration was transferred from the Department of the Air Force back to the Ohio Air National Guard, and the installation was renamed Rickenbacker ANG Base. It was realigned as Rickenbacker ANG Station on 30 September 1994.[185]

Pope Army Airfield is located 12 miles northwest of Fayetteville, NC. It was established in September of 1918, as "the flying field at Camp Bragg." In March of 1919, it was designated as Pope Field by the U.S. War Department. When the USAF came into being in 1947, a portion of Fort Bragg, including Pope Field, was partitioned off and became Pope Air Force Base. This designation continued until 1 March 2011, when, in accordance with Congress' Base Realignment and Closure law, Pope Air Force Base was reabsorbed by Fort Bragg and the airfield was redesignated as Pope Army Airfield, Fort Bragg.

During the Vietnam War, the need to train large numbers of aircrews to take advantage of unique C-130 Hercules capabilities led to the establishment of an aircrew replacement training unit. On 15 November 1971, the 318th Troop Carrier Squadron (Commando) was stood up as the 318th SOS at Pope AFB, NC, serving under 1st SOW. The unit's mission was to provide unconventional warfare support in Vietnam with the C-130 Hercules. Training gained at Pope and Fort Bragg prepared aircrews for Vietnam. The drop zones, low-level routes, and dirt landing zones at Fort Bragg were considered important ways to familiarize the air men for the conditions that they would face in Vietnam.

In August 1971, the 317th Military Airlift Wing moved to Pope AFB. One of the most important roles of the 317th was its involvement in the development and testing of the sophisticated Adverse Weather Aerial Delivery System, which allows accurate airdrops through cloud cover and at night, thereby greatly expanding the environment in which airborne operations are possible. This system proved its worth in combat during Vietnam.[186]

Shaw Air Force Base is located in Sumter, SC. It became an important TAC installation during the Cold War. TAC conducted pilot and crew training for fighter aircraft assigned to Shaw AFB. Directed by the Vice Chief of Staff for the Air Force, General Curtis LeMay, TAC established an elite volunteer fighting force for duty in Vietnam in early 1961. By early 1963, the USAF

[184] USAF 1971
[185] ICRMP Rickenbacker May 2011
[186] http://www.pope.af.mil/ April 17, 2014

Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron was in place at Shaw AFB. During the Vietnam War, TAC trained all Air Force tactical reconnaissance pilots at Shaw AFB for the war theater. Missions conducted by the units at Shaw AFB ended gradually during 1968-1970.[187]

3.2.2 USAF COUNTERINSURGENCY TRAINING

The USAF COIN efforts began in 1961 as a response to President Kennedy's requirement for improved COIN tactical air capability. A small number of Air Force Special Operations Command Air Commandos were in South Vietnam advising on COIN tactics began in 1961.[188] Their primary mission was to help other people fight their own war, not fight it for them.[189] So that personnel could advise on these matters, COIN tactics were already being incorporated into USAF training.[190] USAF had made it clear that its COIN capability was being developed, and must be developed, over and above its traditional strategic power.[191]

The initial purpose of the training centers was to teach Air Commandos how to instruct the South Vietnamese in COIN tactics such as low-level drop techniques for personnel and cargo, close air support for day and night operations, fast deployment of ground forces, and reconnaissance including the use of flares and other devices to expose guerrilla movements at night. Other techniques that were taught were the use of special weapons to cut off retreats, interdiction raids, raids on supply dumps, and psychological warfare as well as survival techniques.[192] The emphasis on these types of training was reflected in enrollment numbers, when in 1962 there were 900 USAF men in Air Commando groups, and by the next year, the number increased dramatically to 5,000 men.[193]

In response to the need for COIN tactics, in 1962 the Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, developed a two-week COIN course. The Air Command and Staff College's course supported the increase of men in commando groups.[194] All of the Commandos learned survival techniques at Stead AFB, NV. They also are taught hand-to-hand combat. Many also took the U.S. Army jump course for paratroopers.[195] To meet the COIN training demand, other training facilities were established and USAF personnel also trained at the Army's Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina (see section 3.1). Increased training demands on Air Commandos led to the establishment in April 1962 of the SAWC at Eglin AFB, Florida. The SAWC was assigned to the TAC.[196]

By the mid-1960s, the Special Air Warfare Indoctrination Course was taught to prepare officers for duties in Southeast Asia. The three-week course gave the officers a background of the war in Vietnam. The course included both lectures and field training, and covered subjects such as the strategic background of the war, escape and evasion techniques, the nature of insurgency, Communist theory, cultures and customs of Southeast Asia, and weapons selections. During the

[187] USAF ACC. Shaw AFB, June 2009
[188] ERDC 2014
[189] Witze 1962
[190] ERDC Dec 2014, pg. 176
[191] Witze 1962
[192] Witze 1962
[193] ERDC Dec 2014
[194] ERDC 2014
[195] Witze, 1962
[196] ERDC Dec 2014

field work, the officers learned how the Air Force was organized in Vietnam, how to train the Vietnamese Air Force and how to escape and evade. Special emphasis was placed on the close coordination between forward air controllers and the tactical fighter pilots in the position identification and rapid destruction of enemy targets in a counterinsurgency environment.[197]

In addition to air crew proficiency training and area orientation, as many students as possible were run through Swamp Rat – a special air warfare escape and evasion exercise.[198] Other skills were added to the training as a result of lessons learned in Vietnam. These skills included avoiding small arms fire from the ground that harassed and damaged aircraft, landing in unlit fields after night operational missions, delivering ordinance under low ceilings (750-1500 feet).[199]

The Special Air Warfare Center was officially activated on 27 April 1962 at Hurlburt Field (officially designated as Eglin Air Force Base Axillary Field Number 9, FL). Hurlburt Field was selected as the home of the Air Commandos and the SAWC because the field possessed the necessary environment for accomplishment of the assigned missions of the 4400th CCTS under OPERATION JUNGLE JIM. It was a self-contained area with easy access to the terrain and other facilities uniquely required for counterinsurgency-type operations. It had the geographical advantages of jungle terrain, water areas, and available space for simulated clandestine operations, as well as the vast testing resources of the Eglin Air Proving Ground Center at its disposal. Because it was an active field, no large sums of money were required to reactivate a base. Workshops, flight line facilities, offices, spaces, housing, and other support type facilities were immediately available and in operations upon activation of the SAWC.[200]

Hurlburt Field had two runways. The largest was 9,600 feet long by 150 feet wide. The other measured 4,800 feet long by 150 feet wide and ran northeast to southwest. Aprons along the runway furnished a space of 306,766 square feet.[201] Hurlburt Field and auxiliary fields had 14 different types of propeller and-driven and jet aircraft, the largest variety of any Air Force operational wing.[202]

Upon its activation, the facilities for the SAWC were considered to be more than adequate. SAWC Headquarters was located at Eglin AFB, as was the 1st Combat Applications Group, while the 4400th CCTS occupied facilities at Hurlburt Field. At Eglin AFB, SAWC Headquarters and the 1st Combat Application Group occupied building #2 throughout 1962.[203]

Other base facilities at Hurlburt Field included an exchange, barber shop, nursery, service club, NCO club, Officers open mess, hobby shops, theater, gymnasium, dining hall, commissary, branch bank, post office, library, dispensary, dental clinic, credit union branch office, gas station, nine-hole golf course, tennis courts, marina, beauty shop, cafeteria, teen club, and softball diamond.[204]

[197] Hurlburt Hilites, Vol 4, No. 2, January 28, 1965
[198] Hurlburt Hilites, Vol 5, No. 16, August 24, 1966
[199] O'Neill 1962
[200] O'Neill 1962
[201] O'Neill 1962
[202] USAF 1971
[203] O'Neill 1962
[204] O'Neill 1962

Housing was an issue at Hurlburt Field as wait times during 1962 were 10 weeks for field grade officers and 60 weeks for junior officers. Non-commissioned officer waiting period was 4 weeks for chief master sergeant to 52 weeks for staff sergeant. There was a total of 280 on-base quarters, plus 6 substandard units located in the Florosa area for airmen below the NCO grade. Bachelor Officer Quarters facilities were completely saturated and not available. There were over 175 personnel in all grades on the waiting list for base quarters as of 31 December 1962.[205]

By 1965, the activities at Hurlburt had expanded rapidly; every year saw more personnel, more aircraft, more students, and more visitors. There had been very little construction on the base since 1953 and most units were operating from overcrowded, obsolescent facilities. The primary reason for the lack of construction support was the rapid and un-programmed nature of the SAWC mission expansion and the inherently slow reaction time for construction. In 1965, the minor construction program consisted of the conversion of the unused dining hall, building 9070, for the field training detachment; a new warehouse for the base equipment management office; a new building for weapons maintenance and training section; a new squadron operations building; a new ground support equipment building; additional ammunition storage facilities and a SAWC. Other programs included an addition to the commissary, a dispensary and dental clinic addition and air conditioning to the bachelor officers' quarters.[206]

3.3 U.S. MARINE CORPS

Historically, the Marines had been "First to Fight" because of their ability to mount small infantry strike forces on short notice. Regular Army troops had greater logistical needs which affected both cost and time. Additionally, there was a feeling within the U.S. government that intervention by Marines was less provocative than the dispatch of regular Army forces. In this view, the deployment of Marines abroad was not considered tantamount to an act of war, while deployment of Army troops was. As a result, the Marines acquired considerable experience in such aspects of counterinsurgency as pacification and the creation of native civil law enforcements during operations from 1915 to 1934 in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Santo Domingo, and Nicaragua.[207]

3.3.1 SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Force Reconnaissance was activated on 19 June 1957 with the 1st Amphibious Reconnaissance Company, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, located out of Camp Pendleton, CA. The company would be formed into 3 platoons: an amphibious reconnaissance platoon, a parachute reconnaissance platoon, and a pathfinder reconnaissance platoon. Subsequently, in 1958, half of the company was transferred from Camp Pendleton to Camp Lejeune, NC to form the 2nd Force Reconnaissance Company, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, and supported the 2nd Marine Division. It is worth noting that it would be another 4 years before the Navy SEALs would come on the scene, and another 11 years before the Army would designate a counterpart to Force Recon with the creation of LRRPs.[208]

[205] O'Neill 1962
[206] Hurlburt Hilites, Vol 4, No. 3, February 11, 1965
[207] Brush, 1999
[208] Pushies, 2011

These men were proficient in land navigations, small arms tactics, and patrolling, as well as mastering the skills of attacking from the air and sea. Fast boats, rubber rafts, and submarines were not new to the Marines, who had used these craft as platforms during World War II and Korea. Members of 1st Force Reconnaissance Company were deployed to Vietnam in 1965, while 2nd Force members were assigned to train new Recon Marines to be sent to Southeast Asia. The Force Recon Marines at Camp Lejeune would also serve as the primary unit should any other contingency arise elsewhere that required the attention of the Marine Corps. To enhance the new skills of the Force Reconnaissance companies, many of the Marines attended Recondo School taught by members of the U.S. Army 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne).[209]

By 1966, the Marine Corps had a detailed plan for the conduct of the war in I Corps. This plan was divided into 3 objectives: counter and destroy the guerrillas, conduct large unit operations to defeat both the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army main forces, and conduct pacification to rebuild South Vietnam. To counter the guerrillas, they would kill them and destroy their infrastructure by ambushes, patrolling, and collecting intelligence from civilians. Additionally, they would train local security forces to defend the villages. The conduct of large unit operations was predicated on reconnaissance to locate primary enemy units and then conduct search and destroy missions. Pacification had 5 important programs. The first was to develop village security by training local forces and forming a local intelligence net and providing information to the people. Next was the establishment of village government with Marine assistance. They conducted a census, installed local officials, provided security to those officials, and kept close relations with them. Third was the improvement of the local economy; they created local markets, improved lines of communication, and protected crops during harvests. Improvement of public health was the fourth program; this was accomplished by direct medical treatment and training, feeding those in need, and evacuating the seriously ill. Finally, Marine efforts sought to improve public education. They provided support to students, taught English, assisted in school construction and provided vocational training.[210]

The Combined Action Program was a United States Marine Corps operational initiative implemented in the Vietnam War and it proved to be one of the most effective counterinsurgency tools developed during that conflict. Operating from 1965 to 1971, this program was characterized by the placement of a 13-member Marine rifle squad, augmented by a U.S. Navy Corpsman, and strengthened by a Vietnamese militia platoon of older youth and elderly men in or adjacent to a rural Vietnamese hamlet. The entire unit of American Marines and Popular Force militia members together was designated as a CAP. The concept of combining a squad of Marines with local PFs and assigning them a village to protect proved to be a force multiplier.[211]

The program was formalized in February 1967. It became an official "win the hearts and minds" civic action program, and a school of sorts was eventually established near Da Nang. Training was 10 days and covered a few essentials such as a few Vietnamese phrases, local government structure, sensitivity to customs and culture, some civic action precepts, and some military topics

[209] Pushies, 2011
[210] http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/pelli.pdf
[211] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Combined_Action_Program

and combat tactics.[212] The CAPs peaked in 1970 and with 4 Groups and 114 companies it spread through the 5 provinces of I Corps.[213]

3.3.2 SPECIAL OPERATIONS TRAINING BASES

By 1962, the Marine Corps was increasing its emphasis on training in counterguerrilla warfare and COIN operations. The Marine Corps school system provided instruction in the theory and practices of both tactics, while a newly devised course was introduced to train senior officers in planning and conducting COIN operations. The majority of Marine training for Vietnam was conducted at Camp Pendleton, California, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, or Quantico Marine Corps Base, Virginia.[214]

Camp Pendleton

Because of its location, Camp Pendleton, CA was the primary training installation for the Marine Corps during the Vietnam conflict. The 15-day intensive guerilla warfare training introduced trainees to mines, booby traps, and ambushes. The majority of guerilla warfare training occurred at Camp Las Pulgas (Area 43 at Camp Pendleton) and in wooded terrain behind the Naval Hospital in Area 26. Between 6,000 and 8,000 Marines were trained each month for Vietnam and after the 2 weeks of training, Marines were deployed to Vietnam.[215]

Source: imef.marines.mil

Figure 3-4: Amphibious Training, MCB Camp Pendleton.

New training villages were constructed to assist Marines in improving jungle combat techniques as well as to provide enough training areas to accommodate the increased number of trainees. The training camps were located in the Horno area (Area 53), beside DeLuz Creek, behind the Naval Hospital (Area 27), and near Las Pulgas in the Piedra de Lumbre Canyon (Area 43). Camp Horno was part of a $20 million expansion and upgrade during the Korean War. The villages were constructed like many other mock Vietnamese villages used for training throughout the DoD. They included bamboo structures, underground tunnels, concrete bunkers, and barbed

[212] Brady 2005
[213] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Combined_Action_Program
[214] ERDC Dec 2014
[215] ERDC Dec 2014

wire. The Marine Corps also built a mock Vietnamese village at Quantico, VA. These villages oriented Marines to the challenges of military operations in Southeast Asia's jungle environment.[216] During the 1960s, Marines also received amphibious assault warfare training on beaches at Camp Pendleton. [217]

Camp Lejeune

Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune is a 246-square-mile training facility in Jacksonville, NC. The base has 11 miles of beaches making it a key area for amphibious assault training and its location between 2 deep-water ports (Wilmington and Morehead City) allows for rapid deployments. The main base is supplemented by 6 satellite facilities: Marine Corps Air Station New River, Camp Geiger, Stone Bay, Courthouse Bay, Camp Johnson, and Greater Sandy Run Training Area. Military forces from around the world come to Camp Lejeune on a regular basis for bilateral and NATO-sponsored exercises.

One of the major training innovations to prepare Marines for Vietnam was the 2nd MarDiv Guerilla Warfare Center, which was built at the southwestern tip of the Camp Lejeune complex about one mile northwest of Sneads Ferry. Courses lasting from 1 day to 2 weeks provided Marines instruction in the fundamentals of guerilla warfare and successful counter operations. Marines were also lectured on Vietnamese society and customs. This program was an effort by the Corps to familiarize Marines with the environment they would be entering and to deter crimes committed by servicemen against civilians.[218]

During the 1960s, the population on Camp Lejeune was in flux. Camp Lejeune was a transient facility, with most of the Marines stationed there either having just returned from Vietnam or scheduled shortly to be en route. Although construction continued throughout the 1960s, housing was a problem. The quarters at Berkeley Manor were completed in 1962, and a $1 million renovation of the Tarawa Terrace complexes (I and II) had taken place. Although there were about 4,810 units of family housing on base, almost half of Camp Lejeune's population of 60,000 military personnel and dependents were forced to live off base.[219]

Marine Corps Base Quantico

The Senior School and the Junior School were first organized after World War I as the Field Officers Course and the Company Officers Course at Marine Corps Base Quantico. They were two of most prestigious schools at Quantico Marine Corps Base, VA. On 1 August 1964, they were renamed the Amphibious Warfare School and the Command and Staff College. Not long after the schools assumed their new titles, Marines landed in Vietnam and Quantico geared up for its wartime role of providing highly qualified officers to lead combat missions.[220]

[216] ERDC Dec 2014, Note: More information on mock villages can be found in Archibald, Dan, Adam Smith, Sunny Adams, and Manroop Chawla. Military Training Lands Historic Context - Training Village, Mock Sites, and Large Scale Operations Areas, Construction Engineering Research Laboratory (CERL) U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center TR-10-10, March 2010
[217] Winkler, Training to Fight, pg. 116
[218] http://www.lejeune.marines.mil/Portals/
[219] http://www.lejeune.marines.mil/Portals/
[220] Fleming et al 1978

There were no drastic changes at Quantico as the Corps enlisted strength increased from 193,000 to 223,000 and the number of officers increased by 3,000. Since World War II, Quantico had developed a sufficiently flexible education system to continue its missions without disruption.[221]

One of the more unique additions to Quantico during the Vietnam years was the construction of the Southeast Asian village near Camp Barrett. Completed in August 1966, the Xa Viet Thang village provided invaluable training.[222]

On 1 January 1968, the base was re-designated the Marine Corps Development and Education Command (MCDEC) in the spirit of the command motto, “Semper Progredi” — Always Forward. Although the new name better reflected the mission of education and development, the new title did little to alter the base physically.[223]

3.4 U.S. NAVY

Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke recognized that future hostilities would involve guerrilla activities, and in March 1961 he recommended forming Naval Special Forces to counter the threat. On 25 May 1962, in his address to Congress, President John F. Kennedy emphasized the need to "expand rapidly and substantially, in cooperation with our allies, the orientation of existing forces for the conduct of non-nuclear war, paramilitary operations and sub-limited or unconventional war." This led to the development of National Security Action Memorandum 57, "Responsibility for Paramilitary Operations" on 28 June 1961 that prompted each branch of the armed forces to form its own counterinsurgency force. The Navy utilized UDT personnel to form separated units called SEAL teams. SEAL Teams 1 and 2 were commissioned in January 1962.[224]

The SEAL involvement in Vietnam began immediately and was advisory in nature. SEAL advisors instructed the Vietnamese in clandestine maritime operations. SEALs also began a UDT style training course for the Biet Hai Commandos, the Junk Force Commando platoons in Danang.[225]

The Navy also developed a robust riverine warfare capability during the Vietnam War. To train for the riverine operations in the Mekong Delta, Navy troops underwent training at the Naval Amphibious Base Coronado.[226] Amphibious readiness was a unique capability shared by the Navy and Marine Corps team in Vietnam. Mobile Support Teams provided combat craft support for SEAL operations, as did PBR and Swift Boat sailors. In February 1964, Boat Support Unit ONE was established under Naval Operations Support Group, Pacific to operate the newly reinstated PTF program and to operate high-speed craft in support of Navy Special Warfare forces. In late 1964 the first PTFs arrived in Danang. In 1965, Boat Support Squadron ONE began training Patrol Craft Fast crews for Vietnamese coastal patrol and interdiction operations.

[221] Fleming et al 1978
[222] Fleming et al 1978
[223] Fleming et al 1978
[224] http://www.military.com/special-operations/navy-seals-missions-and-history.html
[225] http://www.military.com/special-operations/about-the-navy-seals.html
[226] ERDC Dec 2014

As the Vietnam mission expanded into the riverine environment, additional craft, tactics, and training evolved for riverine patrol and SEAL support.[227]

Source: Toomey; Photo K-40290, NARA RG 428: General Records of the Navy, 1941-2004, Series: Vis-Aid Index to the General Photographic Files of the Department of the Navy,

Figure 3-5: Seabee team members and Vietnamese trainees constructing homes, Lai Thieu District. 1967.

As described in Chapter 2, in December 1965, the U.S. Navy initiated OPERATION GAME WARDEN to patrol the major rivers and canals in the Mekong Delta and Rung Sat Special Zone.[228]

The U.S. Navy also supported the war effort by building shore facilities throughout South Vietnam. Navy Construction Battalion (Seabee) teams arrived in South Vietnam in January 1963, initially in support of U.S. Army Special Forces. They worked to construct small, fortified camps for Army Special Forces and to assist Vietnamese civilians living in rural areas. Special Forces personnel worked in remote sections, training and advising CIDGs in guerrilla tactics; thus, they needed stronger base camps that could withstand Viet Cong ground and mortar

[227] http://www.military.com/special-operations/about-the-navy-seals.html
[228] http://www.vietnamwar50th.com/assets/1/7/U.S._Navy_in_Vietnam.pdf

attacks.[229] Seabees also built enormous support bases at Danang and Saigon to supply all Navy and Marine Corps forces and some Air Force and Army units in the field.[230]

Source: James L. Morrison; Photo CC-45172, NARA RG 111: Records of the Office of Chief Signal Officer, 1860-1985 Photographs of U.S. Army Operations in Vietnam, compiled 1963 - 1973.

Figure 3-6: CIDG Unit training in hand-to-hand combat under the guidance of the 5th Special Forces. 1967.

In the spring of 1965, there were 9,400 Seabees on active duty at various sea and shore locations. Most of the Seabees were assigned to 10 peace-time (reduced) strength Mobile Construction Battalions. They were split between Atlantic Seabees (Davisville, Rhode Island & Gulfport, Mississippi) and Pacific Seabees (Port Hueneme, CA), and their deployment sites. A major training and logistics base for the Pacific Command was at Subic Bay in the Philippines where

[229] DeVries, 2011
[230] http://www.vietnamwar50th.com/assets/1/7/U.S._Navy_in_Vietnam.pdf

the Navy and the Bureau of Yards and Docks (later, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, renamed in 1969) had maintained a significant presence in the Far East dating back to the Korean Conflict buildup and basing of regiments and mobile construction battalions. During the Vietnam era, the total Seabee force grew from 14,000 in mid-1966, to 20,000 in mid-1967, and finally, to more than 26,000 during the peak of the war in 1968 and 1969.[231]

Source: R.E. Woods; Photo K-36671, NARA RG 428:
General Records of the Navy, 1941-2004, Series:
Vis-Aid Index to the General Photographic Files
of the Department of the Navy, 1958 – 1981.

Figure 3-7: Seabees build a bridge connecting two villages under the direction of the Civic Action Group. 1966.

[231] DeVries, 2011

3.4.1 U.S. NAVAL SPECIAL FORCES TRAINING BASES

The first two SEAL teams were formally established in 1962 and were located on both coasts of the United States, at Naval Amphibious Base Coronado, CA and at Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek, VA. Formed entirely with personnel from Underwater Demolition Teams, the SEALs' mission was to conduct counterguerrilla warfare and clandestine operations in maritime and riverine environments.[232]

Because of the dangers, prospective SEALs went through tough training. The intense physical and mental conditioning it takes to become a SEAL begins at Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) training. SEAL candidates begin BUD/S training at the Naval Special Warfare Center, Naval Air Base, Coronado. This 6-month course of instruction focuses on physical conditioning, small boat handling, diving physics, basic diving techniques, land warfare, weapons, demolitions, communications, and reconnaissance.[233]

The first phase trains, develops, and assesses SEAL candidates in physical conditioning, water competency, teamwork, and mental tenacity. The second (diving) phase trains, develops, and qualifies SEAL candidates as competent basic combat swimmers. During this phase, physical training intensifies. Emphasis is placed on long distance underwater dives with the goal of training students to become basic combat divers who use swimming and diving techniques as a means of transportation from their launch point to their combat objective. This is a skill that separates SEALs from all other Special Operations forces. The third phase trains, develops, and qualifies SEAL candidates in basic weapons, demolition, and small-unit tactics. This phase concentrates on teaching land navigation, patrolling techniques, rappelling, marksmanship, and military explosives. The final three-and-a-half weeks of the third phase are spent at Naval Auxiliary Landing Field, San Clemente Island, CA where students apply all the techniques they have acquired during training.[234]

For the Seabees, basic training consisted of courses on construction planning and estimating, engineering aid, chemical, biological, and radiological defense operations, construction mechanics, advanced diagnostics, shop management, construction inspection, building, steel working, welding, tools and equipment maintenance, utilities, electrical, equipment operation, water well drilling, blasting and quarry operations, and crane operating.[235]

Naval Amphibious Base, Coronado

In June 1943, the Secretary of the Navy authorized the establishment of the Amphibious Training Base in the San Diego area to meet demands for trained landing craft crews during the war. These crews were deployed to the South Pacific theater where their successful efforts contributed to ending World War II. Training for infantry coordination with naval artillery and attack aircraft was provided at the Naval Gunfire Liaison School and Support Air Control School. In 1946, the base was renamed Naval Amphibious Base, Coronado. The base has also provided training for UDTs, Navy SEALs, Brown Water Navy personnel, and Naval Reserve

[232] ERDC Dec 2014
[233] https://www.navy.com/careers/special-operations/seals.html#ft-training-&-advancement
[234] https://www.navy.com/careers/special-operations/seals.html#ft-training-&-advancement
[235] https://www.navy.com/careers/special-operations/seals.html#ft-training-&-advancement

Officer Training Corps midshipmen. The base also conducted research and tested of newly developed amphibious equipment.[236]

Naval Amphibious Base, Coronado is approximately 1,000 acres and includes the Main Base, training beaches, a California least tern preserve, recreational marina, enlisted family housing, and state park. State Highway 75 separates the base into surfside (ocean) and bayside sections. Amphibious training is conducted on both surfside and bayside beaches. To the south of the Main Base, the majority of amphibious training activities take place on about 257 acres of ocean beachfront property, leased from the State of California.[237]

The Naval Amphibious School supported amphibious warfare-related activities such as underwater demolition, naval gunfire support, landing craft handling, and naval control of shipping.[238]

Source: https://www.vetfriends.com/militarypics/

Figure 3-8: Coronado Island – Patrol Boat, River Training. 1967.

Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek

Joint Expeditionary Base–Little Creek, formerly known as Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek, is the major operating base for the Amphibious Forces in the U.S. Navy's Atlantic Fleet and is the largest base of its kind in the world. The base comprises four locations in three states and spans nearly 12,000 acres. Its Little Creek location in Virginia Beach, VA totals 2,120 acres. Outlying facilities include 350 acres located just north of Training Support Center Hampton

[236] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naval_Amphibious_Base_Coronado
[237] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naval_Amphibious_Base_Coronado

[238] Training to Fight pg. 110

Roads in Virginia Beach and 21 acres known as Radio Island at Morehead City, NC, used for U.S. Coast Guard ships and personnel. Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, NC serves as an amphibious embarkation/debarkation area for U.S. Marine Corps units. The base's combination of operational, support, and training facilities are geared predominantly to amphibious operations.[239]

Naval Construction Battalion Center, Gulfport

Naval Construction Battalion Center is a 1,100-acre U.S. Navy industrial complex located in Gulfport, MS. An Advanced Base Depot was established in Gulfport on 2 June 1942. Gulfport had the necessary deep-water port facility needed during World War II to serve the Caribbean region, as well as a semi-tropical climate for year-round training and shipping.

In 1944, the mission of the Center changed to a U.S. Naval Training Center for basic engineering, diesel engine, radio, quartermaster, and electrician training. Continuing realignments of the Center occurred creating a single command of the Naval Training Center and the Advanced Base Depot. The Depot became the U.S. Naval Storehouse in 1945 and the Training Center was decommissioned in 1946. In 1948, the storehouse became the custodian of certain national stockpile materials.[240]

There were times when some 25,000 Naval personnel were stationed at the Center. They lived in wooden barracks, tents and, Quonset huts. The population between the late 1940s and early 1960s dropped to 4 or 5 enlisted personnel and 4 or 5 commissioned officers with a fluctuating civilian employee population.[241]

In early 1952, the Naval Storehouse was converted to the U.S. Naval Construction Battalion Center. In the mid-1960s, there was an increasing need for naval construction forces in Southeast Asia. The Navy's mushrooming commitments for construction forces in Southeast Asia led to an increased mission for the Center in February 1966. The first group of 509 Seabees arrived unannounced from Davisville, Rhode Island (RI) in March 1966. The galley, barracks and other personnel support facilities were still closed and locked. Ten months later, the Center had expanded to include new functions such as Seabee Team Training, and a new tenant, Construction Training Unit. The staff for the Naval Construction Battalion Center had expanded to 183 military and 523 civilian personnel to support approximately 4,200 Seabees. A personnel training facility, inactive for 20 years, was effectively forming, staging, training and homeporting mobile construction battalions.[242]

Naval Construction Battalion Center, Port Hueneme

Naval Base Ventura County is located on the Oxnard plain, about 60 miles northwest of Los Angeles, California on the coast. The Base comprises several sites, including the Naval Construction Battalion Center (CBC), Port Hueneme, California. The CBC Port Hueneme is the homeport of the Pacific Seabees. The mission of the CBC Port Hueneme today is much the same

[239] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint_Expeditionary_Base%E2%80%93Little_Creek
[240] http://www.militarybases.us/navy/naval-construction-battalion-center-gulfport/
[241] http://www.militarybases.us/navy/naval-construction-battalion-center-gulfport/
[242] http://www.militarybases.us/navy/naval-construction-battalion-center-gulfport/

as it was in 1942; to provide a homeport to furnish training, administrative, and logistic support for Seabees serving in all parts of the world. CBC Port Hueneme provides training and mobilization requirements for 4 active duty Seabee battalions and more than 16 reserve Seabee units.[243]

In the early days of World War II, CBC Port Hueneme was established to train, stage, and supply the newly created Seabees. CBC Port Hueneme supported all construction in Southeast Asia and the Pacific during the lull following the Korean War while keeping itself and its battalions in a state of readiness. Waterfront facilities were updated; replacement of deteriorated wooden piers with concrete and many other improvements were made throughout the Base to keep it ready for any emergency.[244]

Over the years, the CBC Port Hueneme has expanded or contracted, depending on the world situation and the needs of the Navy. The base itself covers more than 1,600 acres with more than 29 miles of roads and streets and 10 miles of railroad track. Port Hueneme also offers the Navy's only deep-water port between San Diego and Washington.[245]

[243] https://www.netc.navy.mil/centers/csfe/hueneme/
[244] https://www.netc.navy.mil/centers/csfe/hueneme/
[245] https://www.netc.navy.mil/centers/csfe/hueneme/

4.0 APPLICATION OF THE SUBCONTEXT IN THE IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION OF HISTORIC RESOURCES

This chapter presents how to apply this historic subcontext in the identification and evaluation of historic resources. The latter portion of this chapter describes the property types on U.S. military installations associated with special operation forces and warfare training during the Vietnam War. The selection of these property types was based on research and field investigations. Field data were collected at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, and Hurlburt Field, Florida, (see appendixes A and B). The purpose of the field investigations was to identify real property associated with special operation forces and warfare training.

Once resources have been identified, evaluation of a property involves two steps. First, the property will be assessed against eligibility criteria for listing on the National Register of Historic Places (National Register); then it must be assessed for its integrity. The following national register publications are useful guides when evaluating Vietnam War special operation forces and warfare training resources:

1. How to Apply National Register Criteria for Evaluation
2. Guidelines for Completing National Register for Historic Places Forms
3. Researching a Historic Property
4. Guidelines for Evaluating and Documenting Historic Aviation Properties
5. Guidelines for Evaluating and Documenting Historic Properties that Have Achieved Significance Within the Last 50 Years

These guides maybe found at: http://www.cr.nps.gov/nr/publications/index.htm.

4.1 NATIONAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION ACT

The National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) is the centerpiece of federal legislation protecting cultural resources. In the act, Congress states that the federal government will "provide leadership in the preservation of the prehistoric and historic resources of the United States," including resources that are federally owned, administered, or controlled. The NHPA requires the DoD to identify its significant resources, evaluate them for national register eligibility, and plan for the protection of the listed or eligible historic properties.

The NHPA established the National Register. The national register is a list of buildings, structures, objects, sites, and districts that have demonstrated significance to U.S. history, architecture, archaeology, engineering, and/or culture. The national register is maintained by the Secretary of the Interior and is managed by the National Park Service Keeper of the Register. Regulations for listing a property on the national register were developed by the Department of the Interior and are found in 36 *Code of Federal Regulations* (CFR) Part 60. The NHPA requires that federal agencies identify historically significant properties that are eligible for listing on the national register.

Section 106 of the NHPA requires the federal government to take into account the effects of its actions on historic properties prior to implementation of the action. For U.S. military installations, this requirement applies to all proposed actions on federal lands and any proposed activities that are federally supported or funded. Consultation with the state historic preservation office (SHPO) and/or the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP) is a critical step in this process. Activities on lands held by an American Indian tribe with a designated tribal historic preservation officer (THPO) must be coordinated with this official. If an undertaking on federal lands may affect properties having historic value to a federally recognized American Indian tribe, such tribe shall be afforded the opportunity to participate as consulting parties during the consultation process defined in 36 CFR 800.

Section 110 of the NHPA requires federal agencies to locate, inventory, and identify all properties under their ownership or control that may qualify for the national register. It also requires that the agencies manage and protect historic properties. The Federal Agency Preservation Assistance Program provides assistance to federal agencies in meeting Section 110 historic preservation responsibilities.

Section 106 compliance can also be accomplished using agreed-upon streamlined methods and agreement documents such as programmatic agreements. The agreements, which are developed among federal agencies, the ACHP, and SHPOs to provide efficient section 106 compliance guidance for specified historic properties and/or undertakings.

Failure to take into account the effects of an undertaking on historic properties, and afford the ACHP a reasonable opportunity to comment on such effects, can result in formal notification from the ACHP to the head of the federal agency of foreclosure of the ACHP opportunity to comment on the undertaking pursuant to the NHPA. A notice of foreclosure can be used by litigants against the federal agency in a manner that can halt or delay critical activities or programs.

The NHPA requires the DoD to identify its significant resources, evaluate them for national register eligibility, and plan for the protection of the listed or eligible historic properties. The Vietnam War overview historic context "Vietnam and the Home Front: How DoD Installations Adapted, 1962–1975" and this subcontext are designed to assist professionals in the field of cultural resources in identifying significant U.S. military Vietnam War special operation forces and warfare training use-related properties that may be present on military installations state-side. Criteria for evaluating these properties, once identified, are provided in section 4.3.

4.2 IDENTIFICATION OF HISTORIC PROPERTIES AND METHODOLOGY UNDER THIS SUBCONTEXT

The Secretary of the Interior's Standards and Guidelines for Archeology and Historic Preservation (48 *Federal Register* 44716) outline the process for the identification of historic properties. The process includes developing a research design, conducting a review of archival literature, completing a field survey, and analyzing the results of the literature review and field survey.

Those conducting the identification and evaluation of historic properties must meet professional qualifications established by the Secretary of the Interior. The qualifications are divided into five subject areas: History, Archeology, Architectural History, Architecture, and Historic Architecture.

The minimum professional qualifications in history and architectural history are: a graduate degree in history/architectural history or a bachelor's degree in history/architectural history and at least two years of full-time experience in research, writing, teaching, interpretation, or other demonstrable professional activity with an academic institution, historic organization or agency, museum, or other professional institution; or substantial contribution through research and publication to the body of scholarly knowledge in the field of history/architectural history.

The minimum professional qualifications in archeology are a graduate degree in archeology or anthropology and at least one year of full-time professional experience or equivalent specialized training in archeological research, administration, or management; at least four months of supervised field and analytic experience in general North American archeology and demonstrated ability to carry research to completion.

The minimum professional qualifications in architecture are a professional degree in architecture plus at least two years of full-time experience in architecture or a state license to practice architecture. The minimum professional qualifications in historic architecture are a professional degree in architecture or a state license to practice architecture plus at least one year of graduate study in architectural preservation, American architectural history, preservation planning, or closely related field; or at least one year of full-time professional experience on historic preservation projects.

A research design should define the purpose and objectives of the survey as well as the methodologies that will be employed to achieve the objectives. Most often, as stated above, surveys to identify historic properties are undertaken in compliance with Section 106 of the NHPA, which requires federal agencies to take into account the effect of its actions on historic properties and to mitigate adverse effects. Another driver for performing inventories is Section 110 of the NHPA that requires agencies to identify historic properties and manage them in the interest of the public. This requires the establishment of a baseline of known historic properties that must be kept updated, which is then used to develop a management plan for the properties. Depending on the driver, identification could be limited to a single property in compliance with a limited Section 106 action, or it may incorporate an entire installation in compliance with Section 110.

After the objective and scope of identification has been defined, a methodology should be developed to ensure that the identification meets the goals and also makes the best use of time and fiscal resources to guarantee the information obtained from the identification is as comprehensive as possible in anticipation of future actions that may be required. The methodology should include how to determine dates for original construction and all alterations, repairs, and additions; construction techniques and materials; history of property function; and the history of surrounding properties. These types of information are essential to place a resource

within a specific historic context for the property and determining the property's historic significance and integrity.

Historic properties are identified primarily through a combination of literature and archival record reviews and field surveys. Record reviews are conducted using real property records, historic maps and aerial photographs, blueprints and construction drawings, other archival records, and sometimes oral histories. Generally, major command headquarters, installation real property managers and departments of public works, installation historians, and one or more branches of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) keep these types of records. Other sources of information for resources and installation history related to Special Forces are local newspaper archives, archives at academic institutions (especially The Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University), historical societies, websites, and libraries. Previous installation and unit histories may also contain information valuable to understanding the use and history of a building or site in relation to Vietnam War Special Operations forces training.

Field surveys should be undertaken with care to gather as much information as possible as efficiently as possible. Contemporary aerial photographs can be consulted before going into the field and used as a guide to map current features of the property and identify elements that have been added or removed. Using a current aerial photograph also could reduce field mapping time. Photographs should be taken of all elements being inventoried. These photographs should be keyed on the aerial photograph to ensure they can be properly labeled. Photographs should be taken of each building and property feature, including close-ups of unique and representative details. Even if the pictures are not used as part of an inventory report, they could be helpful to document a time line of the property's condition.

Meticulous notes should be taken during a field survey. Oftentimes, database forms or applets can be created and loaded onto data collectors (including most submeter GPS units) to standardize data collection. In this manner, data can then be linked to geospatial databases creating a useful management tool for both cultural resource managers and for facility managers who may need to know, on a moment's notice, if a property or a specific element of a property is eligible for the national register.

4.3 CHOOSING THE CORRECT HISTORIC CONTEXT

The broader overview context contained in *Vietnam and the Home Front: How DoD Installations Adapted, 1962–1975*, can be preliminarily used in determining which properties may be significant on an individual installation by the cultural resources manager; however, the follow-on subcontexts will provide the specifics necessary for determinations of eligibility at the installation level.

Recommendations in *Vietnam and the Home Front: How DoD Installations Adapted, 1962–1975* include the development of additional subthemes for the Vietnam War. The subthemes include ground training, air training, housing, counterinsurgency warfare training, housing, medical facilities, and logistical facilities. Subthemes for each of these thematic areas should be developed to include an in-depth historic context, determination of associated property types, and character-defining features. Every thematic area may not be equally applicable to each branch of

the Armed Services. Currently, the subtheme *Vietnam War-Era Ground Combat Training and Associated Facilities* and Legacy project 14-739, *Vietnam War: Helicopter Training and Use on U.S. Military Installations, Vietnam Historic Context Subtheme* are also being developed.

Association with Special Operations and warfare training at an installation does not automatically imply a relationship to the Vietnam War. For example, some Special Operations forces units may not have been trained to service in Vietnam, but other parts of the world. In other cases, facilities were built previously and may have served an important role during the Vietnam War, and therefore, may have significance to more than one context.

4.4 APPLYING NATIONAL REGISTER CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION

The Secretary of the Interior has developed the National Register Criteria for Evaluation (36 CFR Part 60.4) to assist in the evaluation of properties eligible for inclusion in the national register. The National Park Service has published guidance for applying the criteria in *National Register Bulletin 15*: *How to Apply the National Register Criteria for Evaluation* (NPS 1991). To qualify for the national register, a property must have significance and retain historic integrity. Significance for U.S. military Vietnam War helicopter-related historic properties can be ascertained through Chapters 2 and 3 of this subcontext.

To be listed on, or considered eligible for listing on the national register, a cultural resource must meet at least one of the four criteria that follow:

A. Associated with events that have made a significant contribution to the broad patterns of our history.
B. Associated with the lives of persons significant in our past.
C. Embody the distinctive characteristics of a type, period, or method of construction, or that represent the work of a master, or that possess high artistic values, or that represent a significant and distinguishable entity whose components may lack individual distinction.
D. Have yielded, or may be likely to yield, information important in prehistory or history.

In addition to meeting at least one of the above criteria, a historic property must possess integrity of location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association. Integrity is defined as the authenticity of a property's historic identity, as evidenced by the survival of physical characteristics it possessed in the past and its capacity to convey information about a culture or group of people, a historic pattern, or a specific type of architectural or engineering design or technology.

4.4.1 CRITERION A: ASSOCIATION WITH EVENTS

The first criterion recognizes properties associated with single events such as the evacuation of the U.S. embassy in Saigon, or with a pattern of events, repeated activities, or historic trends such as innovations in new military strategies, testing, and training. The event or trends, however, must clearly be important within the associated history.

The U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War comprised a complex series of political, military, diplomatic, and economic events and programs that affected the lives of millions of people in the

United States and Asia. The Vietnam War was an event that made significant contributions to the broad patterns of U.S. history; however, because the Vietnam War occurred during the Cold War-era (1947–1989), not all military properties related to Special Operations forces training constructed from 1961 to 1975 are significant under this subcontext. The historic property(ies) being considered must have an important and specific association with special operation forces and warfare training in Vietnam. During the Cold War, some Special Operations units were trained and readied for situations in other parts of the world.

Military properties associated with Special Operations and warfare training during the Vietnam War are likely to fall under this criterion. Properties generally related to units that participated in the Vietnam War would also likely be evaluated under this criterion. To determine if a property is significant within subcontext under Criterion A:

1. Determine the nature of the property, including date of construction, type of construction, dates and purposes of modifications, and function(s) from time of construction to the end of the Vietnam War (1975).
2. Determine if the property is associated specifically with Vietnam War Special Operations and warfare training and missions, events, or trends.
3. Evaluate the property's history as to whether it is associated with the Vietnam War in a significant way.

4.4.2 CRITERION B: ASSOCIATION WITH SIGNIFICANT PEOPLE

Properties may be listed in the national register for their association with the lives of significant people. The individual in question must have made contributions to history that can be specifically documented and that were important within history. This criterion may be applicable, but to only a small portion of buildings or structures, as the history focuses on events and on design and construction rather than on individuals. However, background research on a particular installation or building may indicate that it is associated with an individual who made an important contribution to special operation forces and warfare training in the Vietnam War trends or specific events. To determine if a property is significant within this subcontext under Criterion B:

1. Determine the importance of the individual.
2. Determine the length and nature of the person's association with the property.
3. Determine if the person is individually significant within history.
4. Determine if the property is associated with the time period during which the individual made significant contributions to history.
5. Compare the property to other properties associated with the individual to determine if the property in question best represents the individual's most significant contribution.

Refer to *National Register Bulletin 32: Guidelines for Evaluating and Documenting Properties Associated with Significant Persons* (National Park Service) for more information.

4.4.3 CRITERION C: DESIGN/CONSTRUCTION

To be eligible for listing on the national register under Criterion C, properties must meet at least one of four requirements: (1) embody distinctive characteristics of a type, period, or method of construction; (2) represent the work of a master; (3) possess high artistic value; or (4) represent a significant and distinguishable entity whose components may lack individual distinction. Vietnam War special operation forces and warfare training-related resources are most likely to be eligible under the first or fourth of these requirements.

National Register Bulletin 15 defines distinctive characteristics as "the physical features or traits that commonly recur" in properties; type, period, or method of construction is defined as "the certain way properties are related to one another by cultural tradition or function, by dates of construction or style, or by choice or availability of materials and technology." Properties are eligible for listing on the national register if they are important examples, within history, of design and construction of a particular time. This component of Criterion C can apply to buildings, structures, objects, or districts.

"Significant and distinguishable entities" refers to historic properties that contain a collection of components that may lack individual distinction, but form a significant and distinguishable whole. This portion of Criterion C applies only to districts.

Military properties associated Special Operations training may fall under this criterion (and may also fall under Criterion A). To determine if a property is significant as an important example of distinctive characteristics of a building type or as a significant and distinguishable district:

1. Determine the nature of the property, including date of construction, type of construction, major modifications (dates and purpose) historic appearance, and functions during the period of significance.
2. Determine the distinctive characteristics of the property type represented by the property in question.
3. Compare the property with other examples of the property type and determine if it possesses the distinctive characteristics of a specific building type construction.
4. Evaluate the property's design and construction to determine if it is an important example of building type construction.

Although many military installations were impacted significantly by increases in troop levels, changing training requirements, and the engineering demands of the Southeast Asian geography, there was the lack of a unified building campaign in response to the Vietnam War's requirements (Hartman et al. 2014). While many Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force facilities were reopened, expanded, or adapted, there was no identifying architectural style used during that time. The reuse of WWII and 1950s buildings was common, and new construction was often part of the larger modernization initiatives that were being executed by the DoD during the 1950s and 1960s.

The writers of the report, *Vietnam and the Home Front: How DoD Installations Adapted, 1962–1975,* concluded that the Vietnam War differed from previous 20th century conflicts. It was long in duration and the U.S. involvement was gradual. There was no need to repeat the massive WWII effort to establish and fully construct working installations in a few months. As a result, there was no major overarching construction program across the DoD as a response to the U.S. military activities in the Vietnam War. Consequently, there was also no large-scale effort to produce standardized designs to be replicated across the county. Aside from new training methods such as "Quick Kill" ranges and Viet Cong villages, construction was largely piecemeal and focused on specialized training needs (Hartman et al. 2014).

Many buildings constructed new during this period, may incorporate mid-century modern design elements. This may be significant architecture under a Mid-century Modern design theme or just a style of the time period, and not significant to the Vietnam War.

For example, at Fort Bragg, the 2011 Survey Update conclude that "Bryant Hall (D-3206) and Kennedy Hall (D-3004) are eligible under Criterion C as representative examples of work performed by the renowned modernist architectural firm, A.G. Odell, Jr. and Associates, one of North Carolina's most prolific modernist architectural practices. Both structures are also rare examples of high-style modernist works in the greater Fort Bragg area. By extension, Moon Hall (D-3601; CD1255), Hardy Hall (D-3705; CD1256), and the former JFKSWCS Officers' Mess Hall (D-3404; CD1238) are eligible under Criterion C as representative examples of work by A.G. Odell, Jr. and Associates, and under Criterion A for their association with the inception and florescence of the Army's Special Forces."[246]

Source: J. Aaron, 2016

Figure 4-1: Kennedy Hall – Kennedy Hall exhibits characteristic modernist features: flat roofs; horizontal bands of aluminum windows and distinct window blocks; clean lines that emphasize the horizontal or vertical planes; and the use of materials such as concrete, glass, aggregate paneling, and modern metals.

[246] Privett and Mirarchi, 2012, pg 29

4.4.4 CRITERION D: INFORMATION POTENTIAL

Properties may be listed on the national register if they have yielded, or may be likely to yield, information important in prehistory or history. Two requirements must be met for a property to meet Criterion D: (1) the property must have, or have had, information to contribute to the understanding of history or prehistory, and (2) the information must be considered important. This criterion generally applies to archaeological sites. In a few cases, it can apply to buildings, structures, and objects if the property itself is the principal source of information and the information is important. For example, a building that displays a unique structural system or unusual use of materials and where the building itself is the main source of information (i.e., no construction drawings or other historic records) might be considered under Criterion D. Properties significant within this subcontext would rarely be eligible under Criterion D.

4.4.5 INTEGRITY

A historic property determined to be significant under the criteria for evaluation for the national register must possess integrity. Integrity is the ability of a property to convey its significance through retention of the property's essential physical characteristics from its period of significance. The National Register Criteria for Evaluation lists seven aspects of integrity. A property eligible for the national register must possess several of these aspects. The assessments of a property's integrity are rooted in its significance. The reason why a property is important should be established first, then the qualities necessary to convey that significance can be identified. *National Register Bulletin 15: How to Apply the National Register Criteria for Evaluation* defines the seven aspects of integrity as the following:

1. **Location:** the place where the cultural resource was constructed or the place where the historic event occurred.
2. **Design:** the combination of elements that create the form, plan, space, structure, and style of a cultural resource.
3. **Setting**: the physical environment of a cultural resource.
4. **Materials:** the physical elements that were combined or deposited during a particular period of time and in a particular pattern or configuration to form a cultural resource.
5. **Workmanship:** the physical evidence of the crafts of a particular culture or people during any given period in history or prehistory.
6. **Feeling:** a property's expression of the aesthetic or historic sense of a particular period of time.
7. **Association:** the direct link between an important historic event or person and a cultural resource.

National Register Bulletin 15 describes the following steps in assessing historical integrity:

1. Determine the essential physical features that must be present for a property to represent its significance.
2. Determine whether the essential physical features are sufficiently visible to convey significance.

3. Compare the property with similar properties if the physical features necessary to convey significance are not well-defined.
4. Determine, based on the property's significance, which aspects of integrity are particularly important to the property in question and if they are intact.

For properties significant for their association with special operation forces and warfare training during the Vietnam War on U.S. military installations, they must retain the key physical features associated with these themes. Properties significant for their design and construction must retain the physical features that are the essential elements of the aspects of the building type construction that the property represents.

In cases of active military installations, buildings are more likely to have been modified to extend their useful life. These modifications generally include adapting buildings for new communication systems or equipment, mission and staff changes, and changes in military assets such as new aircraft models. These integrity issues will be critical in the evaluation process of significant resources.

To qualify for listing as a historic district, the majority of the properties in the district associated with the history must possess integrity and a sufficient number of properties must be retained from the period of significance to represent that significance. The relationship among the district's components, i.e., massing, arrangement of buildings, and installation plan must be substantially unchanged since the period of significance.

4.4.6 CRITERION CONSIDERATIONS

Certain kinds of properties are not usually considered for listing on the national register, including:

1. religious properties (criteria consideration A)
2. moved properties (criteria consideration B)
3. birthplaces or graves (criteria consideration C)
4. cemeteries (criteria consideration D)
5. reconstructed properties (criteria consideration E)
6. commemorative properties (criteria consideration F)
7. properties that have achieved significance within the last 50 years (criteria consideration G)

These properties can be eligible for listing only if they meet special requirements called "criteria considerations." A property must meet one or more of the four criteria for evaluation (A through D discussed in previous sections) and also possess integrity of materials and design before it can be considered under the various criteria considerations. Three of these criteria considerations may be applicable to U.S. military properties; moved properties (criterion consideration B), commemorative properties (criteria consideration F), and properties that have achieved significance within the last 50 years (criteria consideration G).

A property removed from its original or historically significant location can be eligible if it is significant primarily for architectural value or if it is the surviving property most importantly associated with a historic person or event. Properties that are moveable by their nature, such as a ship or rail car, do not need to meet this criterion consideration.

Commemorative properties are designed or constructed after the occurrence of an important historic event or after the life of an important person. They are not directly associated with the event or with the person's productive life, but serve as evidence of a later generation's assessment of the past. The significance comes from their value as cultural expressions at the date of their creation. Therefore, a commemorative property generally must be over 50 years old and must possess significance based on its own value, not on the value of the event or person being memorialized. A commemorative marker erected in the past by a cultural group at the site of an event in its history would not meet this criterion if the marker were significant only for association with the event and it had not become significant itself through tradition.

Properties less than 50 years old are normally excluded from the national register to allow time to develop sufficient historical perspective. However, under criteria consideration G, a property may be eligible for the national register if it possesses "exceptional importance" or significance. Vietnam War resources span from 1961 through 1975, so could have been built 55 years ago (at this writing), or as recently as 41 years ago. Buildings constructed before 1961 could have significance during the latter part of the Vietnam War. Criteria consideration G (properties that have achieved significance within the last 50 years) applies to buildings and structures that are less than 50 years old at the time of evaluation. This criterion also includes buildings that were constructed more than 50 years ago and that continue to achieve significance into a period less than 50 years ago, or has noncontiguous periods of significance and one of which is less than 50 years ago, or had no significance until a period less than 50 years ago. For buildings, structures, objects, sites, or districts that have achieved significance within the last 50 years, only those of "exceptional importance" can be considered eligible for nomination to the national register, and the finding of "exceptional importance" must be made within the specific history associated with the property. National Park Service publication *How to Evaluate and Nominate Potential National Register Properties That Have Achieved Significance Within the Last 50 Years* further describes criteria consideration G.

Properties evaluated under criteria consideration G that do not qualify for exceptional importance must be reevaluated when they reach 50 years of age under national register Criteria A through D.

4.5 SIGNIFICANCE

To qualify for the national register, a cultural resource must be significant, meaning that it must represent a significant part of U.S. history, architecture, archaeology, engineering, or culture. A resource may possess significance on the local, state, or national level. The significance of a cultural resource can be determined only when it is evaluated within its history. As outlined in *National Register Bulletin 15: How to Apply the National Register Criteria for Evaluation*, the following steps are taken to evaluate a cultural resource within its history:

- Identify what the property represents: the theme(s), geographical limits, and chronological period that provide a perspective from which to evaluate the property's significance.
- Determine how the theme of the history is significant to the local area, the state, or the nation.
- Determine the property type and whether it is important in illustrating the history.
- Determine how the property represents the history through specific associations, architectural or engineering values, or information potential (the national register criteria for evaluation).
- Determine what physical features the property must possess in order for it to reflect the significance of the history.

A cultural resource may be significant within more than one area of history. In such cases, all areas of history should be identified. However, significance within only one area is required. If a cultural resource is determined to possess sufficient significance to qualify for the national register, the level of integrity of those features necessary to convey the resource's significance must then be examined.

For this subcontext, resources associated with special operation forces and warfare training, including elite forces, counterinsurgency, psychological operations, riverine, intelligence, civic actions programs and construction, and reconnaissance and patrolling fall under this criterion.

4.6 PROPERTY CLASSIFICATIONS

Significant properties are classified as buildings, sites, districts, structures, or objects. Sites or structures that may not be considered individually significant may be considered eligible for listing on the national register as part of a historic district. The classifications are defined as:

- A building such as a house, barn, church, hotel, or similar construction is created principally to shelter any form of human activity. "Building" may also be used to refer to a historically and functionally related unit such as a courthouse and jail or a house and barn.
- The term "structure" is used to distinguish from buildings those functional constructions made usually for purposes other than creating human shelter.
- The term "object" is used to distinguish from buildings and structures those constructions that are primarily artistic in nature or are relatively small in scale and simply constructed. Although it may be movable, by nature or design, an object is associated with a specific setting or environment.
- A site is the location of a significant event, a prehistoric or historic occupation or activity, or a building or structure, whether standing, ruined, or vanished, where the location itself possesses historic, cultural, or archaeological value regardless of the value of any existing structure.
- A district possesses a significant concentration, linkage, or continuity of sites, buildings, structures, or objects united historically or aesthetically by plan or physical development.

4.6.1 INDIVIDUAL ELIGIBILITY VS. HISTORIC DISTRICT

While Special Operations training installations, as a class of resources, may be significant, not every structure associated with training and use during the Vietnam War is eligible for listing on the NRHP. The framework established by the historic context focuses on the role of Special Operations and warfare during the Vietnam War to assess its significance and the significance of its component resources. In general, training installation and facilities should first be evaluated as potential districts. These facilities typically had both classroom and field training components that contributed to the training mission. In some cases, research and development also played a role in training.

For component structures and buildings to be individually eligible for listing on the national register with the context of Vietnam War special warfare, they should individually embody a significant event associated with the development of special warfare or elite forces tactics and training; or represent an example of a type or method of construction or engineering necessary to training Special Forces, or the important work of a significant architect. Infrastructure and support buildings typically are not individually eligible.

Training facilities were typically designed and intended to be utilized as a whole complex. Each structure or element provided a vital component of the overall training apparatus. The overall importance of a particular range or training facility depends of the mission of the specific installation. For example, North Vietnam military infrastructure was replicated at Eglin AFB for Special Operations training. Project Underbrush, for example, included a mock-up of the Ho Chi Minh Trail and a crude model of the Son Tay prison camp. Project Underbrush encompassed 64 square-miles and included 4 Vietnamese village sites, 6 missile sites, antiaircraft sites, and waterway sampan sites. This site was used for COIN training and training for the actual mission to liberate prisoners at Son Tay. The individual tunnels, trail components, or sites may not be individually significant. However, considered together, they represent specialized Vietnam War training and could be a significant historic district.

The dramatic increase in base populations and the number of units may have resulted in the need for additional housing and recreational amenities. Housing complexes may be a part of a Special Operations historic district, especially if the unit was sequestered from other units on the base.

4.6.2 INDIVIDUAL PROPERTIES

Individual properties are those whose physical attributes singularly represent or embody the Vietnam War Special Operations subtheme. While individual properties need not be unique, they must have integrity and cannot be part of a multiple-property grouping.

For properties that are less than 50 years old to be individually eligible for listing on the national register, they should:

- Clearly and explicitly reflect the important Special Operations mission of the installation. Examples include a Special Operations school building or building where new equipment used for Special Operations were developed.

- Be regarded as symbolic of the installation or of an aspect of the mission. Replica village and tunnels may be examples.
- Represent particularly significant examples of a type or method of construction or an important technological advancement.

Infrastructure and support buildings are not typically individually eligible unless they were: (1) the site of a particular event, (2) directly associated with a significant individual, or (3) of exceptional note as an example of architectural or engineering design.

4.6.3 HISTORIC DISTRICTS WITH ELEMENTS LESS THAN 50 YEARS OLD

Properties less than 50 years old may be integral parts of a district when there is sufficient perspective to consider the properties as historic. This consideration is accomplished by demonstrating that: (1) the district's period of significance is justified as a discrete period with a defined beginning and end, (2) the character of the district's historic resources is clearly defined and assessed, (3) specific resources in the district are demonstrated to date from that discrete era, and (4) the majority of district properties are over 50 years old. In these instances, it is unnecessary to prove exceptional importance of either the district or of the less than 50-year-old properties.

Exceptional importance still must be demonstrated for districts where the majority of properties or the major period of significance is less than 50 years old, and for less than 50-year-old properties that are nominated individually. Some historic districts represent events or trends that began more than 50 years ago. Frequently, construction of buildings continued into the less than 50-year period, with the later resources resulting in representation of the continuation of the event. In instances where these later buildings make up only a small part of the district and reflect the architectural and/or historic significance of the district they can be considered integral parts of the district (and contributing resources) without showing exceptional importance of either the district or the less than 50-year-old buildings.

An exceptional historic district is one comprised principally of structures less than 50 years of age that are integral to understanding the unique aspects of the district's mission or association. Structures that clearly contribute to this understanding would be considered contributing elements to the district. Structures that only tangentially or marginally contribute would not be considered contributing members unless they qualify under the standard national register criteria. Since the Vietnam War and corresponding construction span a period of time that stretches from 56 to 42 years ago, there may be districts or features of districts that will fall into this category.

4.6.4 ONE-OF-A-KIND PROPERTIES

These are properties whose character-defining features singularly embody the Special Operations subtheme and that are the only known property of its type. Singularity alone does not impart exceptional importance if the property is less than 50 years old. Vietnam War Special Operations properties that are singular must be compared against other property types within the same theme to determine if they are truly exceptional. Although unique properties can never be precisely compared quantitatively, a qualitative comparison must take place to protect the exclusivity of the term "exceptional."

The phrase "exceptional importance" may be applied to the extraordinary importance of an event or to an entire category of resources so fragile that survivors of any age are unusual. Properties listed that had attained significance in less than 50 years include, for example, the launch pad at Cape Canaveral from which astronauts first traveled to the moon. Properties less than 50 years old that qualify as exceptional because the entire category of resources is fragile. An example of a fragile resource is a traditional sailing canoe in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, where because of rapid deterioration of materials, no working Micronesian canoes exist that are more than 20 years old.

4.6.5 PROPERTIES SIGNIFICANT WITHIN MORE THAN ONE AREA OF HISTORY

Properties may possess significance within multiple areas of history. For instance, a building may be individually significant to Vietnam War special warfare training history because of its design characteristics, and may also be part of a district related to a particular mission of an installation. Military installations should be evaluated holistically, with attention to their interrelated historic associations over time. When evaluating the significance of a military property, the period of significance should be defined based on the range of important associations over time. In districts, buildings may illustrate various dates of construction, architectural design, and historical associations. A single building may be associated with several periods of history; for example, a building may have played a vital role in both the Vietnam and Korean Wars. Significance within one historic period is sufficient for the property to meet the national register criteria for evaluation. However, all areas of significance should be identified to have a comprehensive picture of the property's importance. For properties constructed during the period of the Vietnam War (1961–1975), other Vietnam War subtheme reports should be referenced on (www.denix.osd.mil) as available.

4.7 PROPERTY TYPES ASSOCIATED WITH SPECIAL OPERATION FORCES AND WARFARE TRAINING DURING THE VIETNAM WAR ON U.S. MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

The members of the Special Operations forces and elite units of each military service required specialized training to prepare them to fight this unconventional war. Special Forces and special warfare involved numerous training programs including COIN, PSYOPS, riverine, intelligence, civil actions programs, LRRP, guerrilla warfare, demolition, medical, clandestine operations, amphibious operations, and underwater operations, to name a few. Additional forms of training for non-Special Forces and warfare and necessary to fight this war, are addressed in other sub-theme context reports.

Training required both indoor and outdoor areas. Primary property types associated with this subtheme historic context include academic buildings and classrooms, libraries, laboratories, and outdoor training ranges and testing areas.

Additional billeting/housing, offices, and other buildings may have also been necessary to provide lodging and support to the training programs. These areas may have been separated from other base areas or integrated to accommodate the influx of military personnel. Buildings and structures did not necessarily need to be constructed during the Vietnam War period (1962–1975); they may have been previously constructed and repurposed for the Vietnam War.

Many of the buildings were constructed using standard designs and not necessarily unique in architectural design or style to a Special Operations training mission or the Vietnam War. For example, if a Special Operations unit was stationed in a separate area of a base, the housing and support buildings (mess, offices, etc.) may have been of a similar in design to other housing built around the same time period. This may result in buildings not meeting Criterion C; however, they may have significance as part of a district under Criterion A.

The following sections identify the types of building, structure, and landscape features that are associated with Special Operations and warfare training on U.S. installations during the Vietnam War. Individual properties need to be investigated at the installation level. Additionally, the omission of a property type in the following list does not automatically exclude it from potentially having significance under this subtheme. These types of buildings, structures, and landscapes may also have be associated with additional basic or more general training in addition to Special Operations and warfare.

4.7.1 ACADEMIC BUILDINGS

Academic buildings could be directly associated with training Special Forces units or courses. The classrooms provided venues for lectures on various operations, skills, and applications of these skills and theories. Lecture topics covered subjects such as the strategic background of the war; the nature of insurgency; Communist theory; cultures and customs of Southeast Asia; intelligence gathering techniques; and teaching tactics, strategies, and techniques for basic weapons, demolition, and small-unit tactics, land navigation, patrolling strategies. Other buildings or rooms would include laboratories and workshops that provided locations for more hands-on training or particular equipment for language courses, medical training and first aid, communications (radio operator and repair), and chemical/gas training facilities; computer simulation facilities; and libraries that housed Special Forces training materials.

Character Defining Features

These facilities include those constructed or adapted and heavily used during 1962–1975 and were directly related to providing training to Special Forces and warfare. This property type will vary in size, shape, and design; and may be an entire building or designated classrooms or a portion of a building. Buildings maybe of similar in design to other installation buildings of the same period, former World War II temporary or permanent buildings, or of a unique or custom design. Interior features include original floor plans, furnishings, and training equipment and materials. Equipment may include printing presses; audio visual equipment and close circuit televisions; radio and other communication equipment for PSYOPS, intelligence gathering, and communication; simulators; and medical training.

These properties would not likely be individually eligible unless containing unique equipment. These properties would be more likely to be part of a district.

National Register Bulletin 15 states that for each property, there are essential features that must have been retained for the property to have integrity and be able to convey a sense of the significant place and time with which it is associated. Without these features, a property could no longer be identified as a product of the place and time from which it came. As discussed in

section 4.4.3, there was no identifying architectural style used specifically for Vietnam War construction. However, many DoD buildings constructed during this time were influenced by architectural Modernism. Modernism covers a number of architectural movements and styles. If the building was constructed during this period, also refer to Legacy Project Number 11-448, *Historic Context for Evaluating Mid-Century Modern Military Buildings*, (Hampton, et al, 2012) for character defining features for the various different architectural movements. An example of a mid-century modern building is the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg (see Figure 4-2, and Appendix A).



Source: Privett and Mirarchi, 2012.

Figure 4-2: John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School Historic District – prior to Bryant Hall's construction. Kennedy Hall is centered, with JFK Officers' Mess Hall (D-3404) immediately behind it, and Hardy Hall (D-3705) to the upper left and Moon Hall (D-3601) to the upper right.

Source: Fort Bragg Museum

Figure 4-3: Language class, JFK Special Warfare Center and School Historic District.

4.7.2 OUTDOOR TRAINING AREAS FOR FIELD EXERCISES TO PUT THEORY INTO PRACTICE

Concept demonstrations, hands-on training, and developing physical endurance occurred primarily outdoors. Training involved weapons, equipment, and creating an environment similar to the one in which the units would be fighting. Training ranges for the Vietnam War, included:

- Jungle warfare and guerilla operations training and testing
- Munitions and bombing ranges
- Air-to-ground delivery ranges
- Rocket test ranges
- Drop areas
- Biochemical test complex
- Physical endurance and skills

In some cases, Special Forces units were sent to a specific military base for a specific specialized training program. For example, survival techniques were conducted at Stead AFB, Nevada; jump school training was at Fort Benning, Georgia; escape and evasion was conducted at Fort Stewart, Georgia; USAF air ground operation school was at Keesler AFB, Mississippi; and low-level mountain terrain navigation was in the Boston Mountains near Little Rock, Arkansas. For Air Force Special Forces, flying, hand-to-hand combat and judo tactics, foreign languages, counterinsurgency, and small arms qualifications were taught on Hurlburt Field (O'Neill 1962).

Character Defining Features

Ranges and training areas were designed to served different training programs, therefore features from one range to another may vary. Some ranges were designed as replicas of the military infrastructure of Vietnam. These ranges may have included:

- Mock-up of the Ho Chi Minh Trail
- Vietnamese village sites or other targeted sites
- Trenches, fox holes and tunnels
- Waterway sampan sites
- Rice-paddy targets

Counterinsurgency, interdiction, and guerilla operations training area may have included large earthen bunkers, a command post, munitions bunkers, personnel bunkers, drop zones, fortified defense arrays, landing zones, simulated surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, antiaircraft sites; and assault-landing runways.

Air-to-ground and ground-to-ground firing ranges and weapons testing areas may have bombing circles, bombing rocketry targets, specialize targets, napalm circles, weapon emplacements, spotting towers, and range control buildings. Some tactical air-to-ground training ranges in gunnery, bombing, and rocketry included an elaborate network of parallel roads with moveable target arrays and simulated bivouacs bunkers. Some training areas may have included a dam and spillway to add water-target arrays.

Other outdoor areas may have been used for testing programs. The testing programs may have used ranges for munitions or weapons testing. Testing program may have included prototype structures.

Amphibious and underwater training would have various water bodies (lakes, rivers, oceans) and could have associated shore facilities, such as docks, wharves, and piers. Underwater training may include submerged equipment, vessels or a navigation course. Water bodies may have been used for boat handling skills or river crossing training.

For physical endurance and skills development, training areas, may include obstacle course, rappelling towers, jump towers, and structures for chemical and gas training.

These same training areas could also have been used for non-Special Forces personnel. The most elementary requirement for training may be a forested area or clearing. These properties and features would not likely be individually eligible and would more likely to be part of a district or landscape.

Source: Hurlburt Field

Figure 4-4: Replica of Son Tay prisoner-of-war camp used for training the rescue mission – Hurlburt Field.



Source: Hurlburt Hilites, Vol. II, No. 12, June 27, 1963. Range 72 Provides Training Grounds for Commando Pilots Day and Night

Figure 4-5: B-26 Fighter on Eglin AFB's Range 73.

Figure 4-6: Vietnam Bunker, Training Range C-72; Eglin AFB.

Figure 4-7: Entrance to tunnel, Training Range C-72, Eglin AFB.

Source: imef.marines.mil

Figure 4-8: Red Beach, Camp Pendleton.



Source: Weitze, 2001

Figure 4-9: Prototype Hardened Shelter, Eglin Air Force Base, Range C-52E Pendleton.

4.7.3 ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FACILITIES

To support the specialized training mission, additional buildings may have been built or renovated to house additional and necessary functions. These may have included headquarters and offices, maintenance and testing shops, flight line facilities, housing, and morale/welfare/ recreation facilities. A swimming pool may have been used for underwater dive training in addition to recreation.

Character Defining Features

These buildings will vary in size, shape, and design. Buildings may be similar in design to other installation buildings of the same period, former World War II temporary or permanent buildings, or of a unique or custom design. These properties would not likely be individually eligible (unless of a unique design) but could be a contributing resource to a historic district if the special forces or special operations training area was a distinct area within the installation. For example, the construction of the Headquarters of the JFK Center for Special Warfare was originally envisioned as the cornerstone of a complex which would include the JFK Chapel, the JFK Memorial Plaza, JFK Hall with an adjacent language training classroom facility, Bryant Hall, a close circuit TV lab and radio station for WCMA 91.5FM, a swimming pool, museum, a service club, advance medical lab, Group headquarters, and barracks. The buildings had modern designs and features, and located adjacent to each other to form a small campus within the larger installation (See Appendix A for more details).

Source: Privett, and Mirarchi, 2012.

Figure 4-10: JFKSWCS's Hardy Hall.

Other property types might include previously constructed buildings re-purposed for special operations warfare training support.

Source: Fort Bragg Museum

Figure 4-11: Original PSYWAR School Library, Fort Bragg, WWII temporary building, circa 1950s.

4.8 CONCLUSION

This work developed a context to evaluate the historical significance of resources constructed on U.S. military installations as they pertained to Special Operation Forces and Warfare training during the Vietnam War. The goal of this historic context is to provide military and cultural resource professionals with a common understanding for determining the significance of DoD facilities within this context in order to increase efficiency and cost savings. It outlines Special Operation Forces and Warfare training that occurred within the USAF, Navy, USMC, and U.S. Army as necessitated by the Vietnam War and provides examples of installations where this training was conducted. Finally, it provides a means for applying this subcontext for the identification and evaluation of historic resources at these and other U.S. military installations. As stated, primary property types include academic buildings and classrooms, libraries, laboratories, workshops, outdoor training areas and ranges, simulators, mock villages, beaches and water bodies, and testing areas. Building types could include those constructed to address a large increase in trainees and staff. These buildings may include barracks and other housing as well as recreation buildings, maintenance facilities, and administrative buildings.

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APPENDIX A:

FORT BRAGG – VIETNAM WAR SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND WARFARE TRAINING HISTORIC CONTEXT AND RESOURCE TYPES

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FORT BRAGG SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND WARFARE TRAINING

A.1 Early History of Fort Bragg

The following is excerpted from http://northcarolinahistory.org/encyclopedia/fort-bragg/

As one of three training camps established in North Carolina to train soldiers during World War I, Camp Bragg was established 4 September 1918 outside of Fayetteville and was the only camp of the three to continue operations after the war. The initial construction of the camp was completed on 1 February 1919. Because Camp Bragg was the only military reservation in the United States with enough room to test the newest long-range artillery weaponry, the Army's Field Artillery board was transferred to Bragg. On 30 September 1922 Camp Bragg became Fort Bragg signifying Bragg's role as a permanent military base.

Throughout the 1920s and 1930s Fort Bragg served as an important location for testing field artillery. Using its environmental diversity – deep sand, heavy mud, swamps, streams, and forests – soldiers thoroughly tested artillery weapons for efficiency and effectiveness. Fort Bragg later became the headquarters of District A of the Civilian Conversation Corps and the training ground for the National Reserve Officer Training Corps, Officers Reserve Corps, and Citizen Military Training Corps.
With the onset of World War II, Fort Bragg underwent further renovations and was updated for modern warfare training. Paved runways were added, and in March 1942 the Army established the Airborne Command at Fort Bragg. By the end of World War II, all five airborne divisions, the 82nd, 101st, 11th, 13th, and 17th divisions, all had a presence at Fort Bragg. At the war's end, the 82nd Airborne Division was permanently stationed at Fort Bragg, and the base became known as the "Home of Airborne."

A.2 History of Special Forces at Fort Bragg

At the end of World War II, all special operations units were disbanded and the Army showed little interest in reviving them. But on 25 June 1950, the surprise outbreak of the Korean War changed all that. Desperate combat requirements revived interest in creating Army Special Operations units and led to the activation of Airborne Ranger companies, a Raider unit, and other new organizations to conduct partisan/guerrilla warfare and special missions deep into North Korean territory.

The renewed interest in Special Operations brought about because of the Korean War, and the tireless efforts of BG Robert A. McClure, resulted in the U.S. Army establishing the Psychological Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in April 1952. The Psywar Center's purpose was to consolidate in one location all the Army's new Special Forces and Psychological Operations training, personnel, and units. The creation of the Psywar Center, the forerunner of today's Special Warfare Center and School, signaled the permanent acceptance of both of these specialties within the U. S. Army. It was also recognition that these capabilities were not easily created in wartime, as had been earlier believed.

As part of the Psywar Center, the 10th Special Forces Group was created under its first commander, COL Aaron Bank. Advertising for volunteers for his new unit, Bank implemented a selection and training regimen similar to the one that had been used to train OSS men like himself ten years earlier. As the news of existence of Special Forces spread throughout the Army, the newly created 10th SFG soon expanded with former Rangers, 'Forcemen,' Paratroopers, and OSS veterans who brought the skills and knowledge they had acquired from their WWII special operations experiences.

At the Department of the Army plans and policy level, Special Forces issues were being represented within the Pentagon by men such as former Philippine guerrilla commanders COLs Russell Volckmann and Wendell Fertig. Others, like COL Donald Blackburn, would later command newly formed Special Forces groups. Europeans with native language skills or specific area expertise enlisted under the conditions of the Lodge Act were also recruited to join Special Forces. On 4 March 1954, a major shift in responsibility occurred when Continental Army Command (CONARC) directed the Psywar School to assume responsibility for all matters concerning guerrilla warfare (GW) and counterinsurgency (COIN) as well as becoming the primary agency for the development of doctrine, tactics, techniques, and training literature pertaining to guerrilla warfare. When linked with psychological operations, this added a new umbrella term of 'Special Warfare' to the U.S. Army's lexicon and led to renaming the Psywar Center to the Special Warfare Center in December 1956.

During these early years, Special Forces' primary focus was directed toward conducting unconventional warfare, training in clandestine operations, establishing intelligence and communications networks, practicing survival, escape and evasion training, and developing expertise in weapons, demolitions, sabotage techniques, and guerrilla organizations. Innovative, large-scale field training exercises in unconventional warfare to evaluate training methodologies were conducted at Camp Mackall, North Carolina, and the Chattahoochee National Forest in Georgia. These became the predecessors of today's ROBIN SAGE exercises. By 1960, these early pioneers institutionalized the basic structure of 2 officers and 10 enlisted men that became the model for the Special Forces Operational Detachment A (ODA), or today's A-Team.

In July 1959, 107 Special Forces military advisors were sent to Laos in Southeast Asia to assist the Laotian Government to counter a full-scale insurgency by Pathet Lao Communist forces supported by China and North Vietnam. The first operation, called HOTFOOT, authorized the deployment of Special Forces units as military training teams (MTTs) to organize and prepare Laotian volunteer units to fight Pathet Lao Communists. Commanded by COL Arthur D. 'Bull' Simons, formerly of the WWII Sixth Ranger Battalion, the Special Forces teams entered Laos in civilian clothes.

On 19 April 1961, Operation HOTFOOT became Operation WHITE STAR. For the Special Forces soldiers committed to this operation, they were now publicly able to train and advise Laotian Government forces, and so began openly wearing their military uniforms. WHITE STAR teams continued to rotate into Laos in six-month increments through the remainder of 1961 and reached its peak strength of 433 Special Forces personnel in July 1962. On a larger scale, though,

before the declaration of Laotian neutrality in July 1962, Special Forces gained invaluable experience that would pay greater dividends in Vietnam.

A.3 Fort Bragg During Vietnam

The following is excerpted from Cultural Resources Survey of Cold War Properties – Fort Bragg, North Carolina, August, 2005. Prepared by Thomason and Associates for the US Corps of Engineers, Savannah, Georgia and the Cultural Resources Management Program, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

From 1960 to 1975, Fort Bragg recorded a period of significant growth and evolving missions. The role of the XVIII Airborne Corps and the 82nd Airborne Division remained largely the same during these years. The 82nd Airborne Division remained "on call" to respond to any threat anywhere in the world. Following the Tet offensive in 1968, the Division's 3rd Brigade was rushed to Vietnam to help counter the North Vietnamese forces. This brigade remained in Vietnam until December of 1969. This period also witnessed the emergence of the Special Forces as an intrinsic part of Fort Bragg and the construction of the Special Warfare Center. Extensive modernization of the post also took place during these years with the construction of many new barracks buildings, family housing, and administrative buildings.

The focus of the XVIII Airborne Corps and the 82nd Airborne Division continued to be one of training and combat readiness in the early 1960s. Troops participated regularly in parachute jumps on the post's many drop zones as well as training in weaponry and tactics. In support of these activities, construction funds of $18.1 million were spent in 1964 and 1965 on building additional aviation facilities for Simmons Army Airfield, a permanent 192-man barracks for the hospital, and a 10-EM (enlisted men) barracks complex. Non-appropriated fund construction projects between 1960 and 1970 amounted to nearly five million dollars and included NCO open messes, bowling centers, banks, an exchange warehouse, a field house, a gymnasium with an indoor pool, a guest house and youth center. The post's family housing was also improved in the early 1960s.

With the widening war in Vietnam, training for jungle combat conditions became a large part of exercises conducted by the 82nd Airborne in the mid-1960s. In November of 1966, a 3,000-man parachute assault exercise was conducted in the Camp Mackall area. The Division employed counterguerilla/counterinsurgency tactics in imitation of tactics utilized in Vietnam. As part of the training during the Vietnam War, several mock villages were constructed at Fort Bragg. These villages approximated the type of combat conditions which would be encountered if troops of the 82nd Airborne Division were deployed to Vietnam.

In 1966, the build-up for the Vietnam War required the activation of Fort Bragg's Army Training Center. The Old Division Area (Area A) was utilized for this effort and some $10.6 million was spent in providing housing, support, and training facilities for this function. Much of this work consisted of rehabilitation and alteration of World War II mobilization-type buildings and the addition of pre-fabricated metal buildings for storage and academic uses. That same year, millions of dollars were spent on building Post Engineer maintenance facilities, a dental clinic, a 40-man BOQ, and a 1,000-seat auditorium.

In addition to the operations of the XVIII Airborne Corps and 82nd Airborne Division, the 1960s also witnessed the growth of Army Special Operations. Special Forces teams were among the first units into the theater in the late 1950s and by the early 1960s were positioned throughout South Vietnam, as advisors and trainers. Their efforts were supported by President John F. Kennedy, whose name is inextricably linked with Special Forces. Kennedy's emphasis on special warfare and counterinsurgency operations placed Special Forces at the forefront of training ethnic groups throughout South Vietnam to learn those military skills that would enable them to resist Communist threats to their own villages and territory.

World War II barracks buildings were converted in 1961 and 1962 to operational use by the Special Forces and money was allocated for the completion of permanent buildings at the planned Special Warfare Center. In 1963, money was set aside for the design and building of a Headquarters and Academic Building and in the next year additional funds were allocated for two 275-man student BOQ's, an Officers' mess, two classified study buildings and a central heating plant. The first building constructed at the Center, Kennedy Hall, was completed in 1965 as the main academic and administrative building for the Special Forces. In 1966-1967, over a dozen new brick buildings were constructed along Ardennes Street to house the headquarters of the 5th and 7th Special Forces Groups and various battalions, as well as a medical clinic for the Center. The John F. Kennedy Chapel was also built during these years to serve as the church for the Special Warfare Center.

Vietnam's fluid strategic and operational situation resulted in a major emphasis on Special Forces Operations. Special Forces teams were among the first units into the theater in the late 1950s and by the early 1960s were positioned throughout South Vietnam, as advisors and trainers.

A.4 JFK Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS)

The following is excerpted from Historic Architectural Resources Survey Update 1962-1972 by Megan Privett and Matthew Mirarchi, September 2012.

JFKSWCS Social History and Context. The Army activated the Psychological Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg on 10 April 1952 to train both Psychological Operations and Special Forces soldiers. In 1956, the Army re-designated the Psywar Center as the U.S. Army Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS), indicative of the organization's expansion to encompass more training paradigms than just psychological operations. The 10th Special Forces Group was the first Special Forces unit, and some members served in Korea in 1953. Next came the 77th Special Forces Group, which became the 7th Special Forces Group in 1960. the By 1961, the Special Warfare Center also encompassed the 5th and 7th Special Forces Group (SFG), 1st and 13th Psychological Warfare Battalions, the Special Warfare Training Group, and the 22nd Special Warfare Aviation Detachment.

With President Kennedy's support for expansion, SWCS grew in sync with the D-Area's regimental campus complexes. Given its centrality to covert training, the center was originally planned for the isolated Yadkin Area, which had been occupied by a WWII-era building complex known as Smoke Bomb Hill. Despite its prime location, the Yadkin Area proved to be too small for SWCS's exponential growth, and would have been counter to Fort Bragg's 1965 Master Plan, which underscored the fact that "…the ever changing strengths and missions of

military units presage the inadvisability of developing 'tailor made' areas which cannot be readily integrated into other areas to meet a change in mission." In lieu of the Yadkin Area, SWCS was sited along Gruber Road. Kennedy Hall's construction was initiated in 1963 and completed in 1965, providing space for academic classes and specific training for new Special Forces recruits. Kennedy Hall also contained a language training center, the crux of which was a Military Assistance Training Advisor (MATA), along with courses focused upon counterinsurgency methods and psychological warfare. In 1972, the Special Warfare Center received another primary command and training facility: Bryant Hall, dedicated in honor of Vietnam War posthumous Medal of Honor recipient Sergeant First Class William J. Bryant.

JFKSWCS, the Vietnam War, and the Counter-Culture Movement. Fort Bragg transformed into a key base of operations for the duration of the Vietnam War. Special Forces unit, such as the 5th Special Forces Group (ABN), were tasked with training personnel in counterinsurgency techniques specific to the Republic of South Vietnam; the 7th Group deployed to Laos and South Vietnam; and the 8th and 3rd Special Forces Groups were activated in 1963.

Advanced training for targeted, high risk, and clandestine missions in Vietnam required sufficient facilities to train to standard. Each of these groups was heavily involved with local populations, and often required mock villages in which to train before deployment. Training in such simulated settings better prepared soldiers for real-life scenarios in Vietnam; Vietnamese Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) efforts peaked during 1965 and 1966, with a total of five mock Vietnamese villages constructed on Fort Bragg and Camp Mackall. By 1963 the CIDG had become enmeshed with 879 Vietnamese villages, with each CIDG camp consisting of one Special Forces detachment and one Vietnamese detachment. By 1967 select CIDG camps were designated as "fighting camps," the purpose of which was to train for and withstand heavy enemy attack. U.S. MIKE worked in conjunction with the CIDG, specifically with regard to defensive strategies and reinforcement replenishment.

During the drawdown in Vietnam. One such program is the Survival, Escape, Resistance Evasion (SERE) course, its curriculum greatly expanded in the 1980s due to the efforts of former Vietnam prisoner of war Special Forces Captain James N. 'Nick' Rowe. SERE-affiliated courses continue to be taught at the Rowe Training Facility at Camp Mackall.

Several name changes occurred over the years. In 1964, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara announced that SWCS had been officially renamed the United States Army John F. Kennedy Center for Special Warfare. In 1969, the Army renamed the JFK Center for Special Warfare the U.S. Army JFK Center for Military Assistance, with the educational programs taught by Special Forces known as the U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance. Regardless of its name changes, the campus itself continued to grow in sync with D-Area construction, the facilities of which provided housing for the growing number of Special Forces and PSYOPS troops. In addition to the regimental campus-like complex groupings, the John F. Kennedy Memorial Chapel (Bldg. D-3116), designed by J. Hyatt Hammond Associates of Asheboro, and the multicomponent JFK Special Warfare Memorial became integral features of the D-Area and JFKSWCS campus. Despite Fort Bragg's Special Forces involvement in the Vietnam War, and its implications for the development of JFKSWCS, resentment of the war permeated Army life through disaffected soldiers returning from the conflict to an overwhelmingly negative national

response. Given the Army's size and diverse composition during the war, tensions ran high, with grievances against the government and Army staged on Army installations. During the course of the Vietnam War, Fort Bragg's built environment became not just a center for Vietnam preparatory training, but also a stage for airing nationally-recognized civil rights injustices.

In conjunction with Fort Bragg's increased growth relative to Special Forces training and JFKSWCS's development, there was a punctuated period of activism that interconnected various minority groups and disillusioned GIs. Concomitant with these activities were responses by GIs, antiwar activists, civil rights groups, and the general population to the sociopolitical activities percolating down from the national level. In effect, then, antiwar and civil rights events at Fort Bragg, as well as the MVA transition, were symptomatic of nationwide social fissions and conflicts along class, socioeconomic, gender, and racial lines that in turn were reflected by and staged on Fort Bragg's built environment.

A.5 Resource Inventory and Evaluations

Properties built between 1962 and 1972 were assessed for National Register Historic Property (NRHP) eligibility relative to their individual architectural merit and their potential to be a contributing property to an established or proposed historic district.

JFKSWCS Historic District (JFKSWCSHD). (See Figure 4-2) The Army's reorientation to and emphasis on unconventional tactics and multifaceted training during the 1960s is reflected in Fort Bragg's architecture, specifically that of JFKSWCS. Standardization and integrated campus-like architectural units trumped the former revivalist architectural schemas that informed Fort Bragg's Old Post Historic District design. JFKSWCS's original campus complex plan included the major command and training facilities, television and radio lab, swimming pool, museum, service club, medical facility, and three Special Forces Group headquarters buildings with barracks. Several of the facilities were constructed as originally intended, but some were relocated west to the regular regimental D-Area, or not constructed at all.

Existing JFKSWCSHD. Kennedy Hall and Bryant Hall comprised JFKSWCS's academic and command core during the Cold War, specifically during the Vietnam War and the Grenada invasion. Both buildings exhibit characteristic modernist features: flat roofs; horizontal bands of aluminum windows and distinct window blocks; clean lines that emphasize the horizontal or vertical planes; and the use of materials such as concrete, glass, aggregate paneling, and modern metals. Bryant Hall's imposing verticality acts as an architectural foil to the low-slung horizontality of Kennedy Hall; however, their modernist architecture and connective hyphen link the two halls as a functional unit.

***Kennedy Hall* (D-3004)**. (See Figure 4-1) Kennedy Hall is a one-story concrete and steel rectangular plan building with a flat roof highlighted by two metal-sided, mansard style roof projections. The building's elevations feature running bands of recessed window blocks of tri-part aluminum fixed and hopper windows; the blocks are separated by concrete supports and sheltered by concrete eaves. Recessed entrances consist of metal and glass doors with transoms and sidelights. An interior open-air courtyard, paved with bricks and accentuated with raised concrete planters, features built-in benches for outdoor seating. Kennedy Hall's interior features include original terrazzo flooring, a dropped acoustical tile ceiling, concrete block walls, and

solid wood doors. Dedicated on 29 May 1965 by Senator Robert F. Kennedy, Kennedy Hall served as headquarters for the Special Warfare Center (later the JFK Center for Military Assistance and the U.S. Army Institute of Military Assistance) and also housed language classrooms, a theater, barbershop, snack bar, radio station, and branch post office. The building won an award for its design in 1966, which was given to the architectural firm A.G. Odell, Jr. & Associates by the U.S. Chief of Engineers. Kennedy Hall was renovated in 2006-2008 during which the interior was updated and remodeled. The building is currently home to the NCO Academy and the Special Forces Warrant Officers Institute. Photographs of Kennedy Hall are prohibited.

***Bryant Hall* (D-3206)**. Named for Congressional Medal of Honor recipient Sergeant William H. Bryant, Bryant Hall is a six-story concrete and steel structure with a flat roof and poured concrete foundation. Concrete panels and structural beams highlight the recessed, fixed three-light window bays that wrap around the entirety of the structure. A concrete roof overhang and wide fascia shelters the elevations. Bryant Hall is a representative example of the New Formalism style of modern architecture, which was the style frequently used for government and civic buildings during the 1960s. Bryant Hall underwent a major renovation between 2004 and 2005, during which time a concrete and steel "parachute" canopy was added to the north and south entrances. Photographs of Bryant Hall are prohibited.

Proposed Additions to JFKSWCSHD. In 1964 the Army allocated funds for two 275-student Bachelor Officers Quarters (BOQs), each of which exhibited a Y-shape footprint and was designed by the architectural firm A.G. Odell, Jr. & Associates; the BOQs were later named Moon Hall and Hardy Hall. Other facilities designed specifically for JFKSWCS in 1964 included the Officer's Mess Hall (D-3404; CD1238), two classified study buildings, and a central heating plant. Of these, the only other Odell designed property was the Officer's Mess Hall. Additional JFKSWCS support buildings were constructed in the block south of and along Ardennes Street to accommodate JFKSWCS's expansion; structures included a medical clinic, Chapel for Special Forces (later renamed the John F. Kennedy Memorial Chapel), barracks, and mess halls. Built according to the Army's standardized plans, and adapted by Wise, Simpson, Aiden & Associates and J.N. Pease and Company, these D-Area structures provided the necessary infrastructure to facilitate JFKSWCS's specific mission objectives. As expansion continued through the late 1960s and into the 1970s more facilities were added to the built environment, further establishing the D-Area as a functionally modern area within Fort Bragg proper. With their improvements through the implementation of modernist design aesthetics and adapted Army-approved standardized architectural schemes, the D-Area and JFKSWCS's campus symbolized a new architectural plan for modern warfare.

***Moon Hall* (D-3601) and *Hardy Hall* (D-3705; CD1256).** Moon Hall was named in honor of Major Walter H. Moon, 7th Special Forces Group, who was killed in Laos in 1961. Moon Hall's sister building, Hardy Hall, was named in honor of Captain Herbert F. Hardy of the 1st Special Forces Group who was killed in Vietnam in 1964. The two-brick high-rise BOQs feature horizontal concrete courses with paired, three-light metal sash windows; these have since been replaced with one-over-one aluminum sash windows. The windows are sheltered by a slight eave. Enclosed exterior stairs at each BOQ's end and paired elevators in the lobby provide access

to the upper floors. The only other examples of these Y-shaped BOQs are found at Fort Hood and were designed Howard R. Meyer and Leo L. Landauer & Associates of Dallas, Texas.

Source: Collection of Savannah Corps of Engineers

Figure A-1: JFKSWCS's Hardy Hall – Officers' Mess Hall (CD1256) in left foreground, ca. 1966.

***JFKSWCS Officers' Mess Hall* (D-3404).** Building D-3404 is a one-story brick and concrete mess hall intended to serve the JFKSWCS's Officers; it is located directly south of JFKSWCS and to the north and west of the BOQs. The building features a flat roof with a deep concrete paneled overhang and fascia sheltering recessed hopper-style aluminum windows; each window bay consists of a large fixed light with a small screened hopper window of the same width below. A concrete panel below the window bays fills the void and creates the illusion of a bay running the building's height. The exterior brick masonry is laid in a running bond, and screened gutters recessed into the concrete paneled eaves provide drainage; metal flashing lines the overhang's edge. Brick pilasters accentuate each elevation's end. The building is sparsely landscaped; grassy areas exist to the north and west, and are dotted with occasional trees, and concrete sidewalks are oriented around the building. The building's exterior historic fabric is largely intact.

Source: Privett and Mirarchi, 2012

Figure A-2: JFKSWCS Officers' Mess Hall – soon after construction, with view of Kennedy Hall in background. Publication of modern-day photographs prohibited on security grounds.

***JFK Memorial Chapel* (D-3116).** Constructed between 1965 and 1966 and named after President John F. Kennedy, the JFK Memorial Chapel was adapted from Army standardized plans by J. Hyatt Hammond Associates; it was intended to serve Special Forces and Airborne troops. The brick-veneered, L-shaped asymmetrical modernist chapel features a large sanctuary with an eastward-projecting classroom and office wing; the wing is visually separated from the sanctuary by a metal steeple. Seven custom stained-glass windows pierce the sanctuary's façade, each of which depicts a scene or engagement from the history of Special Forces. Inspired by illustrations pertaining to the 13th Psychological Operations battalion's engagements, the custom windows were designed by Milcho Silianoff, a former soldier and artist. Manufactured by Pittsburgh Stained Glass Studios in 1965, the windows were completed for $25,000, the funds for which consisted of donations in honor of Special Forces soldiers engaged in the Vietnam War. The sanctuary's south elevation features a large aluminum frame bay. The elevation's bay contains 25 lights, each of which is a portion of a stained-glass commemorative window depicting the Special Forces Prayer, which was composed in 1961 by General William Yarborough. The recessed bay is sheltered by a gabled roof overhang; below the bay is a flat concrete canopy that shelters a four-door glass and metal entrance. The chapel's grounds feature multiple memorials dedicated to Special Forces soldiers, including one specifically for those killed in Southeast Asia and one funded by John Wayne following the filming of *The Green Berets*. The JFK Memorial Chapel was surveyed in 2005 and determined eligible for the NRHP under Criteria A and satisfied Criteria Consideration G.

Source: Privett and Mirarchi, 2012

Figure A-3: JFK Memorial Chapel, 2011.

JFKSWCSHD NRHP Eligibility and Proposed Expansion. In 2005, the current JFKSWCSHD, including Kennedy Hall and Bryant Hall, was determined NRHP-eligible under Criterion A for its association with the Cold War Era Army School System, and satisfied Criteria Consideration G for being exceptionally significant in the development of Special Forces within the Cold War context. None of the FKSWCS-specific support facilities, including the two adjacent, multi-story residential halls and single-story dining hall, have been evaluated as contributing to the existing district, nor have they been assessed per Criterion C, despite having been built by the same architect responsible for Kennedy Hall and Bryant Hall.

As one of the state's premier modernist architectural firms, A.G. Odell, Jr. and Associates designed numerous corporate and civic buildings, schools, auditoriums, coliseums, industrial buildings, hospitals, banks, and private residences throughout North Carolina, including Chapel Hill's Blue Cross Blue Shield building, the Charlotte Auditorium and Coliseum, St. Andrews Presbyterian College, and Greensboro's Burlington Industries Company. While largely devoted to architectural design in North Carolina, Odell, Jr.'s work is well represented throughout the greater southeastern United States. Having earned an undergraduate education at Duke University and an architecture degree at Cornell University, as well as training at the Ecole Des Beaux Arts in Paris, Odell served as the North Carolina Chapter President of American Institute of Architects (AIA) from 1953 to 1955 and became the first national President of AIA in 1964. Additionally, he served as a Lieutenant Colonel for the Corps of Engineers during World War II. With experience in the Army context, as well as the lead architect at an architectural firm with over 75 awards for modernist design, Odell, Jr. was the ideal architect to dovetail Special Forces' mission objectives with cutting edge modernist design on Fort Bragg.

Albeit the center of the JFKSWCS campus prior to Bryant Hall's construction, Kennedy Hall did not exist in an architectural vacuum. Each of the four original buildings of JFKSWCS's core campus was originally constructed to support JFKSWCS-specific mission objectives: Kennedy Hall, Moon Hall (D- 3601; CD1255), Hardy Hall (D-3705; CD1256), and the former Officers' Mess Hall (D-3403; CD1238). As the center of the original campus, Kennedy Hall and its immediate landscape synced with Moon Hall, Hardy Hall, and the former JFKSWCS Officers' Mess Hall. Curvilinear sidewalks and greenways served to interconnect these individual components of the JFKSWCS campus up until Bryant Hall's construction, which reoriented greenways and landscape components in the campus's western quadrant. Later parking lots along Kennedy Hall's east elevation also interrupted the original landscaping and pedestrian pathways that served to integrate Kennedy Hall with Moon Hall and Hardy Hall.

The residential halls and dining facility were critical components for supporting basic daily operations within the campus, especially prior to Bryant Hall's construction. Moon and Hardy Hall were constructed as lodging specifically for officers undergoing mission-specific training at JFKSWCS. The former Officers' Mess Hall served as JFKSWCS's singular mess hall for those undergoing training at JFKSWCS. Additionally, JFKSWCS's associated JFK Memorial Chapel was specifically constructed for Special Forces troops, with custom-made stained glass windows depicting scenes from key Cold War-era engagements. Each of these JFKSWCS-specific buildings represents the transition from revivalist architecture to modernist designs and aesthetics, which reflected the redirection of the Army, and Special Forces specifically, to a new form of militaristic engagement.

While Moon Hall (D-3601; CD1255), Hardy Hall (D-3705; CD1256), and the former JFKSWCS Officers' Mess Hall (D-3404; CD1238) are covered by the 2006 Program Comment for Cold War Era (1939-1974) Unaccompanied Personnel Housing; they were not assessed under Criterion C with regard to their affiliation with the prominent architectural firm of A.G. Odell, Jr. and Associates of Charlotte, North Carolina. None of JFKSWCSHD's properties and associated facilities have been assessed for architectural eligibility under Criterion C. Only Criterion A and Criteria Consideration G have been applied.

The assessments performed for the 2011 Survey Update support that Bryant Hall (D-3206) and Kennedy Hall (D-3004) are eligible under Criterion C as representative examples of work performed by the renowned modernist architectural firm, A.G. Odell, Jr. and Associates, one of North Carolina's most prolific modernist architectural practices. Both structures are also rare examples of high-style modernist works in the greater Fort Bragg area. By extension, Moon Hall (D-3601; CD1255), Hardy Hall (D-3705; CD1256), and the former JFKSWCS Officers' Mess Hall (D-3404; CD1238) are eligible under Criterion C as representative examples of work by A.G. Odell, Jr. and Associates, and under Criterion A for their association with the inception and florescence of the Army's Special Forces.

While Moon Hall, Hardy Hall, and the former JFKSWCS Officers' Mess Hall are aesthetically distinct from Kennedy Hall, they were built in conjunction with it as integral components of a functional modernist campus, the core operative base for Fort Bragg's Special Forces. The JFK Memorial Chapel's inclusion within this newly proposed district boundary is relevant given its significance in serving Special Forces troops, and its custom stained-glass windows. The specific functionality of Moon Hall, Hardy Hall, the former JFKSWCS Officers' Mess Hall, and the JFK Memorial Chapel directly impacted and facilitated the mission goals espoused by Special Forces and executed through the instruction and training at Kennedy and Bryant Halls.

Each of these six resources contributes to the significance of the JFKSWCSHD. Taken together, these resources are representative of a functional modernist architectural unit that reflects the development and florescence of Special Forces at Fort Bragg. As proposed, the newly mapped JFKSWCSHD encompasses six contributing resources, with a period of significance ranging from 1965 to 1972. In the case of the augmented JFKSWCSHD, the district boundary and view shed boundary would share the same footprint. To maintain the vista among the five buildings, and the extension for JFK Memorial Chapel, any new construction within the district boundary must not be taller than six stories. Wooded areas and green space surrounding the buildings within the district boundary should be maintained.

82nd Airborne Division Historic District* (C-Area) *reassessed resources. Despite being surveyed in 2007 as part of the now ineligible 82nd Airborne Division Historic District, several buildings built between 1962 and 1972 within the district were reevaluated for individual eligibility. Each of the reevaluated buildings was determined individually ineligible for the NRHP, due to a lack of significance, a lack of integrity, or a combination thereof: First Citizens Bank (C-5437; CD1181); Tucker Field House (C-5838; CD1182); York Theatre (C-7950; CD1185); a motor repair shop (C-8433; CD1186); and two battalion stationing buildings (C-9445 [CD1192] and C-9546 [CD1193]).

Source: Privett and Mirarchi, 2012

Figure A-4: Building C-7950 (CD1181), York Theatre, 2011.

Several of these buildings retain a high to medium degree of integrity, and serve as examples of late modernist military architecture. York Theatre was the first theater in the New Division Area and La Flamme Dental Clinic was designed by the renowned Greensboro architectural firm of Edward Loewenstein. Comparable to the D-Area's expansion, the C-Area's development during the 1960s and early 1970s was symptomatic of Fort Bragg's expansion and florescence as a base of operations for Special Forces. No further consideration under Section 110 or Section 106 will be required for the buildings within this district.

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APPENDIX B:

EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE AND HURLBURT FIELD, VIETNAM WAR SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND WARFARE TRAINING HISTORIC CONTEXT AND RESOURCE TYPES

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Eglin Air Force Base and Hurlburt Field

B.1 Early History of Eglin AFB

This section is excerpted from www.eglin.af.mil.

In 1931, personnel of the Army Air Corps Tactical School in Maxwell Field, Alabama sought out a site for a bombing and gunnery range and a sparsely populated area on the Florida panhandle was identified. A local businessman and airplane buff, James E. Plew, leased to the City of Valparaiso 137 acres on which an airport was established in 1933, and in 1934 Plew offered the U.S. Government a donation of 1,460 contiguous acres for the bombing and gunnery base. This leasehold became the headquarters for the Valparaiso Bombing and Gunnery Base activated on June 14, 1935. On August 4, 1937, the base was redesignated Eglin Field in honor of Lieutenant Colonel Frederick I. Eglin, U.S. Air Corps, killed on January 1, 1937 in an aircraft crash.

With the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 and President Roosevelt's call for an expansion of the Army Air Corps, General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold ordered the establishment of a proving ground for aircraft armament. Eglin Field was selected for the testing mission, and on June 27, 1940, the U.S. Forestry Service ceded to the War Department the Choctawhatchee National Forest, consisting of some 384,000 acres. In 1941, the Air Corps Proving Ground was activated, and Eglin Field became the site for gunnery training for Army Air Forces fighter pilots, as well as a major testing center for aircraft, equipment, and tactics.

By the end of the war, Eglin Field had made a recognizable contribution to the effectiveness of the American air operations in Europe and the Pacific and continued to maintain a role in the research, development, and testing of air armament. Eglin Field also became a pioneer in missile development.

Both as a reaction to the Soviet atomic explosion in 1949 and in recognition that research and development had lagged in the years of lower priority to operational concerns, the Air Force, in early 1950, established the Air Research and Development Command (later Air Force Systems Command). The following year, the Air Research and Development Command established the Air Force Armament Center at Eglin, which, for the first time, brought development and testing together. On December 1, 1957, the Air Force combined the Air Proving Ground Command and the Air Force Armament Center to form the Air Proving Ground Center. The Center built the highly-instrumented Eglin Gulf Test Range and for the next few years, served as a major missile test center.

B.2 Early History of Hurlburt Field

This section is excerpted from *The Commando*, Special Edition December 19, 1980, Vol. 19 No. 50.

In 1940, one year after the Eglin Field proving grounds were expanded by a War Department decision to take control of the Choctawhatchee National Forest, Air Corps began construction of auxiliary air fields for pilot and gunnery training. This left the main base and range areas free as

a testing and proving ground. Construction of Hurlburt Field and six other fields was rapid and these auxiliary fields were occupied by the beginning of 1943. The site was named after Lt. Donald W. Hurlburt, killed in an aircraft accident Oct. 1, 1943 at Eglin. By war's end, Hurlburt Field had become a testing facility for the electronics section of the Air Proving Ground.

The end of World War II took its toll on Hurlburt Field and other remote sites of the Eglin reservation. By 1951, many of the buildings were being used for storage and most were in serious need of repair. At one time, two of the base's three runways were inoperable. Restoration of Hurlburt Field was completed by mid-1954 when the Air Proving Ground and Tactical Air Command came to an agreement on the joint use of the base and the activation of the 4419th Air Base Squadron of the Ninth Air Force.

In 1962 the newly formed 4400th Combat Training Squadron, nick named "Jungle Jim," carried out President Kennedy's order to the armed forces to strengthen the ability of the U.S. to fight guerrilla warfare, especially communist "wars of national liberation." Within months, the squadron expanded to group size and was redesignated as the 1st Air Commando Group. They became known for their unique and effective operations in southeast Asia. The unit expanded further to become the 1st Air Commando Wing in 1963 and, from that time, Hurlbert became known as "Home of the Air Commandos." In July 1968, the name of the unit changed to the 1st Special Operations Wing whose mission it was/is to provide a rapid reaction force for global Special Operations.

B.3 Special Operations at Eglin AFB and Hurlburt Field

This section is excerpted from *USAF Special Operations Force, Background Information*, Secretary of the Air Force, Officer of Information, Washington, DC. January 1971.

The U.S. Air Force Special Operations Force (USAFSOF), with headquarters at (Hurlburt Field) Eglin AFB, is responsible for training American and allied personnel for worldwide special operations.

Formerly called the Special Air Warfare Center (SAWC), USAFSOF was renamed on 8 July 1968. Because of the increasing emphasis on counterinsurgency training programs, the USAFSOF concept grew from a training squadron in 1961 to a numbered air force equivalent headquarters with one wing, an additional group, and a special operations school.

The Special Operations Force (SOF), a Tactical Air Command (TAC) organization, has the following primary missions:

- Train, indoctrinate, equip, and administer special operations forces;
- Deploy operationally ready, area-oriented forces independently of, or in unison with, other air, sea, or land forces;
- Train and assist allied forces in internal defense operations, military civic action, and nation-building programs;
- Provide technical guidance and assistance in the preparation and execution of military assistance in the preparation and execution of military assistance plans and programs to conduct counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, and psychological operations;

- Train selected personnel in psychological operations, military civic actions, counterinsurgency, and unconventional warfare; and
- Train and equip air forces in strike, reconnaissance, and airlift roles of special operations.

To accomplish its global commitments, USAFSOF has three operational units:

- 1st Special Operations Wing, Hurlburt
- 4410th Special Operations Training Group, England AFB, LA (Hurlburt)
- USAF Special Operations School, Hurlburt

Because of the specialized air missions that often require the use of unimproved landing and operational areas, the Special Operations Force used a wide range of propeller-driven, light jet, and helicopter aircraft. These include the C-47 Skytrain, C-123 Provider, and C-130 Hercules; A-1 Skyraider, T-28 Trojan, and A-37; O-1E Bird Dog, O-2, UH-1 helicopter, U-10 and OV-10A Bronco aircraft.

A unique feature of the Special Operations Force is its own operational testing and evaluation (OT&E) sections, known as the Deputy Chief of Staff, Requirements (DCS/R). The DCS/R was formed on 18 February 1970 when the U.S. Air Force Special Operations Center (USAFSOC) was deactivated. Items and systems tested or evaluated range from manpack radios and night vision devices to systems used in the A-1, O-2, OV-10, and the A-37 aircraft.

The DCS/R works closely with other test activities at Eglin AFB and frequently supports or conducts joint activities with the Tactical Air Warfare Center (Tactical Air Command) and the Armament Development and Test Center of the Air Force Systems Command.

The 1st Special Operations Wing has (1970) the basic mission of employing Air Force resources for counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, and psychological operations. This mission involves the training and maintenance of combat-ready Air Force special operations forces to support operations in conjunction with other services and government agencies.

The wing devises the basic tactics and techniques required for the use of worldwide special operations forces. It also trains specially outfitted detachments required for deployment to and indoctrination of the peoples of friendly foreign countries.

Hurlburt Field's flightlines and those at auxiliary fields have (had) 14 different types of propeller driven and jet aircraft, the largest variety of any Air Force operational wing. SOF's 1st Special Operations Wing has eight major operational-training units at Hurlburt and nearby Holley Field, with an additional detachment at Pope AFB, North Carolina. It also supports the 7th Special Operations Flight at Otis AFB, Massachusetts.

- 319th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) at Hurlburt Field conducts and trains for C-123 operations;
- 603rd Special Operations Squadron at Hurlburt Field conducts A-37 strike operations;

- 25th Special Operation Squadron at Hurlburt Field provides reconnaissance technical capability;
- 4407th Combat Crew Training Squadron (CCTS) at Hurlburt Field trains A-1 and T-28 crews;
- 549th Tactical Air Support Training Squadron (TASTS) at Hurlburt Field trains the OV-10 crews;
- 547th Special Operations Training Squadron (SOTS) at Holley Field trains O-1, O-2A, and O-2B light reconnaissance, observation, FAC/Strike Control and Reconnaissance (SCAR), and psychological operations aircrews;
- 424th Special Operations Training Squadron, located at Eglin AFB Auxiliary Field 3 uses QU-22B aircraft to train personnel in the operation of the utility drone system. This unit is attached to the 1st Special Operations Wing for training purposes only; and
- 317th Special Operations Squadron at Hurlburt Field provides a utility aircraft capability for global special operation using the UH-1 helicopter and U-10 aircraft. It also provides aircrew training in the UH-1 for Southeast Asia. Its primary mission is not to fight insurgents, but to train and assist friendly forces.

The 4410th Special Operations Training Group, formerly the 4410th Combat Crew Training Wing, is one of the three major organizations in the Special Operations Force. It is responsible for the flight training and indoctrination of personnel assigned to special operations units worldwide. The 4410th is also responsible for training and qualifying aircrew members of allied air forces in the equipment, tactics, and techniques used in special operations.

The U.S. Air Force Special Operations School (SOS), located at Hurlburt Field, is the academic element of the Special Operations Force. The mission of the school is to train selected U.S. and allied personnel in the geopolitical, psychological, and sociological implications of insurgency. Courses are conducted in Counterinsurgency, Area Orientation, Special Air Operations/Military Assistance Program for Allied Officers, and the Military Assistance Advisory Course. The object of the Counterinsurgency Course is to prepare officers for duties which deal with insurgency as a potential or actual threat to developing nations and to U.S. national interests. The two-week course is conducted 10 times per year. Its curriculum is divided into four major instructional areas: Introduction to Insurgency, Area Studies in Insurgency, U.S. Response, and Human Factors.

Special operations training locations for elite Air Force and Army troops have been present on the Eglin reservation from 1950-1951, forward. After the start of the Korean War, troop training for jungle warfare arrived at the Eglin reservation, and remained as an ongoing mission into the present. Special operations activities dramatically increased on the Eglin reservation at the outset of the Vietnam War. In addition to adapting existing test areas (TAs), the Air Proving Ground Center augmented the Eglin reservation during 1962 -1970 with a group of entirely new ranges to support test and training operations for the Vietnam War. The expansion represented the most programmatic change at the Eglin reservation since the planning and construction for the Kellex (Vitro) armament ranges of 1951-1956. Twenty-seven land and water ranges supported Vietnam War testing and training, and included the 64-square-mile Underbrush I test area (as a single "range") on the eastern Eglin reservation (Wietze, Vol. I. 2007).

Other Vietnam War efforts at the Eglin reservation turned to replicating the military infrastructure of North Vietnam. Among these latter efforts were the fortified defensive array; Project Underbrush; a mock-up of the Ho Chi Minh Trail; and, a crude model of the Son Tay prison camp. Project Underbrush was the largest Vietnam undertaking at the Eglin reservation, and utilized a 64 square-mile area of the ranges. Like the fortified defensive array, Underbrush dates to 1966. Underbrush included four Vietnamese village sites; six simulated surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites; antiaircraft sites; and waterway sampan sites. Village sites included trenches and foxholes, as at C-72; with Village Site JV having 500 feet of underground tunneling 30 inches in diameter, shored up using corrugated steel pipe. Also, a part of Underbrush were test complexes on ranges 70 and 75, including a rice-paddy target. Testing of smaller equipment occurred. Many of the Vietnam training endeavors at the Eglin reservation were the responsibility of the SAWC, with overall efforts focused on counterinsurgency (COIN) training. (Wietze, Vol. II. 2007)

Field 7: reactivated in 1950-1951 for the U.S. Army Rangers' Infantry Ranger Training School. The site featured four-week training courses for special operations in jungle warfare. It expanded in size by 1967 to 81 officers, 319 enlisted men, and 150 students. In late 1969 the courses were moved from Field 7 to Field 6. (Eglin Vol I Wietze 2007)

***Test area C-62*:** reactivated in late 1962 as a test area for 1st Air Commando Group. Test area C-62 was a dedicated training location for elite special operations forces administered through the SAWC. Activities included counterinsurgency, interdiction, and guerilla operations training for Southeast Asia. The area included a large earthen bunker and assault-landing runway. The Tactical Air Command (TAC) retained the use of test area C-62 from the early 1960s forward. The 33rd Tactical Fighter Wing conducted pilot qualifications for munitions delivery on the range from 1966 through the end of the Cold War.

Permanent infrastructure rehabilitated for use on test area C-62 included two spotting towers located in the northwestern and southwestern corners of the range. (Several of the buildings and structures of the early and middle 1950s were abandoned in place.) The 1st Air Commando Group added a concrete-block range control station, 20 by 70 feet in footprint, near the northwest spotting tower. Also, present by September 1963 was a 100- by 25-foot earth bunker in the center of the range, and a north-south, stabilized clay assault-landing runway 5,000 by 70 feet. In 1966, TAC reassigned test area C- 62 to the 33rd Tactical Fighter Wing, who enlarged the range through the east-west addition of a rectangular area 11,600 by 2,000 feet along the test area's north boundary. TAC also added a large bombing circle and a bombing/rocketry target on the southern part of test area C-62. In 1966, test area C-62 included two 10- by 25-foot bomb targets, six 15- by 15-foot strafe targets, a pyramid in the bombing circle, two special strafe targets, and two 200- by 30-foot skip-bomb targets. By 1971, TAC added two 45-foot steel scoring towers within range boundaries. After the early 1970s, changes to test area C-62 were primarily additions and deletions of temporary targets similar to those already in place. (Wietze, Vol. II. 2007)

Test area C-72: As of June 1967, the Air Force activated the Directorate of Technical Applications for Southeast Asia at Eglin, under the Air Proving Ground Center. The year before, in September, Eglin civil engineering initiated the design and construction of a fortified

defensive array—an interconnected series of tunnels, trenches, and foxholes, loosely evocative of a system of Vietnamese fortifications.



Source Weitze, 2001

The proposed Fortified Defensive Array District at C-72 includes a zigzag trace trench; a crawl trench; a 328- foot tunnel; one- and two-person foxholes; a buried concrete command post; buried wooden and concrete personnel bunkers; buried wood-frame and concrete weapons emplacements; circular and horseshoe mortar emplacements; a Howitzer emplacement; and, dug-in tank emplacements. The series of interconnected tunnels are laid out in an irregular pattern, and are accessed by aboveground shafts. The proposed boundaries include all features of the district, and are aligned with the cardinal directions. The tunnels, trenches, and bunkers contribute to the significance of the proposed district and have sufficient integrity to be considered for the NRHP.

Figure B-1: Vietnamese Fortified Defensive Array Range C-72.

Source: Weitze, 2001

Figure B-2: Vietnamese Bunker- Range C-72.

Source: Weitze, 2001

Figure B-3: Tunnel Entrance - Range C-72.

Tunnel segment depths vary in relationship to the existing natural ground line. The tunnel structure is constructed of 4" by 4", 6" by 6", 8" by 10" and 12" by 12" columns, posts, beams, and cross bracing, with 8" by 12" planking, 4" by 6" decking, and 2" by 4" sheathing. Metal framing anchors and angle brackets bolt columns, posts, beams, cross bracing, planking, decking, and sheathing together. Two continuous layers of 30# felt cover all exterior surfaces in contact with the soil. Metal ladders access the board-and-batten doors to the tunnel shafts. Two tunnel shafts provide entrance and egress, one 4' by 4' square, the other 3' by 3' square.

As measured on site, approximately 340' of interwoven tunnel corridors exist underground at the C-72 site, with two small rooms measuring 8' by 8' branching off of the main tunnel.

Typical corridor cross-section is about 6' 11 " high by 4' wide. Horizontal boards sheath the sides of the tunnels. Portions of the tunnels and shafts are deteriorating, and the soil covering segments of the structure is eroding. One of the entrances has collapsed, making parts of the tunnel inaccessible. (Weitze, 2001)

Test area A-73: reactivated in late 1962 as a test area for 1st Air Commando Group administered through the SAWC. It was entirely reconfigured from its 1950s armament test layout. From 1962-1966 it served as an air-to-ground munitions delivery range and continued similar use into 1975. (Wietze, Vol. I. 2007)

During 1963-1975, the Air Proving Ground Center assigned test area A-73 to the 1st Air Commando Group for air-to-ground munitions delivery training. A special operations unit stationed at Hurlburt Field, the 1st Air Commando Group also had sole use of nearby TAs A-77, A-78, and A-79 (for which, test area A-73 became range control).

In 1963, upon resumed activity at test area A-73, personnel set up 10 vertical 15- by 15-foot gunnery panel targets, four vertical 12- by 12-foot skip-bombing targets, and one 10-foot-high pyramid on the range. By 1967, targets on test area A-73 featured the same basic infrastructure. The pyramid target of the late 1960s (periodically replaced or repaired) was a 6-foot-high structure approximately 150 feet in diameter, positioned in the center of a target circle 1,000 feet in diameter. The Air Proving Ground Center had completely reconfigured test area A-73 in 1964 for a special operations mission, using the two southern towers as the base corners of an equilateral triangulation range 6,000 feet on a side. The original southeastern portion of test area A-73 was no longer within range boundaries. Range personnel also moved the spotting tower erected in the northeastern corner of test area A-73 offsite, to test area C-52. The bomb-and-

rocket pyramid target sat at the apex of the triangular layout. The flight path to the revitalized test area A-73 was southeast to northwest, out of Hurlburt Field. The gunnery and skip-bombing targets sat in the southwest corner of the mid-1960s test area A-73. By 1970, range personnel had augmented test area A-73 again, with the construction of a second bomb-and-rocket pyramid, set in a 600-foot-diameter circle south of the first target configuration. At this date, each pyramid was about 75 feet in diameter. To the west of the two pyramid targets, outside range boundaries, sat a row of five bunkers and a structure mapped as "house." Another added feature was a 100-foot-wide swath of sand, angled east to west near the sustained group of gunnery and skip-bomb panel targets.

In early 1976, the layout of test area A-73 remained essentially static, although the bunker-and house group was no longer shown as present. For the next decade, little change occurred on test area A-73. In 1985, the Armament Division made a final major change to test area A-73. The Armament Division added a cluster of SADS and WEST radars (Site A-30) within the boundaries of test area A-73, adding a similar test area (Site A-31) in the early 1990s. (Wietze, Vol. II. 2007)

Test area A-77 **and** ***Test area A-78*****:** operational in 1965 and 1966, respectively, these were test areas for 1st Air Commando Group administered through the SAWC. They were tactical air-to-ground training ranges in gunnery, bombing, and rocketry from 1965-1966. They included an elaborate network of parallel roads with moveable target arrays and simulated bivouacs and bunkers. They continued similar use for the duration of the Vietnam War and after. (Wietze, Vol. I. 2007)

The Air Proving Ground Center laid out test area A-77 in the middle 1960s as one of two nearly identical ranges south/southwest of the western terminus of test area B-70. Both ranges included arrays of temporary targets and small earthworks to support tactical air-to-ground training in gunnery, bombing, and rocketry. TAs A-77 and A-78 were restricted ranges, used by the 1st Air Commando Group. Although no permanent infrastructure augmented either range, test area A-77 was distinguished from test area A-78 through its network of parallel east-to-west roads. Several targets on test area A-77 are interpreted as mockups of typical enemy emplacements in the jungle environment of Vietnam. The network of roads, with their tactically placed convoy targets and adjacent earthen foxholes, strongly suggests that test area A-77 may have functioned as the primary range for air-to-ground training and munitions tests against the Ho Chi Minh Trail during 1965-1973. After the mid-1970s, range personnel continued to use test area A-78 for unscored tactical air-to-ground firing against temporary vehicular target arrays.

A 50-foot fire break surrounded the range. No instrumentation, electrical power, or communications supported test area A-77. The Air Proving Ground Center set up range control for test area A-77 at the control tower for test area A-73, an instrumented range to the east. As first configured, test area A-77 included a road running through the range from the northwest corner to the east boundary. The chief feature of the range was a target circle for the placement of a napalm target. Laid out in the center of test area A-77, the target circle was 20 feet in diameter. Early earthworks on test area A-77 included a 300-foot long simulated canal, 10 feet wide and 4 feet deep, and three 15- by 15- by 4-foot bunkers. A canal was located in the south/southeast corner of the range and was crossed by three bridges. The bunkers were

southwest of the target circle and in the northwest and southwest corners. The bridges were very simple structures, each built by laying four logs across the canal. A final feature of the initial layout of test area A-77 was a small bivouac area containing 20 manikins in the northwest corner of the range.

By early 1967, range personnel had added a convoy of salvaged vehicles as a temporary target on test area A-77. Five years later, range personnel had augmented test area A-77 with eight east-to-west roads, running irregularly through the range and four shorter roads running north-to-south, as connectors or side roads from the main corridors. In August 1971, the key features of test area A-77 were the target circle (with four salvaged trucks as the napalm target), the three bunkers, the canal, and the bivouac set up with manikins. More convoys of salvaged vehicles sat along the east-west roads. Range personnel had also placed trucks at random along the corridors. Between mid-1971 and early 1976, the layout of test area A-77 remained relatively unchanged. Previous targets were intact, augmented by additional small bunkers, a special bunker with a 40mm gun emplacement, and a surface-to-air-missile (SAM) site. The Armament Development and Test Center (ADTC) had added a large reinforced concrete observation bunker in the far northwestern corner of the range. An unidentified pair of targets also appears in an aerial photograph of test area A-77 in the middle 1970s.

An oral tradition at the Eglin reservation persists that its ranges supported a mockup of the Ho Chi Minh Trail during the Vietnam War years. No discovered maps or documents are labeled "Ho Chi Minh Trail," but test area A-77 presents a possible layout for such a target. The primary corridor of the Ho Chi Minh Trail was a 1,000-mile conduit between the province of Ha Tay and Saigon, built up between 1959 and 1975. However; by the end of the Vietnam War, the Ho Chi Minh Trail had evolved into a network of roads. The Ho Chi Minh Trail covered 12,500 miles and passed through Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Five main corridors ran approximately parallel to one another, with minor crossroads—strikingly similar to the configuration of corridors through test area A-77.

Other ranges at the Eglin AFB also supported tests and training for the Vietnam War, but each of these TAs had explicitly configured targets (such as the earthworks bunker on Test Area C-62, the rice paddy on test area B-70, and the tunnel network on test area C-72). Project Underbrush, on the east Eglin reservation, featured static convoy displays, but did not have the distinctive network of parallel roads present on test area A-77. The consistent placement of vehicle convoys and random trucks along the roads through test area A-77 suggests that this range may be the site of the Ho Chi Minh Trail target. Aerial photographs of the range in the middle 1970s indicate that three areas within test area A-77 were most heavily fired upon: a large area around the napalm target at the center of the range, the canal-and-bridges earthworks south/southwest of the center of the range, and an identified pair of sizable features (possibly buildings) west of range center, near the northern boundary. The two features remain visible in an aerial photograph of about 1981. No information is listed in the range manuals of 1976 and 1981 about the pair. Test area A-77 continued to be active through the end of the Cold War.

The Air Proving Ground Center laid out test area A-78 as a pair with test area A-77, a second unscored, tactical air-to-ground target area of identical size to the northwest. The chief difference between TAs A-77 and A-78 was the intensive network of parallel east-to-west roads laid out in

test area A-77. While both ranges contained temporary tactical targets of very similar types, only test area A-77 featured corridors set up with convoys of salvaged vehicles and randomly placed trucks. The roadside placement of the bunkers, foxholes, and a missile site further distinguished test area A-77 from test area A-78—where similar static displays were off-road. An aerial photograph of 1976 indicates that the SAWC used test area A-78 much less intensively than it did test area A-77 during 1966-1973. Test area A-78 may have been a backup range for primary munitions exercises conducted on test area A-77. Test area A-78 continued to be active through the end of the Cold War. (Wietze, Vol. II. 2007)

***Test area A-79*:** operational in 1966, this was a side-firing weapons test area administered through the SAWC for numbered Air Commando Squadrons. This area was used for tests and training for the AC-47, AC-130, and AC-119, side-firing gunships it continued similar use for the duration of the Vietnam War and Cold War. (Wietze, Vol. I. 2007)

Test area A-79 originated as a natural geographic feature, the swampy head waters of Panther Creek northwest of Hurlburt Field. The range operated under the control of TAC and throughout the Vietnam War was a training range of the SAWC at Hurlburt Field. Men trained with the air-to-ground / air-to-water side-firing weapons systems newly developed for the AC-47, C-119, and C-130. The AC-47 was a modified World War II transport aircraft and saw successful deployment in Vietnam from late 1964 into 1969. The C-119 and C-130 were the more sophisticated gunships that replaced the AC-47 from 1969 forward. Sequential range numbering indicates that test area A-79's Johnson Pond was in initial use sometime in 1966, a date coincident with the initial tests and training for the AC-47 and AC-130 at the Eglin reservation. By the mid-1970s, range personnel improved Johnson Pond through the addition of a permanent dam and spillway, also adding water- and land-target arrays. Test area A-79 remained a TAC training range for air-to-ground side-firing weapons systems throughout the final two decades of the Cold War. (Wietze, Vol. II. 2007)

***Underbrush I (at test area B-70)*:** operational in 1966, this was a jungle environment test and test area. It had partial use as a training ground for air and ground crews before deployment to Southeast Asia, including Air Force and Army special operations units (numbered Air Commando Squadrons and the Green Berets). In about 1963, the Air Proving Ground Center further augmented test area B-70 with a 5,000- by 10,000-foot cleared and staked anti-personnel target area on the southwestern part of the range. Range personnel had refined the rectangular grid into two distinct areas by mid-1967: a smaller anti-personnel staked area, 3,000 by 6,000 feet, and, a 1,500- by 3,000-foot area planted in grass. Within the grassy area, men had configured a simulated rice paddy for Project Underbrush.

The primary Underbrush complex occupied a large land area on the eastern half of the Eglin reservation, used for tests of aircraft-mounted, foliage-penetrating experimental sensor systems and for special operations training. Added test area B-70 targets at the outset of the 1970s included a low-altitude configuration target (honeycomb reflectors in a circle around a triangular target marker: "Cowbell"); a high-altitude configuration target (a 100-foot target-cloth [wire-mesh] cross: "Snake Eyes"); an aiming-point target; two 12- by 15-foot rotatable targets (one optical resolution target, "Lazy Susan," and one wooden passive infrared contrast target); and, a 75- by 43-foot black rhombic target in a cleared 400-foot diameter circle. The black rhombic

structure was a guided bomb target. Only minor layout changes occurred on test area B-70 later in the decade: personnel set up a new Cowbell target— a disked, 800-foot circle on the flight path through the center of the range.

By 1971, the Armament Development and Test Center added laser testing and varieties of static-test projects on test area B-70. The rice paddy was asphalt-paved by 1976, and became a static-test location. During the late Cold War, test area B-70 continued to sustain its target complex of the 1960s and 1970s, with additions of selected targets on a per-mission basis. One target of more permanent construction was an earth-covered, concrete bunker of the mid-to-late 1980s. The bunker target was 40 by 40 feet in footprint. (Wietze, Vol. II. 2007)



Source: Weitze, 2001

Figure B-5: Rice Paddy Project Underbrush.

The ranges described above wire used for Special Operations. The majority of the ranges and test areas were used for non-special forces training and/or testing, including:

- Munitions and bombing ranges
- Air-to-ground delivery ranges
- Rocket test ranges
- Drop areas
- Biochemical test complex
- Jungle warfare tests and training

B.4 Property Types – Hurlburt Field Areas Used for Special Air Warfare Center During Vietnam

In April 1962, General Curtis E. LeMay established the SAWC. The SAWC was established at Hurlburt Field (Home of the Air Commandos) because the field possessed the necessary environment for the assigned mission of the 4400th Combat Crew tra8ning Squadron. The area had jungle terrain, water, and available space for clandestine operations. Hurlburt also had workshops, flight line facilities, office space, housing, and other support facilities. The 1st Combat Application Group of the SAWC, was stationed at Eglin AFB because of the test

facilities at that installation. The 1st Air Commando Group underwent specialized training in flying, survival techniques, hand-to-hand combat and judo tactics, foreign languages and small arms qualifications, as well as participate in Strike Command exercises (O'Neill 1962).

Other bases were used for some specialized training. For example, survival techniques were conducted at Stead AFB, Nevada; jump school training was at Fort Benning, Georgia; escape and evasion was conducted at Fort Stewart, Georgia; USAF air ground operation school was at Keesler AFB, Mississippi; and low-level mountain terrain navigation was in the Boston Mountains near Little Rock, Arkansas. Flying, hand-to-hand combat and judo tactics, foreign languages, counterinsurgency, and small arms qualifications were taught on Hurlburt Field (O'Neill 1962).

Hurlburt Field had a new small arms range built in 1963. Flying training included hard and soft surface landing and take-offs, day and night take-offs and landings. Hurlburt Field had two runways; one 4,800 feet long and the other 9,600 feet long. In order to train bomber crews on landing on short deck aircraft carriers, a runway was marked off with the same width and distance of a carrier (O'Neill 1962). Night time training missions and demonstrations were conducted at Range 52 at Eglin AFB. Range 73 at Eglin AFB was used for day time training missions. The 1st Air Commando Group used other ranges at Eglin AFB as well (see above description under Eglin AFB) (O'Neill 1962).

Test Area C-52: continuously active, 1941 forward, with enhanced missions during the Vietnam War. Impact-bombing and special-projects range: The Air Proving Ground Center made major improvements to Test Area C-52, beginning in 1963. Missions on the range included air-to-ground delivery of napalm; live rockets; gunnery; air-to-ground anti-personnel munitions tests; static detonation of HE bombs; soft-field, combat aircraft landings; drop-zone practice; photo-reconnaissance tests; and firepower demonstrations.

Test Area A-73: reactivated in 1963. Air-to-ground munitions-delivery range: The Air Proving Ground Center reconfigured Test Area A-73 from its 1950s layout, for dedicated use by the 1st Air Commando Group.

B.5 Evaluation of Historic Properties

Some ranges and test areas may not be eligible due to lack of integrity. Abandonment and disrepair could result in lack of features, or changing the type of training could have resulted in the removal of important features, such as targets, bunkers, villages, or towers. The rice paddy in Range B-70 was determined ineligible for the NRHP due to lack of integrity (Weitze 2001). The Vietnamese fortification (including the 340 feet of underground tunnels) is considered eligible as a contributing component of a historic district within Range C-72. Building 8724: observation tower in Range C-52 was determine not eligible for the NRHP (Weitze, 2001). Building 8757: electrical power generator plant in Range C-62 was determine not eligible for the NRHP (Weitze, 2001).

Figure B-6: Tunnel Entrance for Vietnamese Training Tunnels Range C-72.

Buildings and structures built during the Vietnam time period (1962-1975) may be eligible for listing but not associated with Special Operations. For example, the Target Railroad Track at Test Area C-2A. Five features were determined to be contributing resources to the Target Railroad Track historic district for its association with the Vietnam and Cold War; however, it is not associated with Special Forces. (Van Citter 2008).

Prototype buildings (relocatable dormitories) and structures (aircraft shelters) would likely be eligible due to the significance of the program and uniqueness of the resource, as most would have been built over seas and therefore rare in the U.S.

Hundreds of buildings and structures were built and renovated at Eglin AFB and Hurlburt Field during the Vietnam War. They include housing, recreation and support, offices, shops, storage, laboratories, aircraft hangars, infrastructure, utilities, and hardscapes. Any of these buildings and structures could be associated with this or other Vietnam War contexts, or with the Cold War in general.

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APPENDIX C:

PRIMARY SPECIAL WARFARE TRAINING INSTALLATIONS AND THEIR OPERATIONS FORCES UNITS

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Special Operations Bases	Location	UNITS/Designations	Branch
Eglin AFB	FL	7th Special Forces Group	USA
Fort Bragg	NC	7th Special Forces Group	USA
Fort Bragg	NC	5th Special Forces Group (Airborne)	USA
Fort Bragg	NC	3rd Special Forces Group	USA
Fort Bragg	NC	1st Special Forces Group	USA
Fort Bragg	NC	5th Special Forces Group	USA
Fort Bragg	NC	403rd Radio Research Special Operations Detachment	USA
Fort Bragg	NC	Military Intelligence Detachments (unnumbered)	USA
Fort Bragg	NC	24th PSYOP Detachment	USA
Fort Bragg	NC	25th PSYOP Detachment	USA
Fort Bragg	NC	7th PSYOP Detachment	USA
Anderson AFB	Guam	19th Special Operations Squadron	USAF
Bakalar AFB	IN	71st Special Operations Squadron	USAF
Eglin AFB	FL	6th Special Operations Squadron	USAF
Eglin AFB	FL	4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron	USAF
Eglin AFB	FL	1st Air Commando Squadron	USAF
Eglin AFB	FL	20th Helicopter Squadron/20th Special Operations Squadron	USAF
England AFB	LA	319th Troop Carrier Squadron (Commando)	USAF
England AFB	LA	6th Air Commando Squadron/6th Special Operations Squadron	USAF
England AFB	LA	427th Special Operations Training Squadron	USAF
England AFB	LA	6th Special Operations Squadron	USAF
Grissom AFB	IN	71st Special Operations Squadron	USAF
Hurlburt Field	FL	319th Troop Carrier Squadron (Commando)	USAF
Lockbourne AFB	OH	18th Air Commando Squadron/18th Special Operations Squadron	USAF
Lockbourne AFB	OH	71st Special Operations Squadron	USAF
March AFB	CA	19th Special Operations Squadron	USAF
Pope AFB	NC	309th Air Commando Squadron	USAF

Special Operations Bases	Location	UNITS/Designations	Branch
Pope AFB	NC	318th Special Operations Squadron	USAF
Shaw AFB	SC	21st Helicopter Squadron/21st Special Operations Squadron	USAF
Stead AFB	NV	1st Air Commando Squadron	USAF
Camp Lejeune	NC	3rd Force Recon	USMC
Camp Pendleton	CA	1st Force Recon	USMC
Coronado Island	CA	Underwater Demolition Team 12	USN
Coronado Island	CA	SEAL Team 1	USN
Little Creek	VA	SEAL Team 2	USN
Naval Construction Battalion Center, Gulfport	MS	SEABEE STAT/SEABEE Team	USN
Naval Construction Battalion Center, Port Hueneme	CA	SEABEE STAT/SEABEE Team	USN

APPENDIX D:

CONTRIBUTORS

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Jayne Aaron, LEED AP Environmental Planner / Architectural Historian

Education

- Master of Environmental Policy and Management, University of Denver
- Bachelor of Environmental Design (Architecture and Planning), University of Colorado, Boulder

Summary

Ms. Aaron has over 20 years of hands-on experience as a project manager, architectural historian / cultural resources specialist, and NEPA specialist. Ms. Aaron meets the qualification of the Secretary of the Interior for Architectural Historian. She has been involved in all aspects of Section 106 compliance for cultural resources, including the evaluation of US Coast Guard vessels, campgrounds, civil works projects, numerous military installations, and other buildings and structures. She has also designed innovative strategies and management plans to integrate new and existing regulations, policies, and guidance, and cultural and natural resource management activities into single planning and compliance programs, including NEPA, Environmental Justice, and the National Historic Preservation Act, and Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990. As part of her compliance responsibilities, Ms. Aaron has participated in consultation and meetings with a variety of stakeholder groups, including state and federal regulators, Indian tribes, environmental consultants, and the public. She has written public releases, given presentations, responded to public comments, and facilitated meetings for various sized groups. She has also designed and developed training courses and has taught in numerous educational and training programs.

As an Architectural Historian and Cultural Resources Specialist, she has extensive experience evaluating a large variety of historic properties for many federal agencies, developing management plans and strategies, and, when necessary, completing mitigation strategies for historic buildings, structures, and districts. The following are just a few project examples to illustrate this experience:

Project Experience

Vietnam War: Helicopter Training and Use on US Military Installations Vietnam Historic Context Subtheme, Legacy 14-739. Ms. Aaron was the project manager and principal investigator to develop a historic context and typology for Vietnam War (1962–1975) helicopter-related resources on Department of Defense (DoD) installations in the United States. The report can be used to identify and evaluate Vietnam War helicopter-related facilities at DoD military installations in the United States. This report's historic context provides military cultural resources professionals with a common understanding for determining the historical significance of Vietnam War helicopter-related facilities, greatly increasing efficiency and cost-savings for this necessary effort.

Wake Atoll Hurricane Damage Assessment, Cultural Resources Inventory, and HABS Documentation for Air Force, Wake Island. Ms. Aaron was the project manager and principal investigator for the survey and evaluation of 128 buildings and structures for listing on the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP). Ms. Aaron also assessed 139 features that comprise the Wake Island National Historic Landmark for damage caused by Typhoon Ioke in 2006. Upon completion of the inventory, Ms. Aaron prepared the HABS documentation for the air terminal on Wake Island. The package included 123 black and white 4 x 5 photographs of the exterior, interior, and architectural details, and architectural drawings and a Level II report.

Project Manager / Principal Investigator. DoD Legacy Project. A National Historic Context for the Hush House (Test Cell) on Current Department of Defense (DoD) Installations Nationwide and Evaluation of a Representative Sample of Extant Hush Houses on DoD Installations. Ms. Aaron was the project manager and principal investigator for the development of a historic context, survey, and evaluation of a sample of ANG and other military branch hush houses. Ms. Aaron led a team of researchers to develop a context detailing the military development and use of the hush house at installations throughout the United States, spanning from WWII through the Cold War. The report provides an understanding of the evolution of test cell structures and technology from propeller testing rigs to jet engine development and maintenance. The context further examines different types of hush houses with attention being paid to technical demands, their spatial arrangement on the landscape, function, and other influences, such as fire considerations, military construction and design regulations, federal FAA regulations, aircraft changes with related maintenance practices, and requirements based on surrounding population density and "good neighbor" policies. The report includes examples of hush houses from all military branches, addressing similarities and differences based on service branch, function, and aircraft.

Principal Investigator. Determination of Eligibility and Determination of Affect for Building 2050, Fairchild Air Force Base, Spokane Washington. Ms. Aaron developed a Determination of Eligibility and Determination of Affect for a World War II-constructed hangar at Fairchild Air Force Base in support of an environmental assessment. The project was on a short time schedule and both the DOE and DOA were conducted simultaneously and presented in the same report. The entire process, including consultation with the SHPO and the Spokane County Historic Preservation Office, was completed in less than four months.

Project Manager / Principal Investigator. Cultural Resource Evaluations for the Air National Guard. Ms. Aaron was the Project Manager and Technical Lead for aboveground cultural resources on the development of four Air National Guard Base (ANGB) installations. The installations are Camp Perry ANG Station and its subinstallation Plumbrook ANG; Alpena ANGB and its subinstallation Grayling Weapons Range; Klamath Falls ANGB; and Des Moines ANGB. The team is identifying significant cultural resource properties and making recommendations on potential National Register of Historic Places eligibility, special protection requirements, and management requirements. Ms. Aaron evaluated over 275 buildings and structures at these four installations.

Project Manager, Case Study for Preserving a DoD Historic Building and Achieving LEED Certification for Renovation Project. Ms. Aaron was the project manager for a Legacy project to determine the feasibility of renovating a DoD historic building to achieve LEED certification and preserve the historic integrity of the building. The purpose of this feasibility study is to apply existing guidance and other studies and involve military and industry experts into an actual renovation scenario to determine whether preservation, sustainability, and energy conservation goals can be incorporated, and to understand the costs, benefits, and tradeoffs of doing so. The building is Indiana Army National Guard (INARNG), Indianapolis Stout Field Building 5. Building 5 was built in 1941 as a National Defense Project funded by the federal New Deal Works Projects Administration. The feasibility study and information provided as part of this project will be used by the INARNG in the design and construction phases of the renovation of Building 5.

Project Manager / Principal Investigator. Historic American Engineering Record (HAER) for the Northwest Field, Andersen Air Force Base, Guam. Ms. Aaron is managing, designing, and developing the HAER for the Northwest Field Complex at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, which is eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic Places. The final HAER documentation is mitigation for the proposed adverse effects to the field. The package will record five historic contexts, including large format photography and drawings to depict the critical role that the field played in World War II and the firebombing of Japan.

Historical and Architectural Overview of Aircraft Hangars of the Reserves and National Guard Installations from World War I through the Cold War, DoD Legacy Project. Ms. Aaron was the project manager for the development of a nationwide historical and architectural context for US Military Reserve and National Guard installations. The report provides a context for understanding the history and design of Reserve and National Guard hangars, an inventory of hangars, and methodology for applying the context to hangar evaluations.

Regional Cold War History for Military Installations, Including Air Force, Navy, and Army in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands, DoD Legacy Project. Ms. Aaron was the project manager for the development of a Regional Cold War Context for US military installations in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI). The report presents a framework for determining NRHP eligibility within the definitive context. This context focuses on the specific relevance of US military installations on Guam and CNMI, with emphasis on two primary events when the Cold War went “hot,” namely, the Korean and Vietnam Wars and the proximity of Guam and CNMI to these war fronts.

Steven Christopher Baker, PhD, Historian

Education

- Doctorate, History, University of Colorado, Boulder
- Master of Arts, New Mexico State University
- Bachelor of Arts, History, Texas Tech University

Summary

Dr. Baker has over 15 years of experience as a professional historian. His proficiency spans several sub-disciplines, including traditional historical research and analysis, cultural resource management, and litigation support.

Dr. Baker has conducted specialized studies of water and agriculture in the Southwest, especially as it relates to the construction of reclamation (dam) projects. Other projects he has worked on include studies of the Manhattan Project and Nuclear West, migrant railroad labor during World War II, and the role of the United States / Mexico border and the US military during the Mexican Revolution.

Dr. Baker has also undertaken a wide range of projects related to the identification and management of historic resources. He has conducted cultural resource management documentation and impacts assessments; evaluated historic buildings, districts, and structures; developed cultural resource management plans and mitigation; and designed innovative strategies to integrate new and existing regulations, policies, guidance, and resource management activities into single planning and compliance programs. Dr. Baker has performed these tasks on projects in 19 states for NASA, the Army National Guard, US Army Corps of Engineers, Department of Defense, the US Fish and Wildlife Service, National Park Service, United States Forest Service, United States Geological Survey, General Services Administration, Air National Guard, US Coast Guard, US Air Force, Colorado Springs Utilities, and Denver Housing Authority. Dr. Baker's projects include a national context study of National Guard and Reserve aircraft hangars and statewide contexts and evaluations of Cold War assets of the Georgia and Washington State Army National Guard Installations. He has also worked with the National Park Service to determine the national significance of potential NPS sites in Colorado and Texas. Dr. Baker has conducted National Register of Historic Places eligibility determinations for single buildings, boats, water conveyance structures, districts of over 200 buildings, administrative facilities, and other buildings and structures.

Dr. Baker also has experience providing expert witness services in litigation associated with federal cases relating various aspects of public lands management, rights of way (especially RS 2477 disputes), water rights, mineral management, navigability determinations, mining, and Indian policy. In this capacity, he advises attorneys on the historic aspects of the questions that the litigation encompasses.

Project Experience

Vietnam War: Helicopter Training and Use on US Military Installations Vietnam Historic Context Subtheme, Legacy 14-739. Dr. Baker was a contributing author to develop a historic context and typology for Vietnam War (1962–1975) helicopter-related resources on Department of Defense (DoD) installations in the United States. The report can be used to identify and evaluate Vietnam War helicopter-related facilities at DoD military installations in the United States. This report's historic context provides military cultural resources professionals with a common understanding for determining the historical significance of Vietnam War helicopter-related facilities, greatly increasing efficiency and cost-savings for this necessary effort.

Historical and Architectural Overview of Aircraft Hangars of the Reserves and National Guard Installations from World War I through the Cold War, Department of Defense Legacy Resource Management Program. Dr. Baker is a historian on the development of a national historic context for aircraft hangars serving the Army National Guard, Air National Guard, and Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Reserves. The project includes the development of a historic context related to the national guards and reserves, narrative of hangar and aircraft development over time, analysis of building forms, explanation of NRHP evaluation criteria, and a database of hangars that might fall under the context.

Historian, Cultural Resources Evaluations Redmond and Camp Murray, WA. Dr. Baker was the lead historian and conducted historic structures evaluations of buildings at Washington Army National Guard facilities at Camp Murray and in Redmond. The project involved record searches at the Washington State Historic Preservation Office and the Washington Army National Guard Headquarters. Thirty-three buildings were evaluated and recorded. Dr. Baker was also lead author of the Historic Structures Evaluation Report, which covered the results of the evaluations as historic properties and/or Cold War resources, photo-documentation, historic context, management recommendations, and applicable historic structure evaluation forms.

Cultural Resource Specialist and Project Manager, Integrated Cultural Resource Management Plan, New Jersey Army National Guard, NJ. Dr. Baker was the Cultural Resource Specialist and lead author on the integrated cultural resources management plan, which was developed using a newly developed integrated ICRMP template. The plan addressed all known cultural resources and inadvertent discoveries, including preservation, survey, and mitigation recommendations. This New Jersey project also included the development of a photographic database of character defining elements of the state's ten historic armories. This photo database was eventually expanded to include all potentially historic properties and objects and was integrated into the New Jersey National Guard's GIS database.

Historian, Integrated Cultural Resource Management Plan, Alaska Air National Guard, AK, and Integrated Cultural Resource Management Plan, Oklahoma Air National Guard, OK. Dr. Baker was responsible for the development of historic contexts for the management, conducted the historic structure evaluations and photo-documentation, and wrote pertinent portions of the management plans.

Historian, Cultural Resources Evaluations, Washington Army National Guard, WA. Dr. Baker was the lead historian in a project with a team of cultural resource specialists that conducted a historic structures evaluation of Washington Army National Guard facilities throughout the state. The project involved record searches at the Washington State Historic Preservation Office and the Washington Army National Guard Headquarters. Fifty-six buildings were evaluated and recorded. Mr. Baker was also the lead author of the Historic Structures Evaluation Report, which covered the results of the structure evaluations as historic properties and/or Cold War resources, photo-documentation, historic context, management recommendations, and applicable historic structure evaluation forms.

APPENDIX E:

ACRONYMS

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ACHP	Advisory Council on Historic Preservation
AFB	Air Force Base
AFMC	Air Force Materiel Command
ANG	Air National Guard
ARCS	Air Resupply and Communications Service
ARVN	Vietnamese Army Forces
AZ	Arizona
BUD/S	Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL
CA	California
CAP	Combined Action Platoon
CBC	Construction Battalion Center
CCTS	Combat Crew Training Squadron
CEIEA	Installation Management Division, Environmental Assets Section of the Environmental Branch
CERL	Construction Engineering Research Laboratories
CEG	Civil Engineer Group
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIDG	Civilian Irregular Defense Group
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CONARC	Continental Army Command
DCS/R	Deputy Chief of Staff, Requirements
DoD	Department of Defense
ERDC	Engineer Research and Development Center
GA	Georgia
HALO	High Altitude, Low Opening
JTD	Job Task Data
LA	Louisiana
LRRP	Long range reconnaissance patrolling
MA	Massachusetts
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAB	Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MAF	Marine Amphibious Force
MATA	Military Assistance Training Advisors
MCB	Marine Corps Base
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
MRF	Mobile River Force
NARA	National Archives and Records Administration
NC	North Carolina
NCDU	Naval Combat Demolition Unit
NCO	Non-commissioned officer

NHPA	National Historic Preservation Act of 1966
NV	Nevada
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
PBR	River Patrol Boat
PF	(Vietnamese) Popular Forces
POLWAR	Political Warfare
POW	Prisoner of War
PRU	Provincial Reconnaissance
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
PSYWAR	Psychological Warfare
PTF	Patrol Torpedo Fast
RI	Rhode Island
ROTC	Reserve Officer's Training Corps
RPA	Registered Professional Archeologist
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SAWC	Special Air Warfare Center
SC	South Carolina
SEAL	Sea, Air, and Land
SHPO	State Historic Preservation Office
SOS	Special Operations Squadron
SOW	Special Operations Wing
STAT	Seabee Technical Assistance Teams
TAC	Tactical Air Command
THPO	Tribal Historic Preservation Office
UDT	Underwater Demolition Teams
USACERL	U.S. Army Construction Engineering Research Laboratories
USAF	U.S. Air Force
USASOF	U.S. Air Force Special Operations Force
UW	Unconventional Warfare
VA	Virginia
VAL	Light Attack Squadron
VNAF	South Vietnamese Air Force